Problems of Communism

NOVEMBER-DECEMBER 1988



Soviet National Security Under Gorbachev
Bruce Parrott

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Thomas S. Szayna

The Aging of China's Population
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Agricultural Crisis in the PRC
Joseph Fewsmith

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Problems of Communism

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NOVEMBER-DECEMBER 1988 VOL XXXVII

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Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze tells the United Nations General Assembly on September 23, 1986, that a US-Soviet summit was a possibility despite the two countries' differences over arms control. Photo by John Chiasson/Gamma-Liaison.

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IN THIS ISSUE OF

Problems of Communism

Articles

Soviet National Security under Gorbachev

Bruce Parrott

Mikhail Gorbachev and his allies have changed the Soviet Union's national security agenda dramatically by insisting with increased specificity that in East-West relations Brezhnev's security policy had placed too much reliance on military power at the expense of political instruments. As the Politburo balance has shifted in Gorbachev's favor, Gorbachev first won acceptance of the principle of negotiated symmetrical cuts of Eastern and Western arms; then of negotiated but asymmetrical cuts; and, most recently, of Soviet unilateral cuts. In the pursuit of security by political means, Gorbachev has shown responsiveness to Western concerns about Soviet human-rights violations, an unprecedented willingness to accept on-site inspections of Soviet weapons installations, and a desire to open Soviet society to varied contacts with the outside world. His moves indicate that unlike past Soviet leaders, he intends to combine a cooperative policy toward the West with domestic liberalization, and that he is seeking a permanent transformation of the nature of East-West relations. Whether Gorbachev will succeed in this monumental undertaking is an open question; his policies have been resisted by significant groups in the party, military, and secret police apparatuses, which fear their repercussions on domestic stability.

Addressing "Blank Spots" in Polish-Soviet Relations

Thomas S. Szayna

In 1987, Polish and Soviet communist officials established a Joint Commission of Party Scholars from the People's Republic of Poland and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics for Issues in the History of Relations Between the Two Countries. The declared purpose of the commission is to clarify aspects of past relations between the USSR and Poland in order to establish better understanding between the peoples of the two countries. However, the party composition of the body and its modus operandi have created justifiable suspicions within Polish society that its purpose is to control and limit the open examination of past events. This is best seen in the continued disavowal of Soviet responsibility for the massacre of thousands of Polish officers in Katyn Forest in 1940.

(Abstracts continued on reverse side)

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The Aging of China's Population

Judith Banister

If the People's Republic of China successfully enforces its policy of one child per couple into the 21st century, by the year 2050 an unprecedented 40 percent of its population will be age 65 or older. Until the mid-1980's, however, Chinese officials failed to perceive that elderly dependence would ever be a problem in China in part because of the traditional family support system. More recently, the government has had to recognize that its attempts to control population growth through a one-child policy are leading inexorably to the dramatic aging of its population, and the care and support of the nation's future elderly has become a source of concern. Given the underdeveloped state of China's system of health and social services, the limited number of pension programs available to China's workers, and a weakened family support system due to low fertility and the effects of recent economic reforms, a major focus of the debate over the aging of the population has centered around issues of demographic policy. Increasingly the unpopular one-child policy has come under question, stimulating a lively debate.

Agricultural Crisis in the PRC

Joseph Fewsmith

The modernization program of Deng Xiaoping found its brightest successes in rural reform and growing rural prosperity. Nowhere was the rural success story more evident than in China's rapidly increasing grain production—an activity traditionally accorded the highest priority by the Communist leadership. Since the mid-1980's, however, the glow of this success story has dimmed as grain production has stagnated—opening a gap between grain supply and growing demand for this commodity. At the same time, the relative economic position of the Chinese peasantry has begun to decline. Chinese policy-makers are locked in debate about whether to restore state controls in the countryside, to muddle along with a mix of collectivization and private enterprise, or to go ahead with a full-fledged market system. It would be a great irony if the agricultural sector, once the flagship of the Dengist economic reforms, were to founder and give rise to a wave of reaction that would significantly alter the orientation of reform set by Deng.

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Soviet National Security Under Gorbachev

Bruce Parrott

When Mikhail Gorbachev was elected general secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, few Western observers anticipated major alterations in Soviet external policy; today, most believe that the changes since 1985 have been dramatic, and even spectacular. Gorbachev has elaborated a sweeping vision whose postulates about military power and security contradict the views of recent Soviet leaders. In superpower arms negotiations the USSR has agreed to drastic arms cuts and intrusive verification measures which have no precedent in past Soviet practice. Meanwhile, the party leadership, once apparently under the sway of the military high command, has downgraded the military's public role and encouraged a cadre of civilian defense analysts to propose radical revisions of inherited military policy. In addition, reformist party leaders have begun to reappraise the role of the Committee for State Security (KGB) and have subjected that once sacrosanct institution to public criticism. These changes have been accompanied by a whirlwind of daring foreign-policy innovations that Gorbachev's immediate predecessors could scarcely have imagined, let alone carried out.

The feverish pace and occasional inconsistency of the Soviet initiatives have spawned disagreements among Western analysts. Some view the proclamation of "new political thinking" as a fundamental shift in Soviet security policy, whereas others regard it primarily as a rhetorical exercise designed to lull the West.[1] Analysts also disagree over whether the recent foreign-policy changes are designed to be permanent or are temporary expedients to allow the regime to cope with domestic difficulties before returning to a more confrontational policy toward the West. Closely linked to this issue is the disputed question of whether the professional officer corps has supported or opposed Gorbachev's new approach to security and budgetary priorities.[2] Less often discussed but no less important is the attitude of the KGB. Have KGB views on security matters paralleled or diverged from the military perspective, and how has the relationship between the two hierarchies affected security decision-making? If Gorbachev is indeed pursuing policies that threaten the in-

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[1]Compare Raymond Garthoff, "New Thinking in Soviet Military Doctrine," *The Washington Quarterly* (Washington, DC), Summer 1988, pp. 131–58, with Gerhard Wettig, "'New Thinking' on Security and East-West Relations," *Problems of Communism* (Washington, DC), March-April 1988, pp. 1–14.

[2]Compare George G. Weickhardt, "The Military Consensus Behind Soviet Arms Control," *Arms Control Today* (Washington, DC), September 1987, pp. 20–24, and US Congress, Joint Economic Committee, *Allocation of Resources in the Soviet Union and China—1985*, Part II, Washington, DC, US Government Printing Office, 1986, pp. 50, 55, 91, with Jack Snyder, "The Gorbachev Revolution: A Waning of Soviet Expansionism?" *International Security* (Cambridge, MA), Winter 1987/88, pp. 93–131.

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terests of both the military and the KGB, has he amassed enough political power to avoid a fate like Nikita Khrushchev's in 1964?[3]

This article seeks to illuminate these issues through a chronological examination of the politics of Soviet security policy-making since 1985. "National security" is here taken to mean military, economic, and political protection against external threats. By this definition, Soviet national-security policy encompasses military programs, diplomatic initiatives, economic choices affecting the state's geopolitical position, and policy toward foreign economic and cultural contacts. Although broader than customary notions of national security, this definition has the advantage of clarifying the thrust of Gorbachev's policy innovations and political tactics.

Gorbachev and the Security Agenda

The dual-track policy and its critics. On becoming general secretary, Gorbachev inherited the dual-track approach to national security hammered out by Leonid Brezhnev at the start of the 1970's. This approach, which Brezhnev had introduced despite resistance from hard-liners opposed to détente with the West, had several features: a nearly reflexive conviction that the continuous expansion of Soviet military power would automatically enhance Soviet security; a belief that diplomatic negotiations, particularly arms-control negotiations, were a valuable complementary means of managing the competition with the United States; a vigorous determination to expand Soviet influence in the Third World; and a desire to draw on Western economic inputs while simultaneously insulating the Soviet domestic system from Western political and cultural influences. By the mid-1970's these policies had become part of a broad political consensus within the party and military elite.

During Brezhnev's final years, however, major international and domestic changes called the dual-track security approach into question. Several Western policies begun under President Jimmy Carter and reinforced under President Ronald Reagan—the new US military buildup, the refusal to ratify the SALT II agreement, and the decision to move toward deployment of American intermediate-range nuclear missiles (INF) in Europe—raised doubts about the security benefits of negotiating with the capitalist powers. The West's vigorous political reaction and economic sanctions against the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan also generated uncertainty about the stability of détente and the wisdom of drawing on Western grain and technology. Soviet difficulties were compounded by a sudden drop in Soviet economic growth and by the Polish explosion, which created the specter of political collapse not only elsewhere in Eastern Europe but possibly inside the USSR itself.

The main public challenge to the dual-track security approach came from the conservative wing of the elite, although soft-line officials and foreign-policy intellectuals apparently lobbied quietly behind the scenes.[4] Questioning the centrist balance between military and diplomatic security instruments struck by Brezhnev, these hard-liners asserted that détente had been permanently eclipsed by a growing American aggressiveness, and that this situation required a large increase in the Soviet defense budget.[5] In addition, they faulted Brezhnev's trade and economic policies for leaving the USSR vulnerable to Western embargoes on technology and grain.[6] Brezhnev, and later his successors Yuriy Andropov and Konstantin Chernenko, countered that détente was a long-term trend that could be revived by tenacious, iron-bottomed diplomacy and that a major increase in defense spending was therefore unnecessary. They also contended that a more militant international posture and higher defense spending would dangerously compound the social and economic problems accumulating at home.[7] An outcome of this acrimonious policy struggle was the 1983 decision to break

[3]Compare Jerry Hough, "Gorbachev Consolidating Power," *Problems of Communism*, July-August 1987, pp. 21–43, with Peter Reddaway, "Resisting Gorbachev," *The New York Review of Books*, Aug. 18, 1988, pp. 36–41.

[4]Scattered evidence indicates that soft-line criticisms were being made privately. Oleg Bogomolov, director of the Institute of the Economics of the World Socialist System within the USSR Academy of Sciences, recently revealed that in early 1980 his institute sent the party leadership a memorandum warning that the invasion of Afghanistan had weakened the USSR's geopolitical position and would prevent progress in controlling the arms race. See the weekly *Literaturnaya Gazeta* (Moscow), Mar. 16, 1988, trans. in Foreign Broadcast Information Service, *Daily Report: Soviet Union* (Washington, DC—hereafter *FBIS-SOV*), Mar. 15, 1988, p. 19. In addition, a major article published at a crucial juncture during Konstantin Chernenko's tenure focused on rejecting hard-line forecasts of intensified East-West political and military competition, but it also referred briefly to critics who advocated unilateral Soviet steps in disarmament to "set an example" for the West. See Yu. Molchanov in *Kommunist* (Moscow), No. 13, September 1984, pp. 109–10.

[5]Dan L. Strode and Rebecca V. Strode, "Diplomacy and Defense in Soviet National Security Policy," *International Security*, Fall 1983, pp. 91–116; and Bruce Parrott, "Soviet Policy Toward the United States: A Fork in the Road?" *SAIS Review* (Washington, DC), Winter-Spring 1985, pp. 110–15.

[6]Thomas N. Bjorkman and Thomas J. Zamostny, "Soviet Politics and Strategy Toward the West: Three Case Studies," *World Politics* (Princeton, NJ), January 1984, p. 196; Bruce Parrott, "Soviet Policy Toward the West: A Fork in the Road?" loc. cit.; and idem, "Soviet Foreign Policy, Internal Politics, and Trade with the West," in Bruce Parrott, Ed., *Trade, Technology, and Soviet-American Relations*, Bloomington, IN, Indiana University Press, 1985, pp. 46–55.

[7]Jeremy Azrael, *The Soviet Civilian Leadership and the Military High Command, 1976–1986*, R-3521-AF, Santa Monica, CA, Rand Corporation, 1987, pp. 19–21.

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off the superpower arms talks in retaliation for the INF deployments in Europe—a decision which was followed by intense infighting over whether to return to the bargaining table on US terms. While the controversy yielded no new national-security formula, it indicated that the elite consensus on the dual-track security strategy, like the elite consensus on domestic policy, was disintegrating.

Gorbachev's public statements before 1985 suggest that he came to power as a defender of the dual-track strategy. Despite the confrontational tone of Soviet-American relations and the charged atmosphere of the internal Soviet debate, his public comments reflected an optimistic belief that energetic diplomacy directed at American moderates and West Europeans was an effective means of managing the rivalry with the United States. Unusually sanguine about the stability of the strategic balance, Gorbachev played down the need for increased defense spending.[8] At the same time, he clearly signaled concern about the Soviet lag in industrial technology and advocated faster growth for the machine-building sector, thereby tacitly accepting the conservatives' criticism of the USSR's vulnerability to Western economic pressure.[9] Although this accent on machine-building may have been calculated partly to widen Gorbachev's political appeal beyond the agricultural sector in which he had previously specialized, subsequent events suggest that it reflected more than political expediency.

Gorbachev's view of the opportunities for protecting Soviet security by political means was far more optimistic than that of such Politburo members as Grigoriy Romanov, the party secretary responsible for overseeing the defense industry. During 1984, General Secretary Chernenko, deeply worried about the US Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), made two bids to drop the previous Soviet demand for American INF rollbacks as a precondition for renewing the superpower arms talks, but this effort was blocked by high-level resistance that included Romanov. The evidence strongly suggests that Gorbachev was one of the Politburo figures who backed Chernenko against Romanov and finally enabled the ailing party leader to initiate discussions with Washington about beginning a new cycle of arms talks.[10] Simultaneously, Chernenko succeeded in replacing Marshal Nikolay Ogarkov, the hard-line chief of the General Staff, with the more moderate Marshal Sergey Akhromeyev, thereby dealing a sharp blow to the political forces favoring a jump in defense spending.[11]

After succeeding Chernenko, Gorbachev pledged to continue the existing foreign-policy line and concentrated most of his attention on reshaping domestic policy. Championing economic revitalization and the reestablishment of internal discipline, he quickly stepped up Chernenko's desultory anti-corruption campaign and cracked down on lax labor practices. But Gorbachev also dropped a few hints that he envisioned changes in foreign policy as well. By calling for "civilized relations" with the West, he intimated that East and West had fundamental values in common.[12] It was necessary, he said, not simply to return to the détente of the 1970's but to achieve "much more"—namely, a comprehensive system of international security based on the recognition that the socialist and capitalist worlds both could benefit from cooperation and both be harmed by rivalry.[13] These statements may have reflected unreported deliberations that later led to dramatic changes in Soviet security policy.[14]

Gorbachev's early speeches underscored the dangerousness of current international trends but contended that vigorous political action could reverse those trends. He underscored the alleged desire of hostile American groups to obtain military superiority and promised to safeguard Soviet strategic parity as a reliable means of deterring Western attack.[15] At the same time, he singled out positive elements in the Reagan Administration's pronouncements and stressed the growing influence of the Western antiwar movement.[16] Noting the burden of the arms race for "all" countries, Gorbachev suggested that the current defense budget was adequate and emphasized the primacy of accelerated technological and economic development in as-

[8]See *Pravda* (Moscow), Apr. 23 and May 19, 1983.

[9]*Krasnaya Zvezda* (Moscow), Mar. 1, 1984.

[10]Bruce Parrott, *The Soviet Union and Ballistic Missile Defense*, Boulder, CO, Westview, 1987, pp. 55–56.

[11]Compare Ogarkov in *Krasnaya Zvezda*, May 9, 1984, with Akhromeyev in *Izvestiya* (Moscow), May 7, 1985.

[12]*Pravda*, Apr. 24, 1985; see also Mikhail Gorbachev, *Izbrannyye rechi i stat'i* (Selected Speeches and Articles), Moscow, Politizdat, 1987–88, Vol. II, p. 204.

[13]Mikhail Gorbachev, *Izbrannyye rechi i stat'i*, Vol. II, pp. 134, 205 (Apr. 7 and May 8, 1985); *Kommunist*, No. 13, September 1985, p. 18.

[14]Gorbachev later remarked (see *Izvestiya*, Feb. 26, 1986) that the April 1985 plenum had undertaken a new analysis of the threat of nuclear war. The plenum materials published at the time gave no indication of such a reassessment. However, Marshal Akhromeyev later indicated that the April plenum had initiated a two-year-long reevaluation of strategic doctrine by the Defense Council. See Raymond Garthoff, "Continuity and Change in Soviet Military Doctrine," in Bruce Parrott, Ed., *The Dynamics of Soviet Defense Policy* (forthcoming).

[15]*Pravda*, Apr. 24, 1985.

[16]Thus, in a move anticipating his discussions with President Reagan at Geneva a few months later, he singled out the "positive aspects" of the President's "very important" statement that nuclear war was unwinnable and the remark that the United States was not seeking military superiority. See *Kommunist*, No. 13, September 1985, p. 25; also Gorbachev, *Izbrannyye rechi i stat'i*, Vol. II, pp. 204–05.

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suring the USSR's survival as a superpower.[17] On the crucial matter of SDI, he remarked that the USSR would respond to a US deployment of space-based defenses by expanding its offensive forces, but he did not say that it would build similar defenses of its own.[18]

To buttress his security views, Gorbachev set forth his own reading of the history of Soviet foreign relations. Asserting that the East-West confrontation was a historical "anomaly," he rejected the historical analogy to the 1930's that Soviet conservatives have traditionally brought up to justify a hard-line foreign policy. Rather than draw confrontational lessons from the lack of Soviet military preparedness on the eve of World War II, Gorbachev alluded to a new assessment of the causes of the war and hinted that some of the responsibility for the war belonged to the USSR for following a political line that allowed Adolf Hitler to come to power in the first place.[19] Underscoring the experience of socialist-capitalist cooperation against fascism during the war, he voiced the hope that East and West could work against the new "common enemy," the threat of nuclear conflict.[20] Although this interpretation of the past provoked deep conflicts when Gorbachev later spelled it out, his wording in 1985 was oblique enough to elicit the support of centrist politicians and some centrist military commanders.[21]

Among the Politburo members who supported Gorbachev's security approach, one of the most important was Andrey Gromyko, the veteran diplomat and party elder statesman. During the final struggle over Chernenko's mantle, Gromyko evidently played a key role in shoring up the pro-Gorbachev coalition inside the party Central Committee and thus helped ensure Gorbachev's victory.[22] While nominating Gorbachev at the March 1985 Central Committee plenum, Gromyko went out of his way to present Gorbachev's foreign-policy credentials in terms that suggested he was trying to allay misgivings among party conservatives concerned about military security.[23] For Gromyko, the main virtue of Gorbachev's program was that it continued the dual-track approach Gromyko had helped Brezhnev to devise and to defend against hard-line criticism in the early 1980's.[24]

Gorbachev's line on security was also backed by several younger Politburo members, particularly those who were promoted in the months after he became general secretary. These included Georgian party chief Eduard Shevardnadze, Prime Minister Nikolay Ryzhkov, and party secretary Lev Zaykov.[25] One obvious reason for their support was that they were indebted to Gorbachev for giving their careers a sudden boost. As Gorbachev had undoubtedly anticipated, their rapid rise left some of these men with a comparatively small political clientele and made them more dependent on his patronage. But their support had other motives as well. In contrast to the Brezhnev generation, which had been decisively shaped by upheavals like the Great Terror and World War II, most of them had little experience with catastrophe and tended to be more receptive to innovative ideas about security.[26] Also, unlike the older Politburo veterans, they had no personal stake in defending the wisdom of the policy choices made in Brezhnev's time.

Nonetheless, not all the newly promoted members of the Politburo were enthusiastic about Gorbachev's security line. A few members, including some who vigorously supported his domestic policies, were cautious

[17]See, for instance, Gorbachev, *Izbrannyye rechi i stat'i*, Vol. II, p. 147 (Apr. 16, 1985); and *Kommunist*, No. 17, November 1985, p. 48.

[18]Gorbachev, *Izbrannyye rechi i stat'i*, Vol. II, p. 178.

[19]Ibid., Vol. II, pp. 136 and 180 (Apr. 7 and May 5, 1985); *Kommunist*, No. 8, May 1985, pp. 13–14. Gorbachev's broad wording suggests that he was referring to Stalin's disastrous orders for the German Communists to concentrate their political attacks on the German Social Democrats rather than on the Nazis—orders that greatly facilitated the Nazis' assumption of power in 1933. As shown below, this criticism of Stalin's early policy toward Germany was later spelled out by several Soviet exponents of foreign-policy reform. At the 27th CPSU Congress, Gorbachev warned against underestimating the danger of a further move to the right in contemporary capitalist politics. See *XXVII s"yezd Kommunisticheskoy Partii Sovetskogo Soyuza* (The 27th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union), Moscow, Politizdat, 1986, Vol. I, p. 3.

[20]*Kommunist*, No. 8, May 1985, p. 14.

[21]Chief of Staff Akhromeyev, for example, also stated that the 1930's were basically different from the current period and remarked that the party was doing "everything necessary" to prevent the West from achieving strategic superiority (*Izvestiya*, May 7, 1985). Compare the statements of Ogarkov cited below in fn. 37.

[22]On the dynamics of the succession, see Jerry Hough, *Russia and the West: Gorbachev and the Politics of Reform*, New York, Simon and Schuster, 1988, pp. 156–64. Yegor Ligachev later listed four leaders who had enabled Gorbachev to become general secretary; he also referred to the major contribution made by a group of regional party secretaries, most of whom doubtless belonged to the Central Committee. See *Pravda*, July 2, 1988.

[23]*Kommunist*, No. 5, March 1985, pp. 6–7; see also *Pravda*, May 25, 1985.

[24]On Gromyko's role in the early 1980's, see Parrott, "Soviet Policy Toward the United States: A Fork in the Road?" loc. cit, pp. 114–16.

[25]In April 1985, party secretary Nikolay Ryzhkov bypassed the customary stage of nonvoting membership in the Politburo and was promoted directly to voting membership; in September, he succeeded the retiring Nikolay Tikhonov as prime minister. Eduard Shevardnadze, previously a nonvoting member of the Politburo, was promoted to full membership in July 1985. Lev Zaykov assumed Grigoriy Romanov's party secretaryship in July 1985 and was promoted directly to voting membership in the Politburo in March 1986. For the new members' statements on foreign policy, see *Pravda*, Apr. 23 and Sept 13, 1985; and *Zarya Vostoka* (Tbilisi), May 4, 1985.

[26]For a useful exploration of generational differences on broad foreign policy values, see William Zimmerman and Deborah Yarsike, *Inter-Generational Change and Soviet Foreign Policy*, Working Paper No. 24, Soviet Interview Project, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, IL, July 1986.

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about his approach to security. Party secretary Yegor Ligachev had backed Gorbachev in the struggle over the Chernenko succession and was a determined advocate of the drive to instill social discipline and root out corruption. But his comments about foreign policy were rather noncommittal and gave the military budget slightly higher priority than Gorbachev assigned to it.[27] For somewhat different reasons, KGB chairman Viktor Chebrikov, another supporter of Gorbachev's candidacy, also adopted a cautious attitude toward the new leader's security policy. Chebrikov's early speeches dwelt on the theme of Western hostility toward the USSR and said little about the chances of improving relations with the West.[28]

Apparently Chebrikov's accent on Western hostility was intended to broaden the KGB's mandate rather than raise the military budget. Chebrikov had described the level of the Soviet military effort as quite adequate, and his warnings about the West underscored the threat of Western "provocations" rather than the danger of Western military attack.[29] Perhaps he was concerned about Gorbachev's hints that the USSR might seek a new and deeper East-West détente. At any rate, the draft of the revised party program unveiled in November 1985 evidently satisfied the KGB chief's desiderata. In contrast to the 1961 program, which did not mention the police in connection with national defense, the draft mentioned the role of the police organs and implied that their mission in combating imperialist political machinations was on a par with the Armed Forces' military mission.[30] Shortly afterward, Chebrikov completed the quid pro quo by delivering a major speech that lavishly praised the potential benefits of flexible diplomacy.[31]

These maneuvers indicated a deal struck by Gorbachev in order to maintain the KGB as a political counterweight to the Armed Forces and obtain stronger backing for his diplomatic initiatives. At the 27th CPSU Congress, which approved the new version of the party program, Gorbachev expressed appreciation for the "large work" the security organs were doing to counter an alleged increase in Western intelligence operations against the USSR, and Chebrikov was allowed to deliver a forceful justification of the KGB's security role.[32] Gorbachev's willingness to widen the charter of the security police contrasted with his rejection of military appeals that the draft party program be amended to expand the section on equipping and manning the Armed Forces.[33] Gorbachev's tactics were shaped partly by his political debt to Chebrikov for KGB help in the succession struggle, and perhaps also by a shortage of military support. But his tactics were also based on economic considerations. The KGB's charter could be expanded at relatively low cost, whereas full acceptance of the military's budgetary claims would eat into investment resources and economic growth.[34]

Gorbachev did need Chebrikov's support because some other Politburo members harbored serious doubts about the General Secretary's security approach. Ukrainian party chief Volodymyr Shcherbytskyi, claiming that adventurist tendencies were becoming stronger in Western policies, warned that the United States was seeking "*decisive* military superiority" over the USSR—a formulation used only by such advocates of stepped-up military spending as Marshal Nikolay Ogarkov.[35] Since Shcherbytskyi also voiced pessimism about the influence of the Western antiwar movement, it can be assumed that he favored a more vigorous Soviet military effort. Having visited the United States and West Germany in early 1985, he remarked that McCarthyite and neo-Nazi tendencies in the two countries "remind world society of similar processes that occurred in the states of the fascist coalition on the eve of the [Second World] War."[36] The parallel drawn by Shcherbytskyi, which was directly at odds with Gorbachev's outlook, was almost certainly intended to bolster a similar parallel drawn by the resilient Ogarkov, who renewed his demand for higher defense spending at this time.[37] Shcherbytskyi also seemed readier than

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[27]*Kommunist*, No. 12, August 1985, p. 21.

[28]Ibid., No. 9, June 1985, pp. 49–53.

[29]Ibid.; and *Pravda*, Feb. 7, 1985.

[30]See Amy W. Knight, *The KGB: Police and Politics in the Soviet Union*, Boston, Unwin Hyman, 1988, p. 99; and *Kommunist*, No. 16, November 1985, p. 35.

[31]*Pravda*, Nov. 7, 1985.

[32]*Izvestiya*, Feb. 26, 1986. This was the first time since 1961 that a KGB chief had addressed a party congress (see Knight, *The KGB: Police and Politics in the Soviet Union*, p. 99.

[33]Parrott, *The Soviet Union and Ballistic Missile Defense*, p. 49. In view of the later evolution of Gorbachev's policies toward the KGB, it is worth noting that the final revision of the program preserved the draft's new references to the role of the political police in protecting national security, but dropped the draft's explicit mention of imperialist "provocations" (*XXVII s"yezd*, Vol. 1, p. 595).

[34]Amy Knight, "The KGB and Civil-Military Relations," in Timothy R. Colton and Thane Gustafson, Eds., *Soldiers and the Soviet State* (forthcoming).

[35]*Pravda Ukrainy* (Kiev), May 8 and 22, 1985; *Pravda*, Mar. 8, 1985 (emphasis added).

[36]*Pravda Ukrainy*, May 8, 1985; see also the account of the Politburo meeting in *Izvestiya*, Apr. 12, 1985.

[37]N. A. Ogarkov, *Istoriya uchit bditel'nosti* (History Teaches Vigilance), Moscow, Voyenizdat, 1985, pp. 20, 24, 93. Shortly after his demotion in September 1984, Ogarkov was forced to recant many of his alarmist views (see *Kommunist Vooruzhennykh Sil* [Moscow], No. 21, 1984, pp. 22–25). In the spring of 1985, however, he published a new book. Although it was an amalgam of disparate elements, it set forth most of the alarmist points that Ogarkov had briefly retracted the previous fall. It was sent to the compositor in late February and signed for printing in early April. Ogarkov's views contrasted with the statements by Marshal Akhromeyev made about the same time (see fn 21).

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Gorbachev to threaten that the USSR would meet the further development of the SDI program with extensive missile defenses of its own.[38]

Romanov harbored views similar to Shcherbytskyi's. Having opposed Chernenko's decision to return to arms-control negotiations, Romanov continued to question the wisdom of making a vigorous bid for improved Soviet-American relations. Although he paid lip service to the notion, he remarked that the international situation was "extremely complicated and dangerous." In his view, the US had been seeking military superiority since the second half of the 1970's—that is, "practically already for a whole decade"—and only the Soviet Union and its allies had prevented nuclear war from breaking out.[39] Romanov's suggestion that the superpower détente of the 1970's had exerted only a fleeting influence on Western military programs seemed to reflect an underlying belief that détente, not confrontation, was the historical anomaly. By describing the renewal of superpower arms talks as a concession made by the United States as a result of unyielding Soviet pressure, Romanov intimated that increased Soviet military spending and hard-line diplomacy were required.

Defense Minister Sergey L. Sokolov shared some of the same attitudes. Although he echoed Gorbachev's statement that all East-West disputes could be resolved by peaceful means, Sokolov painted a grim picture of deepening US militarism. Implying that the Soviet Armed Forces did not currently have all they needed, he remarked that the "severe lessons" of World War II demanded great vigilance. "*The growing military threat from the US and its NATO allies requires [us] to strengthen the defense capacity of our Motherland and the combat might of the Soviet Armed Forces,*" Sokolov said emphatically.[40] There was also a noteworthy difference between Gorbachev's and Sokolov's descriptions of how the USSR would respond to continued development of SDI. Whereas Gorbachev avoided raising the possibility of deploying a Soviet space-based ballistic missile defense, Sokolov said that one side's deployment of an extensive ABM system would "inevitably" provoke a comprehensive response including not only a strategic offensive buildup but also the creation of a large-scale ABM defense.[41]



Marshal Sergey Sokolov, then USSR Minister of Defense, addresses the 27th CPSU Congress on March 1, 1986.

—TASS from Sovfoto.

Sokolov's dissatisfaction over the size of the defense budget was aggravated by the political slight he suffered at Gorbachev's hands. Following Dmitriy Ustinov's death in December 1984, Sokolov was selected to be the new Minister of Defense, but he was not made a Politburo member. In April 1985, a month after Gorbachev became general secretary, two of Gorbachev's political allies—Ryzhkov and Ligachev—vaulted to full Politburo membership without ever having been nonvoting members, and another backer, Chebrikov, was raised from nonvoting to voting membership. Sokolov, however, was made only a nonvoting Politburo member. Spotty evidence indicates that this slight may have been a response to some military support for Romanov's bid to become general secretary.[42] In any event,

[38]In March 1985, Shcherbytskyi told officials in the US that Moscow would respond to the further development of SDI with "both offensive and defensive" measures, a formula that hinted at the possible deployment of extensive Soviet ABM defenses. See *The Washington Post*, Mar. 8, 1985.

[39]*Leningradskaya Pravda* (Leningrad), Feb. 15, 1985. I am grateful to George Breslauer for calling this version of Romanov's speech to my attention.

[40]*Kommunist*, No. 6, April 1985, p. 67 (emphasis in the original.) The party, Sokolov remarked, "is working out and realizing . . . a complex of measures for supplying the army and navy with everything necessary" (p. 69). The implication was that the military would not have all it needed until these measures were fully implemented.

[41]*Pravda*, Nov. 6, 1985. This constituted a noticeable hardening of Sokolov's position on SDI (cf. *Krasnaya Zvezda*, May 5, 1985).

[42]The timing of Sokolov's selection does *not* demonstrate that he was intentionally excluded from the Politburo from December to March, because the Central Committee, which formally elects new Politburo members, did not meet between the time of Ustinov's death and Gorbachev's accession to power. Nevertheless, the absence of military representation in the Politburo probably favored Gorbachev and harmed Romanov, who was closely linked to the military establishment.

For a piece of esoteric communication implying military enthusiasm for Romanov in 1983, see V. Yershov in *Voyenno-istoricheskiy Zhurnal* (Moscow), No. 1, 1983; for an esoteric effort to discourage military involvement in the succession process at the end of 1984, see *Kommunist Vooruzhennykh Sil*, No. 24, 1984, pp. 19–23.

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the outcome gave the other principal state organizations concerned with national-security policy—the Foreign Ministry and the KGB—a stronger voice in top-level deliberations than the Ministry of Defense enjoyed. Sokolov's displeasure is indicated by the fact that in several major speeches in 1985 he never mentioned Gorbachev's name. His first public reference to the new general secretary came almost six months after Gorbachev assumed power.

Economic acceleration and the defense budget. Another point of friction between Sokolov and Gorbachev was the issue of guns versus growth. Gorbachev voiced profound concern about the USSR's future security but highlighted the economic rather than the strictly military aspects of the danger. While promising not to let the United States obtain strategic superiority, he asserted that the future of the Soviet system and of world socialism hinged on accelerated economic development, and he remarked that added increments of military power did not necessarily increase the state's security.[43] Overriding priority, he asserted, must be given to modernizing the machine-building, computer, and other high-technology industries.[44] Although this strong emphasis on industrial modernization offered potential military benefits in the long term, it also created a strong temptation to divert resources from current military programs to industrial research and investment.[45]

Gorbachev initially handled this troublesome budgetary issue through artful political footwork. By asserting repeatedly that the USSR should be able to meet its own high-technology requirements, he clearly distinguished his economic program from Brezhnev's and appealed to conservatives alarmed by the USSR's increased economic reliance on the West. Moreover, despite his firm rejection of analogies between the interwar and contemporary geopolitical situations, on one occasion Gorbachev did compare his campaign for faster economic growth with the breakneck industrialization drive launched in the 1930's. This statement, however, was a gambit to weaken Romanov's support among national-security conservatives rather than a genuine commitment to a new surge of military spending.[46] Apparently it succeeded; two months later, Romanov was ousted from the Politburo.

With Romanov out of the way, Gorbachev took a firmer line toward the budgetary demands of the Armed Forces. In mid-July 1985, he met in Minsk with the military high command. According to informal accounts of his speech, he announced stringent limits on the growth of military expenditures and also called for some changes of military personnel.[47] The fact that this speech has never been published indicates that its contents were unusually sensitive, and indirect evidence suggests that it caused discomfort in the military leadership.[48]

Partly because Gorbachev's drive for industrial modernization threatened other expensive budget items, it provoked a struggle in in the course of which several of Gorbachev's civilian opponents stressed the continuity between current economic policies and those of the Brezhnev era, and the Gorbachev camp advocated a "Leninist" leadership style of policy innovation.[49] Although some military intellectuals and officers were ready to accept short-term military sacrifices for the sake of long-term military effectiveness, Sokolov and other key commanders emphasized the need for the steady expansion of Soviet military power and clearly distrusted promoting industrial modernization at the expense of the current defense effort. In May 1985, when the party *aktiv* of the Ministry of Defense met to discuss the results of the April plenum at which Gorbachev had laid out his plans for industrial modernization, Sokolov reported on the plenum without mentioning Gorbachev's address. Instead, he stressed the continuity between the April plenum and the policies adopted before

[43]*Pravda*, Apr. 24, 1985; Parrott, *The Soviet Union and Ballistic Missile Defense*, Chap. 5.

[44]Gorbachev, *Izbrannyye rechi i stat'i*, Vol. II, p. 147 (Apr. 16, 1985); and *Kommunist*, No. 17, November 1985, p. 48.

[45]Jan Vanous and Bryan Roberts, "Time to Choose Between Tanks and Tractors: Why Gorbachev Must Come to the Negotiating Table or Face a Collapse of His Ambitious Modernization Program," *PlanEcon Report* (Washington, DC), Vol. II, Nos. 25-26, 1986, pp. 1–16.

[46]Gorbachev made the statement in Leningrad, a major defense industrial center in which Romanov had built a strong political machine before moving to Moscow as the national party secretary for defense production. In the speech, Gorbachev refrained from mentioning Stalin or any need to expand the Armed Forces. See *Izbrannyye rechi i stat'i*, Vol. II, p. 214.

[47]Dale Herspring, "The Soviet Military in the Aftermath of the 27th Party Congress," *Orbis* (Philadelphia), Summer 1986, p. 311; and Malvin Helgesen, "Civil-Military Relations under Gorbachev," in Bruce Parrott, Ed., *The Dynamics of Soviet Defense Policy* (forthcoming). This interpretation is consistent with the treatment of the speech by Col. Gen. A. Lizichev, the new Main Political Directorate chief installed after Gorbachev's assumption of power. Lizichev bracketed the Minsk speech with two previous national military meetings, in 1982 and 1984, at which the main theme had been the containment of military spending and the justification of this line to restive officers. See *Kommunist*, No. 3, February 1986, p. 97; also *Pravda Ukrainy*, July 17, 1985.

[48]For instance, an account of the December 1985 meeting of the General Staff's party *aktiv* implied that Marshal Akhromeyev and other officers were uneasy with the line taken by Gorbachev in the Minsk speech. See *Krasnaya Zvezda*, Dec. 31, 1985.

[49]During Gorbachev's first six months in power, he and such backers as Shevardnadze emphasized the current leadership's sharp break with previous party policy. See *Pravda*, Apr. 24, 1985; and *Zarya Vostoka*, May 21, 1985. More conservative figures such as Dinmukhamed Kunayev, Viktor Grishin, and Shcherbytskyi stressed the continuity between current policy and that established under Brezhnev. See *Pravda*, Mar. 14, June 12, and Dec. 22, 1985, also *Pravda Ukrainy*, May 8 and 22, 1985.

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Gorbachev became general secretary.[50] In other words, he sided with the civilian politicians who were trying to restrict Gorbachev's growing power and slow the momentum of his drive for economic revitalization.[51] During 1986, Sokolov again pressed for fuller attention to military needs than Gorbachev was prepared to give.

Diplomacy, summits, and security. During his first three months as general secretary, Gorbachev implied that the USSR might again break off the superpower arms talks if the United States were not more forthcoming. In the summer, however, he gained greater control over foreign policy and discarded this theme in favor of conciliatory gestures toward the West. In the same shake-up that removed Romanov from the Politburo, Gorbachev managed to shift Gromyko to the chairmanship of the Supreme Soviet and installed Shevardnadze, an exceptionally close political ally, as foreign minister.[52] Although he initially avoided major personnel changes at the foreign ministry in order not to offend Gromyko and Gromyko's Central Committee allies,[53] Gorbachev announced a forthcoming summit with President Reagan and declared a unilateral nuclear-test moratorium that he urged the United States to emulate. Shrewdly gauging the tendency of many recent Soviet military theorists to downgrade the role of nuclear weapons in favor of high-technology conventional arms, Gorbachev replaced Marshal Vladimir Tolubko, a veteran rocket specialist who most likely opposed reductions in the Soviet missile arsenal, with a new Strategic Rocket Forces chief more amenable to the dramatic nuclear cuts that Gorbachev now offered to negotiate.[54] At the Geneva summit, Gorbachev hinted that the INF question, previously linked by the USSR to SDI, might be resolved separately, and he agreed to hold two further summits with President Reagan in 1986 and 1987.[55] Together, these steps marked a distinct shift in diplomatic tactics.

Senior party leaders, however, differed over the wisdom of this shift, particularly in view of the fact that the Geneva summit produced few concrete results.[56] Remarking that the Soviet side had not had "the smallest illusions" about American intentions on the eve of the summit, Gorbachev asserted optimistically that the final joint communiqué was significant because it entailed a recognition that nuclear war was unwinnable, along with a pledge not to seek military superiority. The communiqué was not a formal agreement, he acknowledged, but it nevertheless expressed "a fundamental stance of the leaders of both countries obligating [them] to a great deal." Although serious differences continued to separate the two sides, the differences could be resolved and should not be exaggerated. "Even the smallest chance" to curb the arms race through negotiations should not be lost; "inactivity or slowness in actions" would be "criminal."[57] Obviously, Gorbachev regarded the summit as part of an urgent political struggle against US military programs, especially SDI, and he appeared to be trying to persuade other leaders that the summit had been as successful as he claimed.

Led by Shevardnadze, several Politburo members embraced Gorbachev's arguments. Highlighting the Warsaw Pact members' "exceptionally high evaluation" of Gorbachev's skill at Geneva, Shevardnadze hailed the meeting as "an event of enormous international signficance."[58] Perhaps the strongest endorsement came from Ryzhkov, who said that the summit strengthened confidence in the large potential of active diplomacy. The achievements should not be underestimated, and the final communiqué contained "obligations of fundamental importance."[59] Another Politburo member, Geydar Aliyev, likewise emphasized the significance of the final communiqué and called the sum-

[50]The April plenum, Sokolov said, "confirmed with all persuasiveness the continuity of the strategic course developed by the 26th Party Congress"—that is, under Brezhnev—"and by the subsequent plenums of the CPSU Central Committee" (*Krasnaya Zvezda,* May 25, 1985). Compare this with Gen. Aleksey Yepishev's more favorable treatment of the April plenum's decisions at the same meeting. Sokolov's negative attitude was also reflected in his attachment to the Brezhnevian slogan of "developed socialism," which was a major point of contention between Gorbachev and members of the party's old guard. Only days before Gorbachev told the 27th Party Congress that the concept had become a fig leaf for socioeconomic stagnation, Sokolov referred to it approvingly (see *Pravda,* Feb. 23, 1986).

[51]See also Dale Herspring, "On Perestroyka: Gorbachev, Yazov, and the Military," *Problems of Communism,* July-August 1987, p. 101.

[52]Shortly after Gorbachev became general secretary, Shevardnadze hailed him as head of the Politburo (*Zarya Vostoka,* May 21, 1985); to my knowledge he was the first Politburo member to confer this status on the new leader. For Shevardnadze's attitude toward East-West relations, see *Pravda,* July 31, 1985.

[53]Jerry Hough, *Russia and the West,* p. 169.

[54]Marshal Tolubko, who had presided over the large buildup of the Strategic Rocket Forces (SRF), was clearly seeking to preserve preeminent status for his service within the military establishment. His replacement, Gen. Yu. P. Maksimov, was a Ground Forces officer with no previous experience in the SRF. In September, Soviet negotiators in Geneva proposed 50 percent reductions in US and Soviet strategic warheads. See Malvin M. Helgesen, loc. cit.; and Rose Gottemoeller, "Conflict and Consensus in the Armed Forces," in Bruce Parrott, Ed., *The Dynamics of Soviet Defense Policy.*

[55]*The New York Times,* Feb. 6, 1986.

[56]This paragraph is based on Parrott, *The Soviet Union and Ballistic Missile Defense.*

[57]*Kommunist,* No. 17, November 1985, pp. 17, 35–43, 45.

[58]*Pravda,* Dec. 7, 1985.

[59]*Izvestiya,* Dec. 4, 1985; *Sovetskaya Belorussiya* (Minsk), Dec. 15, 1985.

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mit "a very major event of international life."[60]

Gromyko's much more restrained description of the Geneva communiqué as a matter of "importance" apparently signified the onset of tensions with Gorbachev.[61] After the summit, Gorbachev intimated that he was dissatisfied with the objectivity of reports from Soviet diplomats abroad and hinted that these reports might adversely affect the formulation of Soviet policy.[62] Most of the diplomats had been appointed when Gromyko was foreign minister, and Gorbachev may have been complaining about their reporting on the impact abroad of the Geneva summit. A month later, on the eve of his definitive statement delinking INF from SDI—an issue the Soviet side had treated ambiguously since the summit—Gorbachev observed that a Soviet policy based on ultimatums would allow other governments to hide behind the uncompromising Soviet stance and deceive their peoples about their real intentions.[63] By contrast, Gromyko remarked that the restoration of détente had always been the aim of Soviet policy, "including before Geneva, at the Soviet-American summit, and after Geneva."[64] Gromyko's accent on continuity seemed to downgrade the significance of the Geneva meeting and implicitly to justify the handling of foreign policy when he had been foreign minister. Although Gromyko's position on delinking INF from SDI remains unclear, these exchanges suggest that he and Gorbachev were sparring over whether a more flexible diplomatic strategy, including the commitment to hold two more summits, would improve superpower relations. Ligachev's endorsement of the summit also seemed half-hearted.[65]

In comparison, Shcherbytskyi was an outright skeptic.[66] Although he hailed the joint communiqué's statements on nuclear war, he passed over the mutual pledge not to seek military superiority. In a riposte to Gorbachev, he warned against "needless illusions" about the benefits of the summit. Even before the meeting, he asserted, it had been clear that the Reagan Administration intended to continue to pursue military superiority, and recent White House statements demonstrated that superiority remained the administration's goal. At present, possibilities for reaching a superpower understanding on "fundamental questions," particularly SDI and the SALT II agreement, "do not exist," according to Shcherbytskyi.[67] In his view, the US commitment to SDI doomed the world to many years of an arms race and undermined the very basis for limiting or reducing the number of weapons.[68]

The contrast with Gorbachev's words could not have been more pronounced. Gorbachev had forthrightly acknowledged that the superpowers were at odds over SDI, but he and Reagan had agreed that there was a real prospect of reducing strategic nuclear arms and INF contingents. By suggesting that agreements on strategic nuclear forces and on INF, which presumably qualified as another "fundamental question," were impossible, Shcherbytskyi appeared to oppose any move to decouple SDI from agreements on offensive nuclear weapons. Skeptical responses from Chief of the General Staff Akhromeyev and some military commentators indicated that a significant group of professional officers agreed with this view of the summit's results.[69]

Revamping Soviet Diplomacy

This tugging foreshadowed the adoption by Gorbachev of a more daring security policy. In January 1986, he unveiled a sweeping proposal for phased arms reductions and the elimination of nuclear weapons by the year 2000, and at the 27th Party Congress in February he declared that the growing interdependence of the world required a radical improvement of East-West relations. A new level of East-West cooperation was attainable, he asserted, and a rapid transition to constructive action was necessary.[70] Seeking to forestall conservative objections, Gorbachev maintained that this approach did not require the Soviet Union to renounce its principles or ideals.

Although Gorbachev voiced deep apprehension about trends in the East-West military competition, he departed from customary Soviet statements of alarm by identifying political accommodation rather than the expansion of military power as the solution to the problem. With SDI uppermost in his mind, Gorbachev asserted that even the strongest state could no longer protect itself solely by military-technical means; security was in-

[60] *Izvestiya*, Dec. 4, 1985.
[61] *Pravda*, Dec. 11 and 17, 1985.
[62] Gorbachev, *Izbrannyye rechi i stat'i*, Vol. III, p. 121 (Dec. 27, 1985).
[63] Ibid., Vol. III, p. 167 (Feb. 4, 1986).
[64] *Izvestiya*, Jan. 31, 1986.
[65] As one of Gorbachev's most forceful allies in the struggle against Brezhnevite holdovers inside the party, Ligachev presumably had an incentive to express and possibly overstate any favorable attitudes about the Geneva meeting. Seen in this light, his laconic description of the meeting as a "major political event" suggests he was not enthusiastic about the results. See *Bakinskiy Rabochiy* (Baku), Dec. 22, 1985.
[66] This paragraph is based on Parrott, *The Soviet Union and Ballistic Missile Defense*.
[67] *Izvestiya*, Nov. 28, 1985; *Pravda Ukrainy*, Dec. 22, 1985. Compare with Gorbachev, *Izbrannyye rechi i stat'i*, Vol. III, p. 119 (Dec. 27, 1985).
[68] *Pravda Ukrainy*, Dec. 22, 1985.
[69] *Izvestiya*, Nov. 23, 1985; *Krasnaya Zvezda*, Nov. 24, 1985.
[70] *Izvestiya*, Feb. 26, 1986.

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creasingly becoming a task that could be solved only by political means. Emphasizing the unpredictability of conflict situations and the increasing encroachment of automated weapons systems on politicians' ability to control events during a crisis, Gorbachev raised the specter of military logic escaping political control and bringing on accidental nuclear war.[71]

In keeping with this picture, Gorbachev expressed skepticism about the utility of military power. A year earlier, he had praised the Soviet achievement of parity and described it as an effective means for deterring Western attack. Now he asserted that in future stages of the arms race, even if superpower parity were maintained, the Soviet policy of deterrence might not prevent a nuclear war.[72] His new pronouncements signalled the public emergence of a liberal critique of the dual-track security strategy that had been formulated under Brezhnev.

The essence of this critique was that the Brezhnev leadership had placed too much stress on military instruments—not too little, as hard-line critics maintained—and had failed to gain the security benefits available through flexible diplomacy and compromise. At the party congress, Gorbachev gave his first unmistakable signal of displeasure with recent Soviet foreign policy, and shortly afterward he spelled out his criticisms in a speech at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs that was not published until the following year. Gorbachev invoked the "Leninist" style of leadership to justify changes in the security policy inherited from Brezhnev and Gromyko. Observing that continuity in foreign policy had nothing in common with mechanical repetition of past practice, he argued that new approaches were needed to avoid confrontation and reach mutually acceptable compromises. Toward this end, he advocated that future Soviet policy aim not to provoke other countries' "fears, even if imaginary, for their security."[73] This statement, obviously at odds with Gromyko's recent stress on continuity in foreign policy, constituted a striking reversal of the traditional Soviet refusal to acknowledge that Soviet military programs might provoke legitimate apprehensions in other countries. It also heralded a far-reaching personnel shakeup at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.[74]

Consistent with this new perspective, Gorbachev argued that Soviet diplomacy must play a larger role in assuring security, in part because there were serious limits on the amount of military power the country could amass. In a move foreshadowing new diplomatic overtures toward China as well as new concessions to the United States, he denounced the idea of some Soviet strategists that the USSR should be as strong militarily as any potential coalition of antagonistic powers.[75] Declaring that the USSR's military goal was "reasonable sufficiency," Gorbachev argued that any delay in engaging the West in active negotiations would be a mistake. Much, he granted, hinged on the ability of Western leaders to make sober judgments about the current state of global affairs. But in any case, the USSR would not hold back or slam the door on negotiations, as Western reactionary circles desired; instead it would press for dialogue and agreements.[76]

During the following months of fencing between Washington and Moscow over the timing of a new summit, Gorbachev reiterated this theme and sought to counter unnamed Soviet officials who apparently wished to stretch out the arms-control talks and wait for the next US administration. His most specific public rebuttal of this attitude came 10 days before writing President Reagan to propose a meeting at Reykjavik in October 1986.[77] While he assured "many of our people" that the USSR would not allow itself to be surprised by an American break-out in ballistic missile defense, he also argued that the recent upturn in Soviet-American relations was due to improved Soviet economic performance—and not, by implication, to Soviet military programs.[78] Evidently some advocates of larger defense budgets believed that a new summit, rather than yielding beneficial advances in arms control, would merely help the Reagan Administration reinforce its domestic support for the US military buildup.

Widening the diplomatic agenda. Gorbachev strove to minimize this possibility by unveiling a new four-part

[71]*Ibid.*

[72]Gorbachev manifestly had in mind both the Soviet and Western variants of deterrence. Security, he said, could not be built forever on the doctrines of deterrence (*sderzhivaniye*) and intimidation (*ustrasheniye*). Soviet commentators have customarily used the word "*sderzhivaniye*" to describe Soviet nuclear doctrine. They have reserved the pejorative "*ustrasheniye*" to stigmatize Western nuclear doctrine.

[73]*Izvestiya*, Feb. 26, 1986.

[74]Between January and August 1986, seven of the eight deputy foreign ministers who had served under Gromyko were replaced (see Hough, "Gorbachev Consolidating Power," loc. cit.). In addition to Gorbachev, three recently appointed party secretaries attended the meeting at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs: Anatoliy Dobrynin, head of the International Department; Aleksandr Yakovlev, overseer of the Propaganda Department; and Vadim Medvedev, head of the Department for Liaison with Communist and Workers' Parties of Socialist Countries.

[75]*Vestnik Ministerstva Inostrannykh Del SSSR* (Moscow), No. 15, 1988, p. 36. Unpublished for two years, this statement paved the way for the Soviet decision to drop the demand that an INF accord take into account British and French as well as American nuclear forces.

[76]*Izvestiya*, Feb. 26, 1986; *XXVII s"yezd KPSS*, Vol. II, p. 301.

[77]Gorbachev, *Izbrannyye rechi i stat'i*, Vol. III, pp. 284–85, 489 (Mar. 6 and July 14, 1986); *Pravda*, Sept. 9, 1986.

[78]Gorbachev, *Izbrannyye rechi i stat'i*, Vol. III, pp. 356, 376; and *Vestnik Ministerstva Inostrannykh Del SSSR*, No. 1, 1987, pp. 4–6, trans. in *FBIS-SOV*, Sept. 2, 1987, p. 23.

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security agenda that included not only arms control and economic cooperation with the West but cooperation in political and "humanitarian" matters as well.[79] In negotiations, Gorbachev said in his remarks at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Soviet representatives must avoid a "senseless stubbornness" that led to impasses and created the image of "Mr. Nyet" for the USSR. Instead of being passive or defensive when the West raises human-rights issues, Soviet diplomats should engage the West in an open dialogue that stresses Soviet accomplishments in the human-rights area, Gorbachev said.[80]

Gorbachev also implicitly downgraded the importance of the Third World and hinted at a less supportive policy toward Third-World revolutions and commitments. At the party congress, he limited himself to a rather perfunctory pledge of "solidarity" with national-liberation movements and the observation that capitalism had succeeded in keeping many liberated countries in a position of economic dependency. He also sounded a new note by calling the war in Afghanistan a "bleeding wound."[81] While he repeated his predecessors' assurance that the USSR would not "export revolution," he omitted the usual accompanying promise that the USSR would struggle against the "export of counterrevolution" by the West, and he cited Lenin's condemnation of left-wing communists who tried to "push" foreign revolutions.[82] Subsequently, he implied that the aggregate economic burden of Soviet Third-World commitments ought to be reduced.[83]

Gorbachev's view of the relationship between diplomacy and military power was vigorously backed by Shevardnadze, who called for "a decisive renunciation of outdated . . . doctrines" and remarked pointedly that Soviet foreign policy had not yet tapped important reserves of diplomatic dynamism and scholarly expertise. This attitude evidently provoked private objections from Gromyko and his clients in the diplomatic apparatus, since Shevardnadze made a special effort to counter the charge that any defects in the foreign-affairs bureaucracy were of his own making.[84] In ambiguous comments potentially relevant to Soviet as well as Western military doctrine, Shevardnadze condemned the belief that nuclear weapons were necessary to deter a foreign attack. Hailing the beneficial effects of foreign-policy *glasnost'*, he attached special significance to Gorbachev's recent declaration calling for phased arms reductions and the elimination of nuclear weapons by the year 2000.[85] The declaration, said Shevardnadze, was "an event of truly global significance," which "has already attained the character of a material force" and put the United States on the diplomatic defensive. Such new Politburo figures as Boris Yel'tsin, who had displaced the antagonistic Viktor Grishin as Moscow party boss in December 1985, likewise argued that failure to press ahead with the diplomatic campaign would "border on crime."[86]

The most thorough exposition of the need to revise security policy came from Anatoliy Dobrynin. Two months before Gorbachev's speech at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Dobrynin was recalled from his ambassadorial post in Washington and installed as the Central Committee secretary overseeing East-West relations. Shortly after the speech Dobrynin—who played a key role in the shakeup of the diplomatic corps—published a path-breaking call for a new approach to national security.[87] Soviet passivity in the face of negative international trends was unacceptable, said Dobrynin in a jab at the advocates of stand-pat or hard-line diplomacy. Instead, the USSR must respond with unprecedentedly active diplomacy involving a qualitatively higher level of flexibility and make "reasonable compromises."[88] Flexible diplomacy would put the US on the defensive and create virtually irresistible political pressures that would lead to advantageous arms agreements.[89] The Soviet Union, Dobrynin assured the skeptics, would not let itself be outwitted in the maneuvering over another summit meeting, nor would it allow the United States to achieve military superiority while

[79] *XXVII s"yezd KPSS*, Vol. I, pp. 97–99.

[80] *Vestnik Ministerstva Inostrannykh Del SSSR*, No. 1, 1987, pp. 4–6. Although Gorbachev addressed the Foreign Ministry officials soon after the 27th CPSU Congress, his remarks were not published until over a year later. His speech at a major conference of KGB officials held shortly after the foreign-ministry conference has still not been published. See Viktor Yassman in *Radio Liberty Research Bulletin*, RL 382/88, Aug. 29, 1988.

[81] *XXVII s"yezd KPSS*, Vol I, p. 92.

[82] *Izvestiya*, Feb. 26, 1986; Francis Fukuyama, "Gorbachev and the Third World," *Foreign Affairs* (New York), Spring 1986, p. 716.

[83] *Vestnik Ministerstva Inostrannykh Del SSSR*, No. 1, 1987, p. 5.

[84] *XXVII s"yezd KPSS*, Vol. I, p. 416.

[85] "It would seem that everything is perfectly clear and simple: nuclear weaponry is a terrible, immoral and unnatural thing. However, one has only to call for its complete elimination, and at once 'lawyers' appear who give it out as nearly a universal good. Today they are trying anew to prove that such weaponry is allegedly necessary as a factor of mutual deterrence, that allegedly there is no doing without it." In addition to the elimination of nuclear weapons, Shevardnadze advocated the simultaneous implementation of "stabilizing reductions of conventional weapons." See ibid., Vol. I, pp. 412–13.

[86] Another new nonvoting member of the Politburo, Nikolay Slyun'kov, took a similar position. See *Izvestiya*, Sept. 26, 1986; *Pravda*, May 4, 1986.

[87] *Kommunist*, No. 9, June 1986, pp. 18–32.

[88] *Kazakhstanskaya Pravda* (Alma-Ata), May 21, 1986; *Kommunist*, No. 9, June 1986, pp. 24–25.

[89] The Western antiwar movements, Dobrynin asserted, had, perhaps for the first time in history, become a powerful force of independent importance, and some opportunities to strengthen the political influence of Western workers were not yet being utilized or even recognized. See *Kazakhstanskaya Pravda*, May 20 and 21, 1986; *Kommunist*, No. 9, June 1986, pp. 24–25, and No. 16, November 1986, pp. 23–24.

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engaging in negotiations.

Dobrynin clearly thought that the accumulation of Soviet military power was part of the problem rather than part of the solution. In explaining how general war had been avoided in recent decades, he sharply downgraded the role of Soviet military might and highlighted the contribution of Soviet diplomacy, along with the growing influence of reasonable political groups abroad.[90] Looking to the future, Dobrynin, unlike Soviet conservatives, did not focus on the danger of a premeditated Western attack. Instead, he suggested that the current military balance was vulnerable to accidental war and that further advances in military technology would make it more so. In the long term, nuclear deterrence could not prevent general war. Scholars and politicians, said Dobrynin in a slap at military men, had long understood that improved weapons serve merely to make war more terrible, not to avoid it, and nuclear weapons should not be justified on the grounds that they reduced the chances of conventional conflict. Dobrynin also indicated that any future Soviet military response to SDI would probably not be in space.[91]

To spur rethinking of security policy, Dobrynin pushed hard for the creation of new centers of military expertise staffed by civilians. He praised the recent emergence of a "contemporary Soviet school of foreign-policy and military-political research" but noted that many new problems still required scholarly investigation. Dobrynin then listed a series of military-technical topics to which Soviet military theorists and planners had devoted years of careful professional study.[92] At no point, however, did he refer to any of the military academies and institutes engaged in analyzing these topics. Instead, he singled out the Scientific Council on Peace and Disarmament and the institutes of the Academy of Sciences as the loci of promising new research.[93] The same interest in increasing the role of civilian experts in the formulation of military policy was shown by Aleksandr Yakovlev—himself a former director of one of the Academy's foreign-affairs institutes—after he became a full member of the Politburo.[94]

Dobrynin's glaring omission of any reference to military specialists signaled an attempt to reduce the professional authority of the officer corps in favor of civilian defense specialists. Shortly after being appointed to the Secretariat, Dobrynin organized a military affairs section within the Central Committee's International Department. A small arms-control section was also set up under Yakovlev's Propaganda Department. At about the same time, a research department doing classified work on military and security issues was set up inside the Academy's Institute of the World Economy and International Relations, the think-tank that Yakovlev had once headed.[95] Some of the staff members of these new units were retired officers or military men seconded from regular military assignments. As a rule, however, their views have tended to fall outside the mainstream of conventional military thought, and they have generally functioned as allies of civilian experts working to recast security policy.

Dobrynin's desire to improve relations with the United States led him to endorse the unilateral test moratorium and to advocate a less venturesome Third-World policy.[96] But perhaps most striking was his explicit and positive recognition of the linkage between superpower arms control and human rights. The human rights issue, he granted Soviet conservatives, must be removed from the realm of Western political manipulation (*spekulyatsiya*). To do this, however, it was necessary not simply to rebut Western propaganda but to handle the problem constructively. In his view, cooperation in the "humanitarian" field was possible without compromising socialist principles. Civilized international relations, Dobrynin said, involved not just interstate ties, but a broadening of contacts between people and organizations.[97]

[90]During the nuclear era, Dobrynin said, the US had repeatedly tried to use nuclear weapons as an instrument of military-political blackmail. "And if a nuclear war nevertheless did not break out during the four postwar decades, that is not at all thanks to the 'deterrent' (*sderzhivayushchey*) force of nuclear weaponry. In part, the reason of politicians played a role, and in still larger measure, the efforts of the USSR and other peace-loving states and the rise of the mass antiwar movement." *Kommunist*, No. 9, June 1986, p. 20.

[91]Ibid.

[92]These included the interaction between offensive and defensive armaments, as well as between nuclear and conventional weapons, the definition of "reasonable sufficiency" in nuclear arsenals, the mathematical modeling of strategic stability, and the verification of arms-control agreements. Ibid., pp. 26–28.

[93]Ibid., pp. 19, 27–28. The Scientific Council was a civilian body set up immediately after the signing of the SALT II treaty as an umbrella for research on foreign-policy and security matters (see Bjorkman and Zamostny, loc. cit., pp. 204–05). Dobrynin's article was originally delivered as the keynote address at a meeting of scientists organized by the Committee of Soviet Scientists in Defense of Peace, Against the Nuclear Threat. Chaired by Academician Yevgeniy P. Velikhov, this group was set up in 1983 primarily to lobby Western scientists against SDI, but it gradually became involved in deliberations on Soviet military policy, including the deliberations that preceded the Soviet declaration of a unilateral nuclear test moratorium in 1985. See *Vestnik Akademii Nauk SSSR* (Moscow), No. 12, 1986, pp. 3–84; Parrott, "Political Change and Civil-Military Relations"; and Jeffrey Checkel "Gorbachev's 'New Political Thinking' and the Formation of Soviet Foreign Policy," in Radio Free Europe-Radio Liberty, *Radio Liberty Research* (Munich) RL 429/88, Sept. 23, 1988, p. 4.

[94]*FBIS-SOV*, Mar. 16, 1987, p. G/12; A. Yakovlev in *Kommunist*, No. 8, May 1987, p. 18.

[95]Personal communication from Professor Seweryn Bialer, April 1987; *The New York Times*, May 31, 1987; and Jack Snyder, loc. cit., p. 116.

[96]*Kommunist*, No. 9, June 1986, pp. 25, 30.

[97]Ibid., pp. 29–30; *Pravda*, May 28, 1986; and *Kazakhstanskaya Pravda*, May 21, 1986.

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Dobrynin's critique of security policy under Brezhnev implicitly challenged the three main state bureaucracies implementing that policy. Apart from censuring the lack of imaginative diplomacy at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Gromyko's time, Dobrynin was asserting that military power, embodied in the Ministry of Defense, had contributed less to Soviet security than previously supposed. He was also suggesting that the handling of human-rights issues by the KGB had obstructed the achievement of the regime's security goals. When the Politburo discussed the Ministry of Foreign Affairs conference at which Gorbachev had called for a more flexible external policy, the published account of the discussion stated that the tasks posed at the conference must guide the activities of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and all the other institutions involved in implementing Soviet foreign policy. The performance of these institutions, it added, required "a steady improvement."[98] Although the Ministry of Defense and the KGB were not named, the statement constituted a tacit criticism of their past conduct.

Several Politburo centrists accepted the need for diplomatic engagement with the West but distrusted Gorbachev's tendency to make dramatic concessions in order to sway Western opinion. Gromyko, for example, continued to advocate arms control and supported summit diplomacy. But the veteran diplomat, who was obviously the target of Gorbachev's barbed remarks about "Mr. Nyet," seemed reluctant to soften the Soviet position on the Middle East and other regional conflicts in order to improve relations with the United States.[99] Gromyko was plainly unreceptive to Gorbachev's idea that the West needed political reassurance about Soviet strategic intentions. Instead, he continued to treat Western expressions of fear about Soviet strategic aims as propaganda calculated to put the USSR on the political defensive.[100] Moreover, he resisted the notion of a more open diplomatic style that might reveal internal policy disagreements and involve making open concessions to the West on human rights.[101]

KGB chairman Chebrikov, though he backed Gorbachev's comprehensive disarmament plan, shared Gromyko's distrust of conciliatory diplomatic and human-rights initiatives. He treated Western expressions of apprehension about Soviet military programs as a myth that Western propagandists knew to be untrue.[102] Along with some military men, the KGB chief seemed wary of the more forthcoming arms-verification approach that Gorbachev apparently initiated at Geneva, and he feared the sort of society-to-society contacts Gorbachev had endorsed there.[103] Shortly before the Geneva meeting, Chebrikov asserted that the USSR's political appeal abroad was growing despite Western harping on the issue of human rights. At the party congress he underscored the purported efforts of Western intelligence services to obtain a wide range of Soviet state secrets and stressed the intelligentsia's susceptibility to ideological subversion and espionage.[104] Chebrikov was obviously striving to preserve the KGB's control over contacts with the outside world, and his hostility toward *glasnost'* indicates that he opposed more open decision-making on security matters.[105]

If such "swing votes" as Gromyko and Chebrikov questioned Gorbachev's diplomatic tactics but still hoped for substantial benefits from superpower arms talks, such hard-liners as Shcherbytskyi harbored serious reservations about the talks themselves. Although Gorbachev had already gone on record as favoring a separate INF agreement, his highly-publicized January 1986 declaration outlining a plan for phased arms reductions was ambiguous on the question of INF-SDI

[98] *Izvestiya*, June 6, 1986.

[99] For example, where Gromyko had affirmed the necessity for the creation of a Palestinian state, Dobrynin omitted this idea. Compare Gromyko in *Pravda*, Mar. 12 and May 25, 1985, with Dobrynin in *Kazakhstanskaya Pravda*, May 20, 1986.

[100] At the 27th CPSU Congress, Gromyko hailed Gorbachev's January declaration on arms control. At the same time, he warned, as he had in March 1985, that the West was seeking to exploit any internal division within the Soviet leadership. By branding Westerners worried about the Soviet military threat as the knowing perpetrators of "a crude deception," Gromyko implicitly dismissed Gorbachev's suggestion that such views might be genuine concerns requiring Soviet concessions. See *XXVII s"yezd KPSS*, Vol. I, pp. 191–92.

[101] Ibid., pp. 191–92, 196–97.

[102] For example, Chebrikov approvingly quoted Lenin's attack on Westerners who raise the specter of "red militarism," "make a face as if they believe this stupid stuff," and contrive false arguments to deceive the masses. See *Pravda*, Nov. 7, 1985.

[103] According to one Soviet source, during the Geneva summit Gorbachev privately informed Soviet arms control experts that the Soviet position on verification must be altered because of its negative impact in the West. See Ye. Primakov in *Pravda*, Jan. 8, 1988, as cited in Jeffrey Checkel, loc. cit., p. 2. A few months later, Deputy Defense Minister Vitaliy Shabanov warned against the danger of espionage through most kinds of on-site inspection. See *Izvestiya*, Mar. 24, 1988, cited in Helgesen, loc. cit.

[104] Chebrikov also remarked that Western efforts to interfere in Soviet human rights cases would be rebuffed "in the most decisive fashion." *Pravda*, Oct 1, 1985. His accent on the intelligentsia's vulnerability to foreign subversion contrasted sharply with the positive picture painted at the party congress by P. N. Demichev, the minister of culture and a candidate member of the Politburo. See *XXVII s"yezd KPSS*, Vol. I, pp. 346–48, 389.

[105] Chebrikov's general view of *glasnost'* was, to put it mildly, distinctive. "We have built up valuable experience in drawing the toilers into guaranteeing the protection of state and military secrets [and] into the struggle against ideological diversions. . . . The principle of *glasnost'* is also being realized in keeping with the specific nature of Chekist [police] work, and the population is being more widely informed about the probes of the class enemy. . . . Practice shows that the better informed the toilers are about questions of state security, the more consciously and actively they become involved in the cause of guaranteeing it. . . ." *Kommunist*, No. 9, June 1985, p. 51.

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linkage.[106] Three days after the declaration, Shcherbytskyi described it as offering a phased program for the liquidation of nuclear weapons by the year 2000 "on the condition of the prohibition of the creation, testing, and deployment of space-strike weapons."[107] Although accurate in a sense, this description of the declaration differed from the terms used by other leaders, who did not mention SDI in their references to it.[108] Moreover, when Shcherbytskyi mentioned the January declaration at the party congress in February, he remarked only that Soviet citizens could not fail to feel "bitterness and disappointment" at the unforthcoming US response, which was in essence blocking an opportunity for agreement.[109]

In addition, Shcherbytskyi implicitly placed the requirements of the military budget above investments in economic growth. Whereas Gorbachev was touting the geopolitical significance of faster economic development and maintaining that the recent improvement in growth rates was responsible for the upturn in Soviet-American relations, Shcherbytskyi remarked that the realization of Soviet internal tasks depended on the international situation, which remained sharp and complex.[110] In other words, Soviet security demanded that the defense budget receive higher priority than the growth of the economy.

Marshal Sokolov must have welcomed Shcherbytskyi's accent on military needs. It is true that on several occasions in late 1985 and early 1986 Sokolov endorsed the adequacy of the resources going to defense.[111] In mid-1986, however, pressures built up over the finalization of the 12th Five-Year Plan, and some members of the leadership began to highlight the party's demand that the defense industries produce more consumer goods and services.[112] Probably in response to such pressures, Sokolov asserted that the West was seeking "decisive" military superiority. Echoing the assertive military participants in the debate over the treatment of the military in the draft of the revised party program, he claimed that the final version called for "the balanced, dynamic development of all the elements of the combat potential of the Soviet Armed Forces."[113] This claim, which was inaccurate, exaggerated the party's programmatic commitment to military growth.[114]

Moreover, Sokolov stoutly resisted the efforts of Gorbachev, and particularly of Dobrynin, to downgrade the role of military power in ensuring Soviet security. The Armed Forces, he said, "are a real factor deterring the aggressive strivings of imperialist reaction." The avoidance of general war in the recent past had been due above all to Soviet military and economic might and to the inevitability of Soviet retaliation against an attacker.[115] Nor did Sokolov share the belief that the USSR's international image needed refurbishing to aid Soviet arms-control diplomacy. Instead, he flatly asserted that the country's international political appeal had increased as a consequence of World War II and was continuing to grow.[116]

The moratorium and Reykjavik. The Soviet unilateral moratorium on nuclear tests was a touchstone for elite opinion about the wisdom of making conciliatory gestures in an effort to elicit Western reciprocity. During the spring of 1986, delays in renewing the moratorium suggested that the leadership was divided over this step.[117] Continued delay deprived Soviet diplomacy of propaganda gains that could have been reaped by renewing the moratorium on the anniversary of the bombing of Hiroshima in August, and party liberals indicated that the latest renewal had provoked internal controversy, particularly within the military establishment.[118] But military resistance alone probably could not have delayed the decision. Most likely, the party leaders' disagreements about the effect of unilateral

[106]Parrott, *The Soviet Union and Ballistic Missile Defense*, pp. 62–63.

[107]*Pravda Ukrainy*, Jan. 18, 1986.

[108]By any reading, the declaration required limits on SDI before strategic weapons could be reduced. It was, however, ambiguous about INF reductions, which were part of the "phased" reductions also mentioned by Shcherbytskyi.

[109]*XXVII s"yezd KPSS*, Vol. I, p. 136.

[110]*Pravda Ukrainy*, July 12, 1986.

[111]In an article on the eve of the party congress, Sokolov remarked that the Armed Forces accepted the task of protecting Soviet security on the basis of "the most rational utilization of all that the country gives them," and he said at three separate points that the military had "everything" or "everything necessary" for its mission. The article's unusual repetitiousness on the resource-allocation question raises the possibility that it was a command performance written at the behest of Gorbachev and like minds in the civilian leadership. See *Pravda*, Feb. 23, 1986; cf. ibid., Nov. 8, 1985.

[112]This point was made gently by Ryzhkov and vigorously by Zaykov. See *Pravda*, June 19 and 29, and Aug. 9, 1986.

[113]Ibid., May 9, 1986.

[114]Ibid. Earlier, at the 27th CPSU Congress, Sokolov was more accurate. The revised program, he said, pledged that national defense capacity would be comprehensively improved and that everything would be done to prevent imperialism from attaining military superiority. This statement was less assertive than Sokolov's later stress on the "dynamic development" of the Armed Forces' combat potential—a phrase in fact not mentioned in the revised program (see *XXVII s"yezd KPSS*, Vol. I, pp. 453, 595–96).

[115]*Pravda*, Feb. 23, 1986; *XXVII s"yezd KPSS*, Vol I, p. 454. Sokolov also called the strategic nuclear forces the "foundation" of the Armed Forces' might.

[116]*Pravda*, Nov. 8, 1985, and May 9, 1986.

[117]Parrott, *The Soviet Union and Ballistic Missile Defense*, pp. 64–65.

[118]Aleksandr Bovin, quoted in Bohdan Nahaylo, "The Soviet Military and the Kremlin's Moratorium on Nuclear Tests," *Radio Liberty Research*, RL 381/86, Oct. 15, 1986, p. 3; Dobrynin in *Kommunist*, No. 9, June 1986, p. 25. The beginning of the moratorium in 1985 was timed to coincide with the anniversary of the Hiroshima attack.

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gestures on Soviet security caused them to differ over extending the moratorium.

The Reykjavik summit in October 1986 offered a particularly good indication of leadership attitudes toward security policy. At the meeting, the Soviet side made major concessions to US demands on INF and strategic forces. But in the end the meeting foundered on the US refusal to limit SDI, and the Soviet side reversed its previous offer to conclude a separate agreement on INF. The meeting's failure to produce an agreement, which resulted in recriminations between the Soviet and American sides, raised questions about the prospects for reaching arms accords in the future.

In his press conference at the end of the summit, Gorbachev optimistically emphasized that the two delegations had come close to a comprehensive agreement and that this marked great progress. Striking an unusual note, he remarked that the potential for arms-control agreements could be actualized in the future if in Washington "and in our leadership we once more think everything over and manifest responsibility."[119] A few days later, Gorbachev commented that "there was not enough new political thinking" at Reykjavik. Although the context did not make clear whether he was referring to an American or a Soviet shortage of new thinking, his earlier remark about the Soviet leadership suggests that he felt that there had been shortcomings on the Soviet side.[120] Circumstantial evidence suggests that Chief of Staff Akhromeyev, who played a central role at the meeting, may have objected to some of Gorbachev's sweeping proposals for eliminating nuclear missiles.[121]

Shortly after Reykjavik, Gorbachev took his own approach to security one step further. Lenin, said the General Secretary, had expressed a "thought of colossal profundity—about the priority of the interests of social development and common human values over the interests of this or that class. Today, in the nuclear-missile era, the significance of this thought is sensed with special sharpness."[122] In other words, the Soviet pursuit of an international line based on "class conflict" and the alleged interests of the working class alone should be moderated for the sake of more important common human values. The main value Gorbachev seemed to have in mind was human survival in the face of potential nuclear war, but the slogan "common human values" later came to symbolize the need for East-West cooperation across a wide spectrum of issues.

A number of Soviet leaders commented favorably on the Reykjavik meeting. Gromyko's remarks were positive.[123] Aliyev, although increasingly cool to Gorbachev's domestic initiatives, also endorsed the meeting and said it showed that agreements on fundamental questions are "certainly possible."[124] Predictably, Dobrynin enthused about the summit's inhibiting impact on US nuclear weapons programs and SDI.[125] Most optimistically, Prime Minister Ryzhkov said that Reykjavik had moved nuclear negotiations into a "qualitatively new stage" and showed a real possibility of reaching mutual understanding on fundamental questions.[126]

Shcherbytskyi predictably took a far more pessimistic view. He agreed that Reykjavik had created a "qualitatively new situation." On the other hand, he refrained from stating that Reykjavik showed that arms-control agreements were still possible. Instead, he highlighted the US decision to "bury" the 1972 ABM Treaty and the SALT II agreement, calling this "a blow to the structure of fundamental agreements in the area of strategic-arms limitations that was created in the course of 15 years," and he approvingly mentioned the Soviet government's declaration on this matter.[127] In sum, Shcherbytskyi seemed no more positively disposed toward the results of the Reykjavik meeting than he had been toward the Geneva summit a year earlier.

Marshal Sokolov was more laconic but even less positive than Shcherbytskyi. Reykjavik, he said, showed that the US administration still hoped to achieve military superiority, which necessitated a constant improvement of the Soviet Armed Forces' combat capacity. According to Sokolov, the US commitment to SDI had scuttled the possibilities of an agreement in Iceland.[128] Sokolov did not echo the theme that the meeting marked a new stage in the struggle for peace or that it was a stepping-stone toward future arms-control agreements. Given the other signs of tension between Gorbachev and Sokolov, it is fair to conclude that the Marshal felt that the meeting had been a setback for Soviet external policy.

Within the spectrum of leadership opinion toward Gorbachev's security policy during 1986, Ligachev moved from qualified support to qualified criticism. At the beginning of the year, Ligachev gave hints of impatience at Gorbachev's accent on unilateral Soviet re-

[119] *Pravda*, Oct. 14, 1986.
[120] *Kommunist*, No. 16, November 1986, p. 13.
[121] Parrott, *The Soviet Union and Ballistic Missile Defense*, pp. 68–69.
[122] *Kommunist*, No. 16, November 1986, p. 12.
[123] *Izvestiya*, Nov. 14, 1986.
[124] Ibid., Nov. 15, 1986.
[125] *Pravda*, Nov. 20, 1986.
[126] Ibid., Oct. 21, Nov. 21, and Dec. 6, 1986.
[127] *Pravda Ukrainy*, Dec. 9, 1986.
[128] *Krasnaya Zvezda*, Nov. 7, 1986; *FBIS-SOV*, Jan. 21, 1987, p. AA/2.

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straint.[129] Nevertheless, he emphasized the significance of the mutual no-superiority pledge at the Geneva summit and said firmly that Gorbachev's January declaration would exert a beneficial, long-term influence on international affairs. Ligachev also spoke of the "tremendous means that are now being squandered" on the arms race.[130] Endorsing the benefits of flexible diplomacy, he remarked that the USSR had gained new allies and now held the initiative in the international arena.[131]

But Ligachev disagreed with Gorbachev's assessment of Reykjavik. Three days after Gorbachev emphasized the progress made at the meeting, Ligachev described it as "a failure" (*neudacha*).[132] In an apparent reply, Gorbachev observed that a great deal of progress had been made at Reykjavik and that "this is not a failure [*proval*] or a hopeless matter."[133] Exactly how these divergent evaluations were linked to the internal controversy over the Soviet offers at Reykjavik remains uncertain. Perhaps Ligachev, swayed by the arguments of Shcherbytskyi or other conservatives, balked when a real choice had to be made on Gorbachev's proposal to sign an INF agreement in the absence of new curbs on SDI. At any rate, Ligachev now came out in favor of the acceleration of Soviet military research and development. Reykjavik had shown that the US favored the creation of new weapons of mass destruction, he said. "Therefore it is now more important than ever before to strengthen the role of scientists in defending peace and strengthening the country's defense capacity."[134] A few weeks later, Ligachev was more positive toward Reykjavik, but his statements still contained a trace of skepticism, suggesting that the lessons he drew from the event were more pessimistic than Gorbachev's.[135] Just as he seemed increasingly wary of the General Secretary's shift toward a more liberal position on domestic economic and political reform, Ligachev seemed more critical of Gorbachev's security policy as well.

Security, Credibility, Liberalization

Since the beginning of 1987, Gorbachev has pushed harder to upgrade the relative importance of political factors in the Soviet security calculus. This attitude is exemplified by his decisions once again to decouple INF from SDI, to conclude an INF treaty involving asymmetrical Soviet reductions, and to announce a unilateral plan for reducing Soviet military manpower by 500,000 men. On a bureaucratic level, Gorbachev has focused elite attention on the political elements of security by giving a green light to unorthodox civilian defense theorists and stepping up the pressure for a reform of the Armed Forces that encompasses military doctrine as well as organization. He has also encroached on some traditional KGB prerogatives, particularly the blanketing in secrecy of Soviet institutions and decision-making, in order to satisfy the unprecedented verification requirements of the INF and prospective START agreements. Perhaps most significantly, he and his supporters have tried to institutionalize the new security approach by promoting a drastic revision of the traditional assessment of the Western military threat and by proposing reforms that would allow the domestic public to influence the broad contours of security policy.

These steps have been complemented by redoubled efforts to allay Western fears of the USSR. In addition to offering new concessions on arms cuts and verification, Gorbachev has sought to recast the traditional relationship between Soviet domestic politics and external policy. His predecessors tended instinctively to link the pursuit of external security with internal regimentation. In contrast, Gorbachev is attempting to moderate Western military behavior by capitalizing on the dramatic new program of internal political liberalization that he first unveiled before the Central Committee in January 1987. In revising security policy, he has drawn increasingly on the intellectual class for point men and political allies.[136] This tactic, designed to overcome conservative resistance at home, is also intended to reshape Western opinion by appealing to for-

[129]Compare Gorbachev, *Izbrannyye rechi i stat'i*, Vol. III, p. 136, with Ligachev in *Izvestiya*, Jan. 22, 1986.

[130]*Izvestiya*, Jan. 22, 1986; *FBIS-SOV*, Feb. 6, 1986, pp. K/3–4.

[131]*FBIS-SOV*, June 20, 1986, p. R/13; and *Kommunist*, No. 15, October 1986, pp. 10–11.

[132]*Pravda*, Oct. 14, 1986; *Vestnik Akademii Nauk SSSR*, No. 11, 1986, p. 14. Ligachev used this word when denouncing US attempts to put the blame for Reykjavik on the USSR, but he did not challenge the accuracy of the term.

[133]*Kommunist*, No. 16, November 1986, p. 13.

[134]*Pravda*, Oct. 17, 1986. Ligachev's comment was reported quite differently in the *Vestnik* of the Academy, where a substantial contingent of members was becoming eager to curb the growth of military R & D. The Academy account quoted Ligachev as advocating vigorous efforts by Soviet scholars to enlist their foreign colleagues in the peace struggle—a theme that was omitted from the *Pravda* summary. Moreover, the *Vestnik* quoted Ligachev as expressing confidence that Soviet scientists would do everything necessary to strengthen Soviet defense; the idea of increasing the contribution of scientists to the military effort was omitted (see *Vestnik Akademii Nauk SSSR*, No. 11, 1986, pp. 9–15). In other words, the *Vestnik* gloss pointed toward a continued emphasis on energetic diplomacy and high-level intellectual contacts; the *Pravda* summary pointed toward a greater accent on Soviet military programs.

[135]*Pravda*, Nov. 7 and 14, 1986.

[136]Gorbachev, *Izbrannyye rechi i stat'i*, Vol. III, p. 416; *Kommunist*, No. 16, November 1986, p. 14.

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eign intellectuals and opinion-makers. It is graphically symbolized by Gorbachev's decision to end Andrey Sakharov's six-year banishment, to invite the eminent dissenter to address the international Moscow Forum in February 1987, and, most recently, to allow him to travel to the United States.[137]

Security and military power. One indication of the evolution of Gorbachev's policy is his pledge that the USSR will not seek more security for itself than the United States has because this would make the United States feel insecure and thus violate political stability.[138] By emphasizing that strategic stability has a vital political as well as a military component, Gorbachev implicitly gave political relations with the United States a significant role—at least in theory—in determining Soviet military requirements.[139] Previously Gorbachev had confined his criticism of deterrence theory to warnings that in the future the policy of deterrence might lead to war. In the fall of 1987, however, he denied the past contribution of nuclear deterrence to Soviet security and implied that such a policy endangers the country. "Many people," he said, still sincerely believe in the efficacy of nuclear deterrence. In actuality, the possibility of catastrophic technical or human error has risen with the number of weapons, their complexity, and the duration of their deployment. Together these factors constitute "an enormous number of contingencies" that has heightened the likelihood of military conflict.[140]

Clearly the danger of accidental nuclear war triggered by a reflexive commitment to deterrence has worried Gorbachev more than the danger of an unprovoked Western attack. Contextual evidence makes it virtually certain that this critique of deterrence theory was directed at the theory's Soviet as well as Western proponents.[141] During this period, Soviet START negotiators in Geneva were showing an increasing willingness to consider deep cuts in strategic nuclear weapons, and Gorbachev appeared ready to push the logic of such cuts a long way.[142]

Gorbachev also gave a new twist to his contention that Soviet security depended on greater economic dynamism. While playing down the Western military threat, he claimed that reactionary Western circles were trying to slow the USSR's progress by locking it into a policy of military confrontation. However, he asserted, the USSR would not "irrationally and automatically" adopt military programs that imperialism was trying to foist on it through the arms competition.[143] The obvious implication was that a larger Soviet military effort, far from foiling imperialist designs, might play into the West's hands by undermining Soviet economic performance.

Gorbachev's increasingly radical security approach provoked tension. In advancing his sweeping proposals for political liberalization at the January plenum, Gorbachev sought to change the complexion of the Politburo by adding to it the liberal Aleksandr Yakovlev, and he focused on the political and economic "crisis phenomena" inside the Soviet system.[144] Glossing over the military competition with the West, he indicated that the Armed Forces should make more effective use of existing resources rather than press the party for bigger budgets.[145] He also expressed veiled dissatisfaction with the military establishment, which he said "also lives by means of restructuring." His displeasure probably stemmed from military foot-dragging on personnel changes as well as on other aspects of internal military reform.[146]

After hearing Gorbachev's speech, the Central Committee adopted a divergent interpretation of Soviet security needs. Omitting the concept of a domestic crisis, the plenum's final resolution highlighted the efforts of "militant imperialist circles" to attain strategic superiority. Although it stated that the party must "maintain the

[137]Sakharov's banishment was lifted in December 1986. He travelled to the US in early November 1988 to participate in a meeting of the International Foundation for the Survival and Development of Humanity, a new nongovernmental Soviet-American organization with headquarters in Moscow and Washington, DC.

[138]*Pravda*, Sept. 30, 1987.

[139]Ibid., Feb. 26, 1987.

[140]Taking up a theme sounded earlier by Dobrynin, Gorbachev denied that world war has been avoided in recent decades because of nuclear weapons. Rather, he asserted, world war was avoided despite such weaponry. *Pravda*, Sept. 17, 1987.

[141]*Ibid.* As previously, the word Gorbachev used to describe the idea of deterrence was the neutral "sderzhivaniye," not the pejorative "ustrasheniye," suggesting that he has Soviet policy in mind as well. Moreover, some military men have declined to endorse his critique of deterrence.

[142]In the fall of 1987, for example, he referred favorably to a Soviet-American study which suggests that strategic stability could be maintained with only 5 percent of existing nuclear weapons (*Pravda*, Sept. 17, 1987). Soviet participants in this work apparently included some of the civilian theorists from the Academy of Sciences who have been involved since 1984 in modeling the effects of deep cuts beyond a first stage of 50 percent reductions. For details of this work, see A. A. Kokoshin in *SShA: Ekonomika, Politika, Ideologiya* (Moscow), No. 2, 1988, pp. 3–12.

[143]*Pravda*, Feb. 28, 1987.

[144]Yakovlev was made a nonvoting member at the January 1987 plenum. He was elevated to voting membership in April.

[145]Gorbachev told the plenum that Soviet military cadres had "an enormous responsibility before the people" to protect the country's security. The people and the party, he said, were doing "everything" to strengthen the Armed Forces and had a right to assume that no aggression could catch the USSR unawares. The party was counting on the officer corps in deciding on the tasks for strengthening the state's defense capacity, said Gorbachev, and the Central Committee was sure that all military cadres would act "with the greatest responsibility." *Pravda*, Jan. 28 and Apr. 11, 1987.

[146]Dale Herspring, "On Perestroyka: Gorbachev, Yazov, and the Military," loc. cit., p. 101.

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country's defense capacity on the necessary level"—language Gorbachev probably favored—the resolution also said incongruously that the international situation required "a comprehensive strengthening of the defense possibilities of our country." Moreover, it praised the Armed Forces fulsomely, dropping the undertone of criticism in Gorbachev's speech.[147]

This episode illustrates the obstacles Gorbachev has encountered in trying to recast the bureaucratic hierarchies overseeing the various elements of security policy. His greatest success occurred in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. At the plenum Gorbachev pressed for the continuation of staff and structural changes at the MFA as a prerequisite for a more active foreign policy. Echoing this theme a few months later, Shevardnadze attacked the diplomatic service for having pursued a distorted definition of the Soviet national interest in the past and voiced his determination to carry out further staff changes.[148]

Marshal Sokolov, on the other hand, was far less receptive to the idea of revamping the Ministry of Defense to pursue a revised interpretation of the national interest and responded coolly to Gorbachev's January plenum speech.[149] Although Marshal Akhromeyev began to treat military personnel and leadership practices as areas requiring serious reform, Sokolov paid only lip service to the idea.[150] Obviously relying on the conservative resistance to Gorbachev within the Central Committee, Sokolov expatiated on the "high evaluation" the Armed Forces had received at the January plenum and played down the need for the rejuvenation of military cadres.[151] In all likelihood, it was Sokolov who instructed the military press to ignore Gorbachev's comments at the plenum about a brewing internal crisis and about the military's shortcomings.[152]

In contrast to their handling of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Defense, Gorbachev's and his allies' handling of the KGB was rather cautious. Shortly before the January plenum, KGB chairman Chebrikov was compelled to acknowledge on the front page of *Pravda* that a KGB official in Ukraine had conspired to persecute a muck-raking journalist.[153] This unprecedented admission of KGB malfeasance probably could not have been extracted without prodding from Gorbachev. Moreover, the push for political liberalization at the January plenum should logically have entailed further censure of the KGB. Nonetheless, Gorbachev did not take this step. Instead, he extolled the high qualifications of KGB personnel and made no mention of any need for *perestroyka* inside the organization.[154] This rhetorical accommodation apparently allowed him to increase his influence within the police apparatus.[155] But it did not augur the kind of personnel shake-ups that were being carried out in the foreign and defense ministries, and which Chebrikov was successfully avoiding inside his police domain. In view of the deep party divisions over political reform that surfaced at the January plenum, Gorbachev probably chose to avoid the risky step of antagonizing the military and police hierarchies simultaneously.[156]

Thus Gorbachev launched a campaign to renovate the military high command and, in the process, to install officers with doctrinal dispositions closer to his own.[157] The campaign received a serendipitous boost from the

[147]*Pravda*, Jan. 29, 1987.

[148]*Vesinik Ministerstva Inostrannykh Del SSSR*, No. 2, 1987, pp. 30–34, trans. in *FBIS-SOV*, Oct. 27, 1987, pp. 52–53.

[149]Employing the same tactics that he and other conservative officials had used earlier, Sokolov played down the significance of Gorbachev's proposals at the January plenum and emphasized that the party's "strategic course" had been set at earlier party conclaves. *Pravda*, Feb. 23, 1987.

[150]In particular, Akhromeyev acknowledged the need for a better cadres policy. See *Sovetskaya Rossiya* (Moscow), Feb. 21, 1987. Cf. Sokolov in *Pravda*, Feb. 23, 1987, and Marshal Viktor Kulikov in *Trud* (Moscow), Feb. 22, 1987.

[151]According to Sokolov, the central requirement of military personnel policy was "capably to combine young and experienced cadres, to ensure their continuity and the development of everything good that has been accumulated in the activity of commanders . . . and has passed the test of time." See *Pravda*, Feb. 23, 1987. Shortly afterward, Sokolov attended a meeting of a military party *aktiv* in which several speakers endorsed changes in cadres policy, including the downgrading of seniority and service records in making military appointments. Sokolov addressed the meeting, but his remarks were not published, no doubt because he opposed the changes. See *Krasnaya Zvezda*, Mar. 7, 1987, trans. in *FBIS-SOV*, Mar. 10, 1987, p. V/1.

[152]In publishing the "theses" of Gorbachev's speech, *Krasnaya Zvezda* (Jan. 28, 1987) excised his references to "crisis phenomena" in the USSR. The military newspaper accurately paraphrased Gorbachev's demand for better performance from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, but it omitted his reference to the need for *perestroyka* in the military. Instead, it merely reported that Gorbachev had voiced "our most important concern" about the military cadres who were defending the country. Three days later (Jan. 31), *Pravda* ran an editorial on the plenum that mentioned Soviet "crisis phenomena" and referred to the new demands facing "foreign-policy departments" (presumably including the Ministry of Defense). The next day, *Krasnaya Zvezda*, most likely under pressure from the Gorbachev camp, reprinted the *Pravda* editorial on its front page.

[153]Knight, *The KGB: Police and Politics in the Soviet Union*, p. 101.

[154]*Pravda*, Jan. 28, 1987.

[155]The January plenum made Anatoliy Luk'yanov a party secretary overseeing the Central Committee's Administrative Organs Department, which is responsible for supervising the KGB and the Armed Forces. Luk'yanov, holder of a doctorate in legal studies and a long-time associate of Gorbachev, voiced views on citizen rights and the role of the state that were much less conservative than Chebrikov's. See *Pravda*, June 16, 1987.

[156]The plenum had been postponed three times before it finally occurred in January. See Timothy Colton, "Gorbachev and the Politics of System Renewal," in Seweryn Bialer and Michael Mandelbaum, Eds. *Gorbachev's Russia and American Foreign Policy*, New York Council on Foreign Relations, 1988, p. 177.

[157]See, in particular, *Krasnaya Zvezda*, Mar. 18, 1987. During the preceding two years, the officer corps had responded sluggishly to Gorbachev's calls for "criticism and self-criticism" and institutional *perestroyka*. See Dale Herspring, "On Perestroyka . . . ," loc. cit., p. 101.

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Matthias Rust affair. The ability of the West German youth to pilot his small Cessna to an unhindered landing near Red Square deeply embarassed the Armed Forces and provided a golden opportunity to replace Sokolov with Dmitriy Yazov, an officer more sympathetic to internal military reform.[158] Even before it became fashionable, Yazov had voiced concern about the need to upgrade the personal and professional standards of Soviet military men, and he had been put in charge of personnel policy at the Ministry of Defense shortly after Gorbachev called for *perestroyka* of the military. In selecting the relatively junior Yazov to succeed Sokolov, Gorbachev by-passed a layer of higher-ranking officers and created a defense minister owing a larger than usual political debt to the general secretary.

The drive for military reform was also fueled by an unprecedented wave of articles in which civilian foreign-affairs specialists invaded the domain of the military theoreticians and took stands uncongenial to mainstream military thought. In the pre-Gorbachev days, civilian specialists had tried to influence military policy only indirectly—by offering a more temperate image of the West and its military intentions. Now, in response to the urgings of officials such as Shevardnadze, Yakovlev, and Dobrynin, civilian analysts began to offer opinions on the nature of strategic stability, the scope of arms cuts, and the kinds of weapons that should be eliminated.[159] Although these analysts still lacked access to many varieties of Soviet military data, their outspokenness confronted professional military theorists with an unfamiliar challenge.

Part of the challenge was a growing civilian interest in unilateral military reductions. For example, a deputy director of the USA Institute co-authored an article that recalled Khrushchev's unilateral troop cuts and claimed that the cuts had not harmed Soviet security because "they were accompanied by a broad peace offensive that made it virtually impossible for the West to bring additional military pressure to bear on our country."[160] Disputing this idea, Deputy Defense Minister Ivan Tret'yak warned that curbing imperialism was more important than reducing the defense budget and asserted that the deleterious effects of Khrushchev's troop cuts had endured to the present day.[161] Nevertheless, some prominent civilian analysts continued to advocate unilateral cuts as a more effective means of promoting the country's security and lightening its military burden than negotiated bilateral arms reductions.[162] Although none of the liberal Politburo members publicly espoused this view, privately it plainly enjoyed high-level backing and foreshadowed Gorbachev's 1988 announcement of planned unilateral cuts.

Breaking the Reykjavik stalemate. Gorbachev's battle for tighter control of the country's foreign-policy apparatus coincided with his search for a way out of the post-Reykjavik stalemate. At the end of February 1987, in a move that artfully obscured the simultaneous termination of the Soviet moratorium on nuclear tests, Gorbachev once again decoupled the INF issue from talks on strategic offensive and defensive arms and promised to strive for a quick INF accord.[163] As the INF negotiations progressed and the United States pressed for rigorous measures to verify such a treaty, Soviet negotiators began to evince a new willingness to consider measures that previously had been rejected out of hand. Meanwhile, building on his call for political reform at the January plenum, Gorbachev endorsed the "humanization of international relations" and announced a new approach to the human-rights issues subsumed under Basket Three of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE). Denying the assertion of "those who assume . . . that our position is the result of pressure from the West," he called for a CSCE meeting in Moscow on "humanitarian cooperation," despite the likelihood that such a conference would generate Western pressures for further liberalization of the Soviet system.[164]

In addition, Gorbachev hinted at a relaxation of efforts to promote pro-Soviet regimes in the Third World. The sovereign right of peoples to decide on revolutionary or evolutionary paths of development, including the right to preserve "the status quo," should be observed unconditionally, he said.[165] This statement appeared in a speech advocating a major expansion in the peacekeeping role of the United Nations. Evidently it was intended to signal a new Soviet restraint in regional conflicts and to build up the UN as an umbrella under which

[158] Ibid.

[159] Robert Legvold, "Gorbachev's New Approach to Conventional Arms Control," *The Harriman Institute Forum* (New York), January 1988; Raymond Garthoff, "New Thinking in Soviet Military Doctrine," *The Washington Quarterly* (Washington, DC), Summer 1988, pp. 131–58; and A. Arbatov in *Mirovaya Ekonomika i Mezhdunarodnyye Otnosheniya* (Moscow—hereafter, cited as *MEMO*), No. 4, 1988, pp. 10–22.

[160] Vitaliy Zhurkin, Sergey Karaganov, and Andrey Kortunov in *Novoye Vremya* (Moscow), No. 40, 1987, quoted in Harry Gelman, *The Soviet Military Leadership and the Question of Soviet Deployment Retreats*, Santa Monica, Ca, Rand Corporation, September 1988. I am grateful to Dr. Gelman for allowing me to read this report before its publication.

[161] *Moscow News*, No. 8, 1988, quoted in Gelman, op. cit.

[162] See, in particular, A. G. Arbatov's presentation of this view to the Scientific Council of the Academy's Institute of the World Economy and International Relations, *MEMO*, No. 5, 1988, p. 152.

[163] *Pravda*, Mar. 1, 1987.

[164] Ibid., Feb. 17 and 25, Apr. 11, 1987.

[165] Ibid., Sep. 17, 1987.

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the USSR could withdraw from some of its most exposed Third-World commitments, particularly in Afghanistan.

Several of Gorbachev's colleagues backed his diplomacy, including his announcement delinking INF from other arms issues. Ryzhkov, asserting that the idea of nuclear disarmament "is not a utopia," hailed the new INF offer and forecast favorable possibilities for progress on other aspects of superpower arms control.[166] Zaykov likewise supported flexible diplomacy. Strongly endorsing the "new philosophy of international relations" embodied in Gorbachev's statement at the Moscow Forum in February 1987, Zaykov referred favorably to the INF offer and struck an optimistic note about the future benefits of Soviet arms-control diplomacy.[167] Gromyko also endorsed the INF proposal.[168] Yakovlev's enthusiasm for innovative security policies almost certainly included vigorous private backing for delinking INF from other arms negotiations.[169]

Other figures reacted more coolly to Gorbachev's emphasis on political gestures and concessionary arms-control initiatives. Ligachev waited almost two months before mentioning and commending the new policy.[170] If the meaning of this delay was ambiguous, Shcherbytskyi's position was more clear-cut. Unlike some liberal politicians, the Ukrainian leader refrained from mentioning the positive effects of the January plenum on Western public opinion. Instead he interpreted the plenum in a way that underscored the comments on military preparedness in the plenum resolution. More important, his brief reference to the new policy on INF fell far short of an endorsement, most likely signifying a continuing belief that no INF agreement should be signed in the absence of new limits on SDI.[171]

Minister of Defense Sokolov, not yet under the shadow of the Rust affair, also remained skeptical. After keeping silent for two and a half months about the INF decision, Sokolov finally endorsed it, but he simultaneously emphasized the aggressive nature of imperialism and presented a pessimistic gloss on the lessons of World War II, thereby suggesting that a policy of diplomatic maneuver might not suffice to counter the Western military threat.[172] In short, the debate about how to combine political gestures, negotiating concessions, and military preparations was still simmering.[173]

This impression was confirmed by polemics that broke out shortly after Gorbachev announced his decision to delink INF. Aleksandr Bovin, a liberal journalist who had long favored a softer line toward the West and was pushing for more *glasnost'* in the media's treatment of foreign policy, suggested that the original decision to deploy SS-20 missiles in the European theater had been a mistake. Invoking Lenin's criticism of a diplomacy based on "ultimatums," Bovin justified the recent decoupling of INF from SDI in terms that suggested some people believed the recoupling at Reykjavik should become part of a long-term strategy, rather than merely a short-term tactical maneuver.[174]

Bovin was promptly challenged by Major-General Yuriy Lebedev, a General Staff officer who had served as military advisor at the unsuccessful Soviet-American INF negotiations in the early 1980's. According to Lebedev, the original decision to deploy the SS-20's was correct. It had not provoked the American INF deployments—as Bovin implied—but had been a response to military moves that the West had already planned.[175] Lebedev was silent about the decoupling of INF, but he was plainly unsympathetic to Bovin's broad hint that Soviet military programs should be curbed to elicit reciprocal Western restraint in areas like SDI. Persistent skepticism about the feasibility of such tactics apparently compelled Gorbachev to defend himself against the charge that his economy-minded emphasis on opening up and commercializing the Soviet space program was causing the USSR to fall behind the United States in the military competition in space.[176]

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[166]Ibid., Mar. 30 and Apr. 28, 1987.

[167]Ibid., Mar. 5, 1987. Solomentsev took a similar position (ibid, Mar. 25 and May 14, 1987).

[168]Ibid., Mar. 11, 1987.

[169]Firmly ruling out the possibility of responding to SDI with a similar Soviet program, Yakovlev called for a move away from deterrence and showed a strong interest in applying the slogan of "reasonable sufficiency" to conventional as well as nuclear arms. *FBIS-SOV*, Mar. 16, 1987, p. G/12, Mar. 20, 1987, p. G/4; and *Kommunist*, No. 8, May 1987.

[170]*FBIS-SOV*, Apr. 27, 1987, p. F/3. When Ligachev did mention the decision, his comments were quite favorable, although still less positive than those of Gorbachev's ardent supporters.

[171]Shcherbytskyi remarked that the January plenum "again affirmed the unshakable character of the unity of the CPSU's internal and foreign policy." He left open the question of whether internal requirements or external dangers should receive greater weight in national policy-making, but in view of his past remarks, it would be fair to assume that he continued to assign special significance to external threats. Shcherbytskyi—in contrast to several of the figures discussed above—did not refer explicitly to the decoupling of INF, and he said nothing about future benefits from the step. *Pravda Ukrainy*, Mar. 25, 1987.

[172]*Pravda*, May 9, 1987. Like Shcherbytskyi, Sokolov described the Soviet proposal as being for the liquidation of intermediate-range rockets in Europe; he did not refer directly to the decision to delink the issue from other arms matters.

[173]For other evidence of continuing debate, see the comments of Gromyko in *Izvestiya*, Jan. 18, 1987; and in *Pravda*, Mar. 14, 1987.

[174]*Moscow News*, No. 10, 1987. During this period, Bovin chastised the ministries of foreign affairs and defense for their secretiveness, and Fedor Burlatskiy called on Soviet journalists to present more factual analyses of the West. *Sovestskaya Kul'tura* (Moscow), May 21, 1987.

[175]*Moscow News*, No. 11, 1987, as cited in *Radio Liberty Daily Report* (Munich), Mar. 20, 1987.

[176]*Pravda*, May 14, 1987; see also "Sales Blitz by Soviet Seeks to Tap Global Market in Space Services," *The New York Times*, Sept. 6, 1987.

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Conservative apprehensions about the future treatment of military programs must have been sharpened by the pronouncements of Shevardnadze and some of his deputies. Shevardnadze assailed past foreign policy for pursuing a distorted conception of the national interest. He emphasized that the arms race was damaging the Soviet economy and argued for a cost-effective external policy that would avoid further growth of military expenditures. Lamenting the lack of creative thinking about foreign affairs, he remarked that at times "we . . . induced enormous material investments in hopeless foreign policy projects and tacitly promoted actions which, both in the direct and the indirect sense, have cost the people dearly even to this day."[177] No doubt Afghanistan was uppermost in his mind, but he was probably referring as well to the decision to deploy the SS-20's. Shortly after the publication of Shevardnadze's address, one of his deputies criticized the SS-20 deployments and hinted that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs should have a say in future decisions about developing and deploying new weapons.[178]

Security, Liberalization, and Subversion

The evolving security debate posed questions not only about diplomatic tactics and military policy but about opening the Soviet system to the outside world. As the superpowers edged closer to agreeing on the weapons to be eliminated under an INF accord, Soviet decision-makers were forced to weigh how much information and access the USSR would give American arms-control monitors in order to gain American acceptance of the agreement. One hint came in August, when Soviet and American negotiators agreed on a system of compulsory challenge inspections of chemical weapons facilities. Another signal came in September, when several US Congressmen traveling in the USSR were unexpectedly allowed to inspect and photograph the controversial Krasnoyarsk radar facility. These events lent weight to Gorbachev's statement the following week that the USSR was prepared to embrace "previously unheard-of standards" of openness to ensure the monitoring of international arms-control obligations.[179] They also gave some credibility to his implicit acknowledgment that the published Soviet defense budget was misleading and his promise that as the regime carried out internal economic reform, it would publish a defense budget comparable to Western budgets.[180]

The interaction between security policy and political liberalization was also reflected in the shifting Soviet stance on human rights. In September, despite a sharp rise in human-rights protests by some ethnic minorities, Gorbachev followed up his earlier proposal for a Moscow CSCE meeting by stating that national legislation and rules on humanitarian issues must be brought into conformity with international obligations and norms.[181] Shortly before Gorbachev traveled to meet President Reagan in Washington, the press announced the formation of a Public Commission for Humanitarian Questions and Human Rights to "achieve conformity of Soviet legislation with the obligations assumed by the Soviet Union in the Helsinki Final Act and in UN human rights documents."[182] Despite the internal sensitivity of the issue, Gorbachev sought to accommodate Western concerns and played down the possibility that the West might manipulate the issue to undermine the Soviet system.

In support of these steps, several of Gorbachev's Politburo colleagues argued that *perestroyka* was persuading the West of the USSR's benign intentions and hamstringing the efforts of Western antagonists to justify anti-Soviet policies. Ryzhkov hailed the benefit of *perestroyka* in countering foreign propaganda about the USSR's "expansionism" and "closed society," and Dobrynin espoused a similar view.[183] Other leaders suggested that the "humanization" of international relations would improve Soviet security. Shevardnadze, Yakovlev, and Zaykov, for example, all supported the idea of holding a CSCE meeting in Moscow.[184] Holding such a conference would indeed have a dramatic international impact, but—as many of its proponents doubtless knew—scheduling it would also generate pressures for further domestic liberalization if its impact were to be positive, not negative.

This linking of *perestroyka* and foreign relations struck the more conservative leaders as dangerous. Figures such as Shcherbytskyi had taken a hard line on

[177] *Vestnik Ministerstva Inostrannykh Del SSSR*, No. 2, 1987, pp. 30–34, trans. in *FBIS-SOV*, Oct. 27, 1987, pp. 51–55. This speech was delivered on 27 June.

[178] According to Deputy Foreign Minister Aleksandr Bessmertnykh, decision-making on the SS–20 deployment had erroneously allowed technological factors to prevail over political calculations. Bessmertnykh went on to assert that "national interests must determine strategy, while strategy must determine political tactics and, to a certain extent, the technological development of the Armed Forces." *New Times* (Moscow), No. 6, 1987, as quoted in Gelman, op. cit.

[179] *Pravda*, Sept. 17, 1987.

[180] Ibid., Aug. 27, 1987.

[181] Ibid., Feb. 17 and 25, Apr. 11, and Sept. 17, 1987.

[182] *Izvestiya*, Nov. 30, 1987, as quoted in Radio Free Europe-Radio Liberty, *Soviet East European Report* (Washington, DC), No. 13, 1988. The head of the commission is Fedor Burlatskiy.

[183] *Pravda*, Apr. 23, 1987; *FBIS-SOV*, May 5, 1987, p. AA/7.

[184] *Pravda*, Mar. 4 and June 18, 1987; *Izvestiya*, Mar. 12, 1987.

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security policy from the beginning; others, such as Ligachev, were disciplinarian reformers whose views of security now seemed increasingly conservative because of the emerging radicalism of Gorbachev's approach. Although these leaders generally believed that economic revitalization would strengthen the USSR's international position, they were far more skeptical about the benefits of political liberalization.[185] Shcherbytskyi and Ligachev both asserted that the West sought to promote a form of democratization that would destroy the socialist system, and both remained silent about the idea of an international human-rights meeting in Moscow.[186] The connection between domestic political reform and socialism's attractiveness abroad, Ligachev explained, had to be understood "from precise class positions."[187] In other words, the essentials of the party's authoritarian rule must not be sacrificed in a misguided effort to make the USSR politically appealing to the West.

Chebrikov articulated the conservative view most forcefully in a speech commemorating the birth of Feliks Dzerzhinskiy, the first head of the secret police. Liberalized treatment of dissidents, said Chebrikov, would not eliminate Western "ideological speculation" on human-rights issues. Rather, it would give greater influence to antisocialist elements susceptible to being used for subversive ends by Western intelligence agencies.[188] Permeated with fear of conspiratorial links between domestic and foreign political forces, Chebrikov's speech contradicted Dobrynin's earlier stand on the need to neutralize foreign "speculation" through a more accommodating posture on human rights. More important, the statement was at odds with Gorbachev's position, and it came just days before the General Secretary endorsed the goal of bringing Soviet human-rights legislation into line with international legal norms.

Concern about the stability of the political system appeared to be one reason for Chebrikov's veiled warning that he, much like Dzerzhinskiy during the 1918 debate over the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk, might not support such diplomatic concessions toward the West as the prospective INF treaty.[189] Although Dzerzhinskiy had considered the signing of the 1918 Treaty "a mistake," said Chebrikov, he had defended party unity and had rejected the tactics of the "left communists," which had threatened to split the party over this issue. The striking thing about this passage was Chebrikov's failure directly to condemn Dzerzhinskiy's opposition to the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk, which generations of Soviet policy-makers have invoked as a precedent to legitimize foreign-policy concessions. At the time, pro-Gorbachev intellectuals were citing Brest-Litovsk to justify a more accommodating line toward the West, and Gorbachev's own brief comments on the treaty portrayed it in a favorable light.[190]

Chebrikov also appeared concerned about the security implications of Gorbachev's diplomatic tactics and approach to arms-control verification. Western intelligence agencies, warned the KGB chief, were stepping up efforts to gain information about Soviet technical research and economic plans, as well as about the USSR's "planned foreign-policy actions."[191] This remark was a clear rebuttal to Shevardnadze and others pressing for more *glasnost'* in the realm of foreign policy. In all probability Chebrikov, who had taken a conservative line on the general issue of *glasnost'* and had warned of intensifying Western efforts to obtain Soviet military secrets, disliked Gorbachev's radically new stance on arms-control verification. Many KGB officials undoubtedly distrusted it because it threatened to breach the secrecy in which the KGB had long cloaked Soviet military activities.

Additional evidence supports the supposition that some members of the top leadership opposed the INF Treaty. The tone of Gorbachev's remarks on the eve of the Washington summit suggested that he was parrying doubts within the leadership. Harking back to Reykjavik, he remarked that events had borne out the evaluation he had given 40 minutes after the meeting, whereas "panic" and skeptical declarations about Reykjavik's "failure" had been disproved.[192] Apart from Chebrikov, the targets of this pointed reminder probably included Shcherbytskyi and perhaps Ligachev. In describing the approaching Washington summit, Shcherbytskyi ignored the draft INF treaty and observed that "the world is awaiting a palpable change on the key question of . . . reducing strategic nuclear means," although it was clear that the summit would produce no breakthrough on strategic weapons.[193] Ligachev, of course, was the Politburo member who had openly declared Reykjavik a failure the year before. Meanwhile Yakovlev, who undoubtedly favored the

[185]Ligachev, for instance, observed that economic revitalization and better consumer goods would enhance the attractiveness of socialism's image abroad. *Ekonomicheskaya Gazeta* (Moscow), No. 22, 1987.

[186]*FBIS-SOV*, Mar. 10, 1987, p. R/8; *Pravda Ukrainy*, Mar. 7, 1987.

[187]*Problemy Mira i Sotsializma* (Prague), No. 7, 1987, p. 6.

[188]*Pravda*, Sept. 11, 1987.

[189]Ibid. This interpretation of Chebrikov's intent is strengthened by the fact that other portions of the speech contained obvious arguments by historical analogy intended to caution Gorbachev against the dangers of runaway political liberalization.

[190]Ibid., Nov. 3, 1987.

[191]Ibid., Sept. 11, 1987.

[192]*Krasnaya Zvezda*, Oct. 2, 1987.

[193]*Pravda Ukrainy*, Nov. 6, 1987.

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Two American inspectors (in civilian clothes with identification badges) at an August 1, 1988, press conference with Soviet Lt. Col. Petrenko, chief of the missile destruction center in Saryozek, Kazakhstan, to publicize the destruction of Soviet missiles.

—Novosti from Sovfoto.

treaty, indirectly confirmed the existence of opposition by speaking out against Soviet persons who feared "imaginary losses" in a nonnuclear world.[194]

Although it is extremely doubtful that any of the party leaders believed in the feasibility of complete nuclear disarmament, the INF Treaty apparently crystallized the leaders' differences over reducing Soviet reliance on nuclear weapons, especially if this meant foregoing curbs on the French and British nuclear arsenals and giving up more weapons than did the United States. This is probably why the signing of the Treaty was momentarily set back by the Yel'tsin affair. Although the Yel'tsin affair centered on domestic rather than foreign policy, it temporarily weakened Gorbachev and forced him to delay scheduling the Washington summit until he could resolve the bitter clash between Boris Yel'tsin and the same Politburo conservatives who evidently harbored reservations about the treaty.

The gradual convergence of Gorbachev's revision of security policy with his campaign for domestic political liberalization posed a serious challenge to the country's national-security institutions. As it happened, Yel'tsin had already provided a harbinger of the challenge by launching lacerating public attacks on the Air Defense Forces in the aftermath of the Rust affair. Flaying commanders for "elitism" and for ignoring party recommendations in making military promotions, Yel'tsin complained that the military establishment had ignored the party's call for *glasnost'* out of a mistaken belief that public discussion of military deficiencies would be harmful to national security.[195]

At about the same time, a prominent Belorussian writer actually argued that if the West launched a massive first strike, Soviet nuclear retaliation would be unjustified, and he praised the superior courage of military

[194] *Pravda*, Nov. 4, 1987. The context showed that Yakovlev was referring to persons inside the USSR rather than to foreigners.

[195] *Krasnaya Zvezda*, June 17, 1987.

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men who "give their military expertise to the antiwar movement."[196] Leading officers in the Main Political Directorate and General Staff replied with angry denunciations of such "pacificism."[197] Nonetheless, the liberal intellectuals reiterated their position unequivocally, arguing that "the truth of the new thinking is obligatory even for military thought," and some objected to the traditional practice of interrupting the education of promising young specialists by drafting them for military service. A few daring writers even went so far as to argue that the military establishment had a vested interest in opposing peace and was willfully misinterpreting Gorbachev's pronouncements on security.[198]

The anger this provoked among some Politburo members was expressed most forcefully by Defense Minister Yazov. Although willing to agree that organizational and doctrinal reforms could make the Armed Forces more efficient, Yazov clearly resented such wide-ranging attacks on military values. Adopting a cautious attitude toward political liberalization as a whole, Yazov warned that criticism was a very sharp weapon. Sensationalism and a disrespectful attitude toward military cadres should be avoided, he said, and the forthcoming celebration of the Revolution's 70th anniversary should be used to instill a patriotic appreciation of Soviet history.[199] Yazov's remarks about disrespect may have been intended as a rebuttal to Yel'tsin, and the Defense Minister must have been happy to see Yel'tsin publicly humiliated when Gorbachev, carefully weighing the political situation, came down on the side of Yel'tsin's enemies. In December 1987, Yazov met with a group of Soviet writers and again lashed out at the negative depiction of the military in literature that, in his view, threatened the patriotic sentiments needed to maintain a powerful military establishment.[200]

The disagreements about literature clearly overlapped with the debates over security policy. At the meeting with the writers, deputy chief of the Main Political Directorate Col.-Gen. D. Volkogonov complained that although "the term deterrence has been stigmatized, today, *when no political mechanism for curbing war is available,* we . . . have no other option but to resort to the military mechanism."[201] Similarly, Aleksandr Prokhanov, a highly conservative writer and author of many articles praising the intervention in Afghanistan, glorified the army for achieving parity with the United States and castigated the "shameful" attacks on the military by liberal intellectuals. Denying that the INF Treaty had come about because of "pacificism" rather than Soviet strategic parity, he contended that the military's special expertise had to make it the central participant in arms control, just as it was central in the military buildup.[202]

Plainly, Prokhanov spoke for members of the officer corps who were unsettled by the terms of the INF Treaty and feared that the principle of asymmetrical reductions might be applied to other forces.[203] Marshal Akhromeyev, while supporting the accord, also asserted that "reasonable sufficiency" must be based on an "approximate balance" of military forces with offsetting advantages on each side. The General Staff chief was quite adamant that the concept of sufficiency "cannot be interpreted one-sidedly" or as a "unilateral lessening of our defense efforts."[204]

Reassessing the Western challenge. Near the end of 1987 Gorbachev began to articulate the idea, latent in his previous speeches, that the Western powers might be adopting a much less aggressive form of international behavior. At the 70th anniversary celebration of the Revolution, Gorbachev noted that members of the Western ruling elite now recognized the existence of a "catastrophic danger to peace," and he asked rhetorically whether heightened world interdependence might not curb the most destructive types of imperialist

[196] *Moskovskiye Novosti,* Mar. 8, 1987, as quoted in Stephen Foye, "Intellectuals Attack the Military," *Sovset' News* (3, No. 9), July 30, 1987. The writer, Ales Adamovich, was active in the work of the Committee of Soviet Scientists for Peace and Against the Nuclear Threat. The Committee was set up in 1983 primarily to lobby Western scientists against SDI but began to play a significant role in Soviet security deliberations under Gorbachev. Adamovich also became a member of the human-rights commission established under Burlatsky's chairmanship in the fall of 1987.

[197] *Literaturnaya Gazeta,* May 8, 1987, as quoted in Foye, loc. cit.

[198] *Literaturnaya Gazeta,* May 22 and June 8, 1987, as quoted in Foye, loc. cit.; and A. Nuykin in *Vek XX i mir* (The 20th Century and Peace), as cited by A. Pavlov and V. Lyashenko in *Kommunist Vooruzhennykh Sil,* No. 21, 1988, p. 24.

[199] *Krasnaya Zvezda,* July 29 and Aug. 13, 1987.

[200] Moscow Television Service in Russian, Jan. 16, 1988, trans. in *FBIS-SOV,* Jan. 22, 1988, pp. 68–69.

[201] Ibid., p. 65, emphasis added.

[202] "I think that we are now experiencing a moment when culture must come to the aid of . . . the Army without delay. Attacks by certain sectors of our culture on the Army are, in my opinion, shameful. This is because our contemporary repentant culture, which has been genuinely repentant for its role in the years of stagnation, cannot be compared with the Army which during the same period of so-called stagnation managed to achieve military-political and strategic parity with the United States. We have nothing to blame the Army for. The Army is now in need of moral support." Ibid., pp. 66–67.

[203] In early 1988, General Vladimir Arkhipov, chief of the Moscow Military District, remarked that some officers disapproved of the treaty because it required the destruction of more Soviet missiles than American missiles. Most officers, Arkhipov added, supported the treaty. *Izvestiya,* Mar. 16, 1988, in *FBIS-SOV,* Mar. 23. 1988, pp. 84–85. Nonetheless, the main military newspaper reported that mail from its readers was "permeated more than ever before by a certain alarm, by doubts, and by anxiety in connection with the signing of the treaty." *Krasnaya Zvezda,* Apr. 5, 1988, in *FBIS-SOV,* Apr. 11, 1988, p. 86.

[204] *Problemy Mira i Sotsializma,* No. 12, 1987; and *Krasnaya Zvezda,* Mar. 20, 1988.

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behavior.[205] In February 1988, he told the Central Committee that current international conditions were substantially different from past conditions because the political balance in Western regimes had shifted from the "party of war" to the "party of peace."[206] Yakovlev echoed this theme, claiming that the USSR had entered an era "entirely different" from the one during which it had been necessary to respond to the West's military challenges with emergency measures.[207] Gorbachev and his Politburo allies obviously felt that the West had ceased to behave in a traditional "imperialist" fashion, although they refrained from saying this directly, and they sanctioned the publication of articles by civilian analysts who spelled out this view with extraordinary bluntness.

The clearest example was an article by three foreign-affairs specialists published in the first issue of *Kommunist* in 1988. Vigorously rejecting analogies between 1941 and the current international situation, the authors categorically denied that the West would intentionally attack the USSR. According to them "today in East-West relations there is not one conflict" that might produce "the temptation to resort to war . . . it is difficult to imagine for what goals Western armies might invade the territory of the socialist states . . . today there are no politically influential forces in Western Europe or in the USA which would set themselves such a task," let alone launch a surprise nuclear attack. In place of the classic Leninist claim that imperialism's internal dynamics make it inherently aggressive, these authors asserted that "bourgeois democracy serves as a definite barrier on the path of unleashing . . . war" between the capitalist and socialist systems. However, they warned, the likelihood of *accidental* nuclear war between East and West was growing: "An outwardly paradoxical situation is therefore developing: the threat of intentional nuclear aggression is declining, but the threat of war can also increase."[208]

The implications of this diagnosis were truly radical. If East-West military conflict was likely to arise not from premeditated Western aggression but from misperceptions and technical malfunctioning of weapons systems, the main goal of Soviet security policy must shift from intimidating the West to reassuring it. This being the case, the accumulation of military power could easily become counterproductive, whereas measures to allay the fears of potential adversaries would acquire a vital role in protecting the USSR against nuclear destruction.

Some party leaders and military men, however, doubted that the trends in Western policy were as benign as Gorbachev and his allies contended. Shcherbytskyi, for example, highlighted the "aggressive nature of imperialism" and underscored the need to keep in mind "the severe experience of the past." In his view, highly influential groups in the West were still pursuing a reckless plan to achieve military superiority through the militarization of space, as well as by fanning regional conflicts and engaging in international terrorism. Apparently Shcherbytskyi, whose reservations about the INF treaty have already been noted, disapproved of Gorbachev's approach to the resolution of regional conflicts. In what was probably a reference to internal deliberations over whether to sign an agreement calling for the removal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan, he declared that the USSR was on the side of "all states and peoples repelling the attacks of international reaction . . . [and] defending the sovereign right to select the paths and forms of their development."[209]

The theme of persisting imperialist aggressiveness was also underscored by Defense Minister Yazov. Yazov had displayed considerable flexibility on a number of points of military policy and doctrine. He had endorsed the goal of a 50 percent cut in strategic arms and a "radical, bilateral reduction of conventional forces."[210] He also declared that the avoidance of war had become a governing principle of Soviet military doctrine—thereby implying that the Armed Forces must devote greater attention to confidence-building measures designed to prevent inadvertent war.[211] But Yazov was not ready to dismiss the Western military threat or to contemplate unilateral cuts. "The threat emanating from imperialism," he warned, "must not be underestimated."[212] Asserting repeatedly that military-strategic parity was the decisive condition for preventing war, he maintained that military parity must be a crucial part of any definition of military sufficiency.[213] He also demanded that historians describe the Armed Forces' decisive contribution in the past to the avoidance of war.[214]

Some military intellectuals spelled out the conservative view of Western intentions even more clearly. Ac-

[205] *Pravda*, Nov. 3, 1987; see also ibid., Feb. 26, 1987.
[206] Ibid., Feb. 19, 1988.
[207] Ibid., Nov. 4 and 28, 1987.
[208] V. Zhurkin, S. Karaganov, and A. Kortunov in *Kommunist*, No. 1, January 1988, pp. 44–47. See also Stanislav Kondrashov in *Izvestiya*, Apr. 2, 1988, trans. in *FBIS-SOV*, Apr. 6, 1988, pp. 2–3.
[209] *Izvestiya*, Dec. 13, 1987.
[210] *FBIS-SOV*, Feb. 26, 1988, p. 71.
[211] *Krasnaya Zvezda*, July 29, 1987; *Pravda*, Feb. 8, 1988.
[212] *FBIS-SOV*, May 13, 1988, p. 16; *Krasnaya Zvezda*, Feb. 23, 1988.
[213] *Krasnaya Zvezda*, Feb. 23, 1988; *FBIS-SOV*, Feb. 26, 1988, p. 70.
[214] *FBIS-SOV*, Feb. 26, 1988, p. 68; *Pravda*, May 9, 1988.

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cording to one prominent theorist, aggressiveness was an inherent attribute of Western imperialism and showed "a firm tendency to grow stronger." In addition to applying military force in Afghanistan, Angola, and elsewhere, said this writer, US reactionaries were still motivated by the "exceptionally dangerous idea of 'a preventive strike' with a calculation of 'victory'."[215] Two other officers acknowledged that a nuclear war would be catastrophic but challenged the liberal view that common sense would prevent imperialism from launching a nuclear attack. Such a view, they contended, "inevitably leads to a distortion of the essence of the new political thinking and to a wholesale negation of the necessity to adopt measures . . . for the prevention of possible imperialist aggression."[216]

The 19th Party Conference and After

In the spring of 1988, as preparations unfolded for the 19th national party conference, the "Andreyeva affair" revealed the depth of the political disagreements surrounding security policy. Reportedly on the prompting of Ligachev, the newspaper *Sovetskaya Rossiya* printed a chauvinistic attack by Nina Andreyeva on Gorbachev's political program.[217] In a thinly veiled allusion to Gorbachev's and Yakovlev's accent on the priority of "common human values" in international relations, Andreyeva objected to the recent intellectual about-face of "a respected academician" who now asserted that "present-day relations between states from the two different socioeconomic systems apparently lack any class content." In actuality, said Andreyeva, "peaceful coexistence is nothing but a form of class struggle in the international arena." Andreyeva denounced "a pacifist erosion of defense and patriotic consciousness" that fed such ideas as the abolition of Soviet military service. She also inveighed against emigration, especially of Soviet Jews, and warned that the politicization of unofficial organizations at home was leading to "a by no means socialist pluralism" patterned on Western political liberalism.[218] All in all, the article amounted to a defiant restatement of traditional national-security attitudes carried over from the Stalin era, and some military as well as civilian party units called meetings to publicize its contents.[219]

After almost three weeks, *Pravda* delivered a stinging editorial rebuttal. Condemning persons who failed to understand the depth of the domestic crisis affecting the country, the party newspaper accused conservative forces of supporting a brittle ideology that made the Soviet regime more susceptible to foreign propaganda. *Pravda* also condemned Andreyeva's "speculation on the concept of patriotism. A patriot is not one who screams loudly about alleged 'internal threats' to socialism . . . . A patriot is someone who, not fearing any difficulties, acts in the interests of the country and the benefit of the people."[220] According to one Western press report, after a Politburo confrontation over the Andreyeva letter Gorbachev met with several military district commanders, possibly to shore up his position with the officer corps.[221]

Nevertheless, echoes of the deep anxieties voiced by Andreyeva continued to appear in the statements of political conservatives and military men who were alarmed about the harsh criticism of the military establishment by liberal civilians. A military theorist warned against overestimating the influence of the Western "peace parties" (which according to Gorbachev now determined Western policy) and challenged the reformers' pet notion of responding asymmetrically to new Western military programs. In the same vein, the conservative writer Prokhanov claimed that military parity was indispensable for the USSR, which was still "surrounded by powerful Western civilizations that have integrated against us." "Amateurish experiments" in arms control, he warned, "can set off an explosion because the present balance is very tenuous."[222]

In response, the liberal reformers, already seeking ways to undermine the theoretical assumptions of traditional security policy, launched a complementary at-

[215]V. V. Serebryannikov, *V. I. Lenin ob aggressivnosti imperializma* (V. I. Lenin on the Aggressiveness of Imperialism), Moscow, Voyenizdat, 1988. The passages quoted are paraphrases drawn from a review of this book by S. Tyushkevich in *Kommunist Vooruzhennykh Sil*, No. 8, 1988, pp. 85–86. I was unable to obtain a copy of the original work for the preparation of this article.

[216]Pavlov and Lyashenko, loc. cit., pp. 24, 26.

[217]Unconfirmed reports suggest that the letter, which appeared over the signature of Andreyeva, a Leningrad chemistry teacher, was originally sent to Ligachev and was carefully revised under his instructions before being printed. After its publication, Ligachev reportedly endorsed it in private as a guideline for party policy, and almost four weeks passed without any public signal to the contrary. Only after heated debate inside the Politburo did *Pravda* repudiate the article. See Michel Tatu, "19th CPSU Conference," *Problems of Communism*, May-August 1988, pp. 1–4, and Seweryn Bialer, "The Changing Soviet Political System: The Nineteenth Party Conference and After," in *Inside Gorbachev's Russia*, Seweryn Bialer, Ed., Boulder, CO, Westview, 1989, pp. 207–208.

[218]*Sovetskaya Rossiya*, Mar. 13, 1988, trans. in *FBIS-SOV*, Mar. 16, 1988, p. 51.

[219]Helgesen, loc. cit., citing Soviet press sources; Bialer, "The Changing Soviet Political System," loc. cit., p. 207.

[220]*Pravda*, Apr. 5, 1988.

[221]*L'Unità* (Rome), Apr. 22, 1988, cited in Helgesen, loc. cit

[222]*Literaturnaya Rossiya* (Moscow), May 6, 1988, in *FBIS-SOV*, June 9, 1988, pp. 72–73. See also the article by MPD chief Lizichev in *Izvestiya*, May 29, 1988, trans. in *FBIS-SOV*, June 6, 1988, p. 63; and Colonel G. Mukhin in *Krasnaya Zvezda*, June 7, 1988, in *FBIS-SOV*, June 8, 1988, p. 2.

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tack on its historiographical underpinnings. The most dramatic example appeared in the publications of Vyacheslav Dashichev, a historian employed at an institute of the Academy of Sciences. Closely identifying his views with Shevardnadze and the Foreign Ministry, Dashichev faulted Stalin's foreign policies for a political failure to protect Soviet security against the Nazis and for causing the West to unite against a perceived Soviet military threat after World War II. More recently, he said, such ill-considered actions as the intervention in Afghanistan and the deployment of the SS-20's had given the United States a pretext for military expansion, creating a dangerously superior Western potential for generating military power, and had crystallized an anti-Soviet front including the NATO powers, China, and Japan.[223] Dashichev denied that strategic parity with the West was desirable and clearly contrasted the idea of parity with the notion of "reasonable sufficiency." To curb the arms race, he said, a "political modus vivendi" must be found between East and West. Instead of misguided efforts to achieve "small-change" successes in the Third World, the USSR's real national interests required the creation of an international climate favorable to a deep sociopolitical and economic transformation of the Soviet system, which "can and must influence the world social process exclusively by its economic, political, scientific, and cultural successes."[224]

These assertive arguments provoked sharp ripostes from more conservative commentators. No doubt upset by the military establishment's crumbling monopoly over drawing military lessons from Soviet history, Defense Minister Yazov warned that writers on military history bore a "great responsibility" to avoid superficiality and a lack of objectivity.[225] In a similar vein, two foreign-affairs specialists, Valentin Falin and Lev Bezymenskiy, provided a lengthy rebuttal of the liberal line. The reappraisal of Soviet diplomacy, they cautioned, should not yield to "the temptation to seek the truth 'somewhere in the middle' and to metaphysically divide in two the blame for all prewar and postwar complexities . . . , let alone to load these sins on Stalin and Stalinism just for the sake of 'breaking' with the past." According to these writers, "the 'cold war' was not our choice" but the result of American machinations.[226]

These disputes foreshadowed developments at the party conference. Gorbachev's keynote speech severely criticized the foreign-policy legacy he had inherited. The past application of "command-administrative methods," he asserted, had produced erroneous foreign-policy decisions made by a handful of people without adequate reflection or consultation. Gorbachev stated that attaining strategic parity with the US had been necessary, but he vigorously questioned the lengths to which this policy had been carried. Although "fundamental changes in the world" had made it possible to employ political methods of ensuring security, he argued, these methods had not always been used, and the USSR had allowed itself to become entangled in an arms race harmful to its socioeconomic development and international standing. Moreover, traditional Soviet political methods of struggling for peace and disarmament had lost their persuasiveness, thereby increasing the danger of military confrontation and requiring new political thinking.

As Gorbachev described it, the heart of the new thinking was the priority of common human values over class values in the nuclear age. Thanks to the new approach, said Gorbachev, "the USSR is, as it were, 'opening' anew for the outside world." From extensive contacts with other societies it was extracting useful ideas and reaching new understandings of the meaning of such values as freedom and democracy.[227] This comment signaled Gorbachev's desire to incorporate Western economic and political ideas into the reform agenda and to use society-to-society contacts with the West to modify the traditional Soviet political culture. At the same time, Gorbachev signalled reduced attention to military requirements. Proclaiming that the share of national income going to consumption must be increased in the upcoming five-year plan, he connected this goal with the need for "deep changes" in the heavy and defense industries. The technological and manpower requirements of defense programs, he said, should now be guaranteed primarily in qualitative rather than quantitative terms.[228]

Gorbachev also advocated basic alterations in the process of formulating and implementing security policy. Calling for much more foreign-policy *glasnost'*, he advocated decision-making arrangements that would reflect the interests and desires of all social groups. In addition, he urged a "radical increase" in the adminis-

[223]*Literaturnaya Gazeta*, May 18, 1988; *Komsomol'skaya Pravda* (Moscow), June 19, 1988. On Stalin's mistaken policies toward the Nazis and German Social Democrats in the early 1930's, see also Ernst Genri in *Moskovskaya Pravda*, May 19, 1988, in *FBIS-SOV*, June 9, 1988, pp. 63–64.

[224]*Literaturnaya Gazeta*, May 18, 1988. Academician Oleg Bogomolov, who directs the institute where Dashichev works, claimed that negotiating strategic parity at lower military levels would "still be a colossal burden for our economy—a burden that will not allow us to breathe and will condemn us to a continued lag." Ibid., June 29, 1988.

[225]*FBIS-SOV*, Feb. 26, 1988, p. 68; *Pravda*, May 9, 1988.

[226]Lev Bezymenskiy and Valentin Falin in *Pravda*, Aug. 29, 1988, trans. in *FBIS-SOV*, Aug. 31, 1988, pp. 6, 11.

[227]*Pravda*, June 29, 1988.

[228]Ibid.

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trative effectiveness of the agencies handling foreign affairs. No agency, he said pointedly, could remain outside the process of democratic renewal; it was necessary to support the work of the KGB, the Ministry of Defense, and the General Staff in bettering their activity in conditions of unfolding democratic processes.[229] Unlike Gorbachev's past criticisms of the management of external policy, this statement did not name the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Foreshadowing developments later in the fall, Gorbachev's new accent on *perestroyka* in the KGB and the General Staff amounted to a demand for institutional and policy change in these components of the national-security establishment.

This demand dovetailed with Gorbachev's proposal for a governmental reform that would strengthen the legislative organs and vest extensive new powers over external policy in a chief of state elected to chair the Supreme Soviet. Under this new dispensation, the chief of state, in addition to setting the domestic political agenda, would chair the Defense Council and play the central role in deciding major questions of foreign and security policy.[230] Gorbachev plainly intended to occupy this new post himself rather than concede it to Gromyko, the head of state at the time. At the conference one regional party official took the extraordinary step of advocating changes in the Politburo, and after a leading question from Gorbachev, he named Gromyko and Mikhail Solomentsev as members who should be removed.[231]

These maneuvers provoked high-level resistance. Just before the Politburo and Central Committee met to finalize the theses to be discussed at the conference, an angry Gromyko twice warned Gorbachev against forcing the pace of *perestroyka*.[232] Gromyko's objection probably explains why the theses, which were published before the conference, made no mention of restructuring the office of chief of state. The proposal appeared without forewarning in Gorbachev's opening conference address, and the final conference resolutions skirted the question of what powers the chief of state would exercise under a reformed governmental structure. Moreover, Gorbachev's efforts to remove Gromyko were temporarily stymied. Working to shore up the centrist and conservative forces in the Politburo, Ligachev intervened by pointedly reminding the conference that Gorbachev had become general secretary thanks to support from Gromyko, Chebrikov, Solomentsev, and himself.[233] Shcherbytskyi, perhaps reflecting the opinion of some military men, also resisted Gromyko's removal.[234] Gorbachev's bid to use legislative reform to strengthen his power and mobilize public support for his security agenda was momentarily blocked.

Behind the scenes, however, Gorbachev and his allies continued to press their attack. Addressing a large meeting at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in July, Shevardnadze issued a ringing affirmation of the priority of common human values over class values and urged the "exclusive hegemony" of political over military means in conducting foreign relations. According to the Foreign Minister, the interpretation of peaceful coexistence as a specific form of class struggle was "erroneous" and "anti-Leninist." Glancing back over the history of Soviet external relations, Shevardnadze echoed many of the themes sounded by Dashichev and other liberal publicists. Stalin's mistaken line toward the German Social Democrats, he said, had contributed to Hitler's rise, and the blood purges had undermined the credibility of Soviet foreign policy among potential sympathizers abroad. After the war, the USSR had failed to exhaust all the possibilities for mitigating the Cold War. Arguing for a rethinking of the lessons from World War II in light of "the newest experience," Shevardnadze contended that the war had shown that large standing military forces were not of decisive importance. Any advantage in standing forces enjoyed by an aggressor could be overcome if the victim possessed a developed scientific and industrial base.[235]

Shevardnadze's comments about the current international scene were equally provocative. His suggestive remark about the "peculiar boomerang effect" of the use of military force in the postwar era undoubtedly referred to Afghanistan and probably also reflected a

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[229]Ibid.

[230]Ibid.

[231]Ibid, July 1, 1988; Tatu, "19th Party Conference," loc. cit., p. 8, fn. 32.

[232]Gromyko first cautioned that an attempt to set a timetable for the completion of *perestroyka* would be "erroneous and not statesmanlike (*ne po-gosudarstvennomu*)." *Pravda,* May 16, 1988. Five days later, he was more pointed: "It is clear that if a certain person declares that it is necessary to complete *perestroyka* by such-and-such a date, then he will place himself under the threat of provoking the most unpleasant commentaries addressed to him." Ibid., May 19, 1988. A few days later, the Politburo met to discuss the draft theses before submitting them to the Central Committee.

[233]Ibid., July 2, 1988.

[234]Shcherbytskyi, chairing an evening session of the conference, read a note from a delegate defending Gromyko as a committed Communist who should not be mistreated. Had Shcherbytskyi favored Gromyko's removal, he undoubtedly could have ignored the note. The note was from a "Comrade Mamayev," presumably the A. Mamayev who oversaw patriotic education for DOSAAF and who was the only person associated with the military to address the conference. See *FBIS-SOV,* July 5, 1988, pp. 54–55.

[235]*Vestnik Ministerstva Inostrannykh Del SSSR,* No. 15, 1988, pp. 32–33. This view was also strongly advocated in a major theoretical article which appeared about the same time (see I. Usachev, "The All-Human and Class [Factors] in World Politics," *Kommunist,* No. 11, July 1988, esp. pp. 110–12, 115–18.

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belief that the decision to deploy the SS-20's had been a mistake.[236] In any case, he bluntly criticized the 1983 Soviet walkout from the superpower arms talks as an error that had contributed to the creation of "a second strategic front" against the USSR through the US INF deployments.[237] He also complained that previous Soviet leaders had contributed to the stalemate in the Vienna negotiations on mutual and balanced (conventional) force reductions (MBFR) by failing to conduct the talks with sufficient energy.[238] This sweeping indictment of the past work of many veteran diplomats, chief among them Gromyko, foreshadowed a shift to unilateral cuts as a means of imparting momentum to East-West force reductions.

Shevardnadze coupled his criticisms of Soviet diplomacy with barbed complaints about the role of the Ministry of Defense.[239] Calling for the creation of a threat-assessment "mechanism free of arbitrary outside pressures from anyone," he went out of his way to say that past Soviet decisions to produce chemical weapons had been based on "the most primitive and distorted conception about what strengthens and what weakens the country." Shevardnadze criticized the past "compulsory delegation" of diplomatic functions from the foreign ministry to "other command spheres." Ensuring the priority of political means in security, he said, required a rethinking of the "role and place of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in the structure of executive authority, ensuring its higher activity . . . and effectiveness in developing all dimensions of our external policy." Soviet diplomats did not claim the right to know literally everything, but they wanted to know everything related to their sphere of responsibility. Hence "major innovations in the realm of the defense program must pass through an MFA check for their legal conformity with current international agreements and with [the USSR's] declared

[236] *Vestnik Ministerstva Inostrannykh Del SSSR*, No. 15, 1988, p. 35.
[237] Ibid., p. 37.
[238] Ibid.
[239] In the early 1980's, the inability of Soviet diplomatic gambits to block the impending INF deployments had sparked tensions between the two ministries, but the tensions had been expressed indirectly. See the article by Gromyko in *Kommunist*, No. 6, April 1983; and Parrott, "Soviet Policy toward the United States: A Fork in the Road?" loc. cit., pp. 115–16.

Andrey Gromyko leaves the rostrum after resigning as chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet's Presidium on October 1, 1988.

—Novosti from Sovfoto.

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political positions."[240] In other words, Shevardnadze was asserting his ministry's right to rule on the congruence of new military policies and weapons systems with Soviet treaty obligations and political declarations.

Shevardnadze also complained indirectly about the KGB's handling of human rights and took a position on military secrecy that probably displeased many KGB officials. In comments undoubtedly intended for Ligachev and Chebrikov, he denied that the USSR was paying too much attention to foreign opinion about human rights and argued that domestic political liberalization was inherently desirable. Parrying the charge that legal reform fell outside his ministry's legitimate concerns, Shevardnadze asserted that the USSR must take account of foreign opinion and that its policy toward the rights of citizens was a critical determinant of the Soviet image abroad. In order to defend Soviet foreign-policy interests, he said, it was essential to ensure "irreproachable positions in . . . the activity of the law-enforcement departments and their adherence to the laws, which must not contradict our political declarations."[241] Shevardnadze also extolled the recent "giant leap" embodied in the changed Soviet policy toward arms-control verification. "It has turned out," he said, "that our national interests will be better ensured if we open the doors of our nuclear 'foundries' to foreign monitors and in turn ourselves step over the thresholds of foreign nuclear facilities . . . . This seems improbable, but it is a fact."[242] KGB handling of dissidents was undoubtedly one target of Shevardnadze's remarks about human rights,[243] and his observations about verification must have grated on the KGB officials responsible for guarding Soviet military secrets against Western espionage.

Shevardnadze's brief for his own ministry tied in with his elaboration of Gorbachev's plan to create a constitutional mechanism for the formulation of security policy. Shevardnadze referred favorably to the idea of having open legislative hearings at which ministers would be required to answer unrehearsed questions from Supreme Soviet deputies, and he asserted that the elected organs should supervise the open discussion of military budgets, plans for military development, and the use of Soviet military forces abroad. He also proposed soliciting the general public's views on basic foreign-policy decisions by means of opinion surveys and referenda. While it is doubtful that Shevardnadze was prepared to grant the public the final word on major foreign-policy decisions, he did envision giving the public a significant role in shaping security policy, and he obviously expected that this would generate pressure for the policies he favored.[244]

Shevardnadze's speech drew a quick rebuttal from Ligachev. Although Ligachev granted that combatting the danger of nuclear war was a vital common human interest, he implicitly denied the priority of common human interests and underscored the class character of international relations. "Any other framing of the question merely introduces confusion into the consciousness of Soviet people and our friends abroad," he said. Plainly upset by Shevardnadze's approach to human rights, Ligachev again warned against the growing enthusiasm for Western political and economic liberalism. Ligachev also took issue with the reformers' increasing inclination to press for compromise settlements of Third-World conflicts as a way of improving relations with the United States. "Active [Soviet] involvement in deciding common human problems," Ligachev cautioned, "by no means signifies any sort of artificial 'braking' of the social and national-liberation struggle."[245] Ligachev sought to buttress his position by stating that Gorbachev's speech at the 19th Party Conference had affirmed the CPSU's solidarity with the workers of the world. He failed, however, to note that Gorbachev had stressed the universality of the principle of self-determination and the impermissibility of using military or other means to force a nation to adopt a particular social system; nor did he mention Gorbachev's depiction of the withdrawal from Afghanistan as a major watershed in the resolution of various regional conflicts. Shortly after Ligachev's speech, Yakovlev reiterated and extended the liberal point of view. Siding with Shevardnadze, Yakovlev asserted that the priority of common human values allowed one to view the theory of coexistence with the West "realistically and healthily."[246] At the time of the party conference Yakovlev had implied that the Soviet system was not yet inherently peaceful and could become so only through further political liberaliza-

[240] *Vestnik Ministerstva Inostrannykh Del SSSR*, No. 15, 1988, pp. 29, 37, 36.

[241] Ibid., p. 40.

[242] Ibid., p. 33.

[243] In addition, the comments may have been aimed partly at the Ministry of Internal Affairs for its recent harsh handling of some public demonstrations.

[244] *Vestnik Ministerstva Inostrannykh Del SSSR*, No. 15, 1988, pp. 29, 34, 37, and 43. Shevardnadze revealed that the ministry had set up an opinion-survey service with the aid of the Academy's Institute of Sociological Research and had already conducted a series of surveys. Earlier, as republic party first secretary, Shevardnadze had championed the use of public-opinion polling in his native Georgia. As Shevardnadze described it, one use of polling would be to "nourish and form" public opinion.

On the ambiguous treatment of referenda in the current program of legislative reform, see Sergei Voronitsyn in *Radio Liberty Research*, RL 478/88, Oct. 19, 1988.

[245] *Pravda*, Aug. 8, 1988.

[246] Ibid., Aug. 13, 1988.

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tion.[247] More clearly than ever before, he spelled out the goal of incorporating Western political and economic practices into the radically new model of socialism that, liberals contended, the Soviet Union required.[248]

At the end of September, Gorbachev and his allies won a significant victory in the struggle over security policy. At a hastily called meeting of the Central Committee, Gromyko resigned and Solomentsev was removed from the Politburo, along with two nonvoting members from the Brezhnev years. At the same meeting, party secretary Vadim Medvedev vaulted to voting membership in the Politburo without passing through the nonvoting stage. Medvedev, who had played a key part in developing a more flexible policy toward Eastern Europe, voiced enthusiastic support for the primacy of common human values in international relations and called for the incorporation of Western elements into a new Soviet model of socialism.[249] Following Gromyko's resignation, the Supreme Soviet also elected Gorbachev chief of state. The Politburo balance thus shifted noticeably toward those favoring a more accommodating, less militarized policy toward the West, and Gorbachev took an important step toward creating a personal power base outside the party apparatus and capitalizing on the projected legislative reforms to strengthen his control over security policy.

These Politburo changes were accompanied by extensive organizational changes at lower levels. The Central Committee apparatus was reorganized to give Yakovlev the leadership of a new commission supervising foreign policy and Medvedev the leadership of a new commission on ideology. Both appointments strengthened the liberals. At the same time, Politburo conservatives apparently won a concession—Valentin Falin replaced Dobrynin as head of the Central Committee's International Department. In the recent polemics over the history of Soviet foreign policy, Falin had vigorously championed the traditionalist interpretation of the Cold War, implying that he lacked enthusiasm for further policy initiatives to accommodate the United States. He has also, however, expressed qualified criticism of the USSR's excessive reliance on military power in the past. In any case, the impact of his appointment on policy was somewhat reduced by the decision to make Dobrynin a personal advisor to Gorbachev.[250]

Perhaps as important as the tugging over foreign policy within the party Secretariat were the changes at the top of the KGB. In a follow-up to Gorbachev's recent emphasis on *perestroyka* of the KGB, Chebrikov was shifted from the KGB chairmanship and made head of the party commission supervising legislative reform. Apparently this shift entailed a substantial reduction of Chebrikov's power. Although Chebrikov no doubt welcomed the opportunity to put a conservative stamp on the long list of upcoming legislation, including legislation concerning the KGB and the new institutional arrangements for national-security decision-making that the Supreme Soviet is to consider, his power will likely be limited by Gorbachev. As party general secretary and head of the Supreme Soviet, Gorbachev is probably in a position to take many controversial issues out of Chebrikov's hands, on the pretext of implementing the party's new commitment to give real power to the legislature. This surmise is strengthened by Gorbachev's decision to make Anatoliy Luk'yanov, the former party overseer of the police and a legal specialist, first deputy head of the Supreme Soviet.

Chebrikov's transfer appears to be part of a stratagem to reshape the KGB into an institution devoted more to foreign intelligence gathering than to domestic political repression.[251] His replacement as KGB chief is

[247] *FBIS-SOV*, June 29, 1988, pp. 38–39.

[248] During the previous year, Yakovlev's writings had heavily stressed several liberal themes: the expansion of *glasnost'*, the recognition of the supreme value of the individual, the reduction of the state's power over the citizens, the creation of political mechanisms to ensure feedback from society to the political leadership, and the adoption of legislation that would block arbitrary behavior by officials. See, especially, his article in *Kommunist*, No. 8, May 1987.

During the 19th Party Conference Yakovlev observed: "For the first time the question has been raised of a . . . practical creation of a political system that would match the nature of a new society and the modern stage of development of socialism" (ibid., p. 38). And later, "Socialism as practice is . . . the art of actually taking account of all traditions and the most up-to-date tendencies . . . of economics and politics . . . both in our country and abroad. At present, when socialism is preparing for the deepest, radical self-renewal . . . we again turn to the theory and practice of all world development, both socialist and nonsocialist." *Pravda*, Aug. 13. 1988.

[249] Medvedev disavowed the idea of a full convergence between East and West. However, he also remarked that the notion that the capitalist and socialist systems could develop on separate tracks was outdated; rather, the two systems influence each other "within the boundaries of one and the same human civilization." More concretely, Medvedev declared that in creating a new model of socialism, Soviet theorists should look not only inside the socialist bloc but outside it. In particular, he said, it was necessary seriously to study the practices of "contemporary social democracy, its concrete activity, including [its activity] in defending the social and general democratic achievements of the workers." *Pravda*, Oct. 5, 1988. In the budgetary debates of the early 1980's, Medvedev defended a pro-consumer line against the advocates of heavy industry and military spending. See *Kommunist*, No. 5, March 1980, pp. 22–23.

[250] According to one Western press report, Dobrynin was appointed Central Committee secretary overseeing relations with nonruling communist and leftist parties. See *The Washington Post*, Oct. 29, 1988. However, to the best of my knowledge, there has been no official Soviet confirmation that this was his function. At the same time, Falin reportedly did not receive the rank of party secretary, as Dobrynin had, after being selected to head the International Department. See Alexander Rahr, "Falin, Kapto, and Bakatin Promoted to Top Positions," *Radio Liberty Research*, RL 475/88, Oct. 21, 1988, p. 4.

[251] For a different view, see Knight, "The KGB and Soviet Reform," loc. cit.

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Vladimir A. Kryuchkov, previously head of the KGB's First Chief Directorate, the branch responsible for foreign intelligence gathering and operations. In the past, chairmen selected from the KGB's own ranks came generally from the more numerous and larger branches responsible for domestic political surveillance, whose officers followed a career path separate from those in the foreign intelligence directorate.[252] In contrast to domestic KGB officers, who have traditionally resisted East-West détente because of the disruptive impact on Soviet internal affairs, KGB foreign intelligence officers have a vested interest in better relations with the West. The relaxation of East-West tensions facilitates espionage and the theft of foreign technology, and it upgrades the significance of KGB political operations (in contrast to Soviet military programs) as a means of enhancing Soviet interests abroad.[253]

Circumstantial evidence suggests that Kryuchkov is more closely aligned with Gorbachev than with Chebrikov or other party conservatives. At the end of 1987, Gorbachev broke a precedent in superpower relations by bringing the foreign intelligence chief with him to the Washington summit; moreover, the pattern of his selection to head the KGB is typical of Gorbachev's leadership style.[254] Kryuchkov's appointment elevated him above two more senior police officials, much as Yazov was appointed over several higher-ranking military men. Unlike Chebrikov, to whom Gorbachev owed a political debt for support in becoming general secretary, Kryuchkov is probably indebted to Gorbachev.

Shortly before his promotion, Kryuchkov made some statements that meshed with the reformist platform and differed from Chebrikov's views. On the eve of the leadership shake-up, Chebrikov voiced resistance to a renovation of police personnel and reiterated the conservative line on human rights and military secrecy.[255] By contrast, Kryuchkov, who attended the July meeting at the foreign ministry, went out of his way to praise Shevardnadze's keynote speech, despite its implicit criticism of the KGB's handling of human rights, and to compliment the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.[256] Kryuchkov strongly underscored the benefits of Gorbachev's flexible approach to arms control and foreign policy. Alluding, perhaps, to Chebrikov's reservations about signing the INF treaty, he remarked that events had answered the people who had recently asked whether further efforts should be expended on disarmament negotiations with the current American administration. Kryuchkov also asserted that the policy of national reconciliation in Afghanistan offered hope and light in the "long and dark tunnel" of that conflict. Although he remarked that foreign intelligence services were continuing their efforts against the USSR, he did not repeat Chebrikov's claim that these efforts were intensifying or that they threatened the existence of the state. Instead, he focused on the benefits of closer East-West ties for Soviet foreign policy—and, by implication, for Soviet intelligence gathering abroad.[257] Further, he suggested that in some respects *perestroyka* had made the job of Western intelligence services more difficult.[258]

Kryuchkov also noted the need for a "further improvement in the work of the organs of state security." As part of this improvement, he said tersely, the duties of the First Chief Directorate were being "broadened." This remark meshed with his implicit endorsement of Shevardnadze's contention that the regime required more discriminating assessments of foreign political forces and foreign threats. At the same time, Kryuchkov stated that some of the First Chief Directorate's own activities would be modified. "A deeper and more sober approach is being developed to evaluating the activity of the [Soviet] special services," he said, "and in necessary cases the forms and methods of work are being reconsidered." Kryuchkov's use of the word "sober," which foreign-policy officials have customarily used as

[252]Knight, *The KGB: Police and Politics in the Soviet Union*, p. 122.

[253]Ibid., pp. 294–95.

[254]*The New York Times*, Oct. 3, 1988; Hough, "Gorbachev Consolidating Power," loc. cit.

[255]Asked by an interviewer to describe *perestroyka* within the KGB, Chebrikov began by recalling the January plenum's judgment that "the state security organs have cadres who are ideologically tempered, devoted to the party and people, and professionally trained. That is a high assessment." Although he acknowledged the need to "restructure our staffers' thinking," he made no mention of any need to bring "fresh forces" into the police establishment. While Chebrikov noted that the KGB was participating in the preparation of security legislation envisaging "a considerable relaxation . . . of measures connected with the protection of state secrets," he emphasized that reactionary imperialist circles were still trying to "discredit the CPSU's domestic and foreign policy and undermine . . . our state . . . security." Soviet observers who believed that this view amounted to "'spy mania'" and the conjuring up of "'mythical foreign agents'" were incorrect, he asserted, because foreign intelligence services were expanding their activities against the USSR. See *Pravda*, Sept. 2, 1988. Shortly before the appearance of the Chebrikov interview, *Znamya* had criticized a collection of stories about the KGB for stirring up 'spy mania.' *Znamya*, No. 2, July 1988, as quoted in Knight, "The KGB and Soviet Reform," loc. cit.

[256]*Mezhdunarodnaya Zhizn'*, No. 10, 1988, pp. 34–37.

[257]Past Soviet policy-makers, he said, had not quickly grasped the potential of the Western antiwar movement, and too many stereotypes had afflicted the Soviet perception of Western political and business groups. "We are studying and learning badly about people; we are giving little attention to developing contacts with foreign political and social activists and are . . . inadequately struggling for their minds. Apparently it is easier and simpler to create enemies than to win supporters." Ibid.

[258]According to Kryuchkov, *perestroyka* had made it harder for Western intelligence agencies to compromise Soviet citizens traveling abroad, because the expression of unorthodox political ideas could no longer be made a basis for blackmail. He cautioned, however, that this meant Western intelligence services would look instead for shortcomings in citizens' moral conduct.

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

Vladimir Kryuchkov, new chairman of the Soviet Committee for State Security (KGB).

—Novosti from Sovfoto.

a codeword for a less venturesome external policy, may indicate a reassessment of some covert foreign operations, perhaps in response to Gorbachev's stress on greater truthfulness in dealing with the West or his declarations calling for heightened measures to combat international terrorism.[259]

Around the time these remarks were printed, V. Rubanov, a junior official from Kryuchkov's directorate, published an article that diverged even more sharply from Chebrikov's security views.[260] Rubanov condemned the pervasive system of state secrecy as a cover for past political crimes and as an obstacle to current confidence-building measures with the West. The Soviet regime, he asserted, must now create an "information culture" that would allow Soviet specialists and scholars to seize the initiative in East-West debates over security by mustering solid arguments grounded on Soviet military data. Rubanov noted that the "competent institutions"—doubtless including many military men as well as many KGB officials—were skeptical about the wisdom of publishing such information. Nonetheless, citing recent Soviet-American confidence-building and arms verification measures, he advocated establishing a new international legal principle governing state secrecy: "*identical secrecy* in the military-political, military-economic and military-technical realms of activity of states." He also proposed to draw on foreign practice to establish Soviet legal norms governing state secrets.[261]

These radical proposals conformed to a reformist security approach that would curb the KGB's domestic role but expand its role in assessing foreign trends and managing foreign operations. According to Rubanov, information and propaganda had now become "a powerful instrument" that could be used to decide "the most complex tasks," including tasks "which in the course of history have many times led to military struggle." In other words, the processing and manipulation of information were becoming a partial substitute for military force. Only a drastically liberalized interpretation of state secrecy, concluded the author, could contribute to "the defense of *perestroyka*" and guard against "voluntarism and the abuse of power in deciding foreign and internal problems."[262] These views, clearly at odds with Chebrikov's, were quite compatible with Gorbachev's condemnation of voluntaristic foreign policy-making and his call to restructure the KGB in keeping with the requirements of democratization.

Gorbachev's December 1988 speech at the United Nations marked a watershed in the internal debate over security policy. By announcing plans for a unilateral reduction of 500,000 troops over the next two years, Gorbachev swung publicly toward the civilians who contend that unilateral Soviet cuts can serve as a political

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[259]*Mezhdunarodnaya Zhizn'*, No. 10, 1988, p. 37. According to one study, one of the three services within the First Chief Directorate deals with *active measures, including disinformation.* See Jeffrey T. Richelson, *Sword and Shield: Soviet Intelligence and Security Apparatus,* Cambridge, MA, Ballinger, 1986, p. 24. For Gorbachev's comments on terrorism, see *Pravda,* Sept. 17, 1987. In a Soviet collection of essays published in June 1988, Andrey Sakharov condemned the KGB's past suppression of dissidents and called for an investigation of the KGB's role in supporting international terrorism during the 1970's. However, Sakharov's reference to the KGB and terrorism was not reported in the Soviet periodical press. See Vera Tolz, "*Inogo ne dano*—A Manifesto of Soviet Reformers," *Radio Liberty Research,* RL 413/88, Sept. 28, 1988, p. 4.

[260]*Kommunist,* No. 13, September 1988, pp. 24–36.

[261]Ibid., emphasis in the original; see also Knight, "The KGB and Soviet Reform," loc. cit., p. 65. Clearly alluding to *Whence the Threat?*—a glossy Soviet pamphlet criticizing US military programs—Rubanov voiced skepticism that "we can forever answer the Pentagon's regular edition of . . . *Soviet Military Power* with refutations having more literary attractiveness than factual persuasiveness." *Kommunist,* No. 13, 198, p. 30.

[262]*Kommunist,* No. 13, 1988, pp. 24, 36.

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stimulus to Western arms reductions and provide a rapid amelioration of mounting internal economic hardships. Gorbachev's pledge to withdraw some 5,000 tanks and bridging equipment from Eastern Europe was also an important step toward making Soviet military doctrine defensive in an operational rather than merely in a rhetorical sense. Apparently these dramatic policy changes generated civil-military tensions and led to the retirement of Marshal Akhromeyev as First Deputy Minister of Defense and Chief of the General Staff. Although Akhromeyev allegedly retired on grounds of health, the fact that his retirement became known on the day of Gorbachev's speech suggests that it was the product of disagreement about the unilateral reductions Gorbachev announced.[263] During the preceeding year, Akhromeyev had consistently opposed unilateral cuts and favored Soviet reductions only as part of an East-West arms-control package entailing symmetrical reductions of NATO forces—if in fact such an agreement could be reached. Akhromeyev's successor has been elevated from the command of a military district and appears to have had no previous assignments at the General Staff.[264] Like other Gorbachev appointments involving rapid promotions or lateral transfers, the selection of Col.-Gen. Mikhail Moiseyev seems intended to create a military policy-maker who is heavily dependent on the General Secretary and prepared to challenge the prevailing security views entrenched in the bureaucracy he will lead.

Conclusion

The Soviet national-security agenda has changed dramatically under Gorbachev. In the five years before he became general secretary, the Brezhnevian dual-track policy was repeatedly attacked by hard-liners who doubted the utility of superpower negotiations and insisted that Soviet military spending must be sharply expanded. By stimulating a new critique of the dual-track approach which charged that too much rather than too little weight had been put on military power, Gorbachev has transformed the two-sided public debate into a three-cornered contest among hard-liners, centrists, and liberals. The story of Soviet security policy since 1985 is a chronicle of the increasing strength of the Politburo forces favoring the liberal approach. Although Gorbachev and his allies have not yet engineered an equally decisive renovation of the party Central Committee, they clearly dominate security decision-making at the present time.

This changing political balance has made Soviet security policy increasingly daring and accommodating. During his first year in office, Gorbachev won domestic acceptance of the principle of negotiated, symmetrical cuts in the Eastern and Western arsenals. Through the INF Treaty, he established a precedent for negotiated but asymmetrical cuts. His recent UN speech validates unilateral reductions as a legitimate method of guaranteeing Soviet security. He and his political allies have shown an unprecedented willingness to accept on-site inspections of military facilities, to respond to Western concerns about human-rights violations, and to open their society to extensive international contacts that previously would have been rejected as a pretext for Western espionage.

Almost all these changes have encountered resistance from significant groups of party conservatives, professional officers, and KGB officials. These groups distrust Gorbachev's emphasis on political instruments of security and his penchant for conciliatory gestures toward the West, and they fear the potential impact of his policies on the Soviet internal order. On occasion, the General Secretary has been forced to backtrack, as the recoupling of INF and SDI at Reykjavik and the temporary postponement of the Washington summit sug-



General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev addresses the United Nations General Assembly on December 7, 1988.

—Mark Peterson from Reuters/Bettmann Newsphotos.

[263]See M. Hauner and A. Rahr, "New Chief of General Staff Appointed," *Radio Liberty Research*, RL 546/88, Dec. 16, 1988. According to this report, Akhromeyev had been recently confirmed as military affairs advisor to Gorbachev.

[264]Ibid. and *Krasnaya Zvezda*, Dec. 15, 1988.

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gest. On balance, however, he and his backers have succeeded in revising security policy along increasingly liberal lines.

What accounts for the scope and speed of this policy shift? Part of the explanation is that the security consensus forged in the early 1970's was already disintegrating before Gorbachev became party leader. Largely hidden from view, the breakdown of the Brezhnevian security consensus under hard-line criticism created intellectual uncertainty within the elite and provided an opening for the liberal alternatives that had been quietly developing in academic think-tanks. However, the party leadership's new receptivity to liberal policy options would have been impossible without the extensive generational turnover that Gorbachev has worked to accelerate. Men like Shevardnadze and Yakovlev represent an emerging generation of leaders whose views of the international environment were not decisively formed in the crucible of Stalin's blood purges and the massive destruction of World War II. Having no personal stake in defending past policies, many of the Politburo members appointed since 1985 regard the deterioration of the economy and the erosion of the party's domestic legitimacy as compelling reasons to reverse the Brezhnevian national-security legacy.

Equally important is Gorbachev's remarkable political skill. By making himself the symbol of the USSR's new-found international appeal, he has strengthened his hand against domestic opponents who might like to oust him but who must hesitate to repudiate a leader who has won so much international approbation for the regime. Gorbachev has also benefited from the differences between his hard-line and centrist critics, who have sometimes been as much at odds with one another as with him. For a long time Gorbachev refrained from publicly attacking Gromyko, even though Gromyko's years in the foreign ministry were being sharply criticized, and he allowed Gromyko to "retire" with some dignity. Thanks to such subtle tactics, Gorbachev was able to retain Gromyko's continued support for some policy innovations and to prevent a Politburo coalition between this quintessential centrist and hardliners such as Shcherbytskyi, who had attacked the Brezhnev-Gromyko security strategy in the early 1980's.

Gorbachev has also shown an exceptional ability to create unlikely bureaucratic coalitions by locating the generational and policy fissures within particular institutional hierarchies and using these divisions to redirect policy. The appointments of Shevardnadze, Yazov, Kryuchkov, and now Moiseyev exemplify a systematic effort to staff the major national-security bureaucracies with individuals who are more committed to Gorbachev and his program than to the traditional interests and tasks of the hierarchies they have been selected to head. Yazov's behavior indicates that this tactic cannot be counted on to produce simple yes-men, but it has helped break the policy logjam inherited from previous leaders. Politburo liberals have also thrown opponents off balance by unleashing a group of vociferous civilian specialists willing to challenge the military establishment's near-monopoly of expertise and advice on security matters. To a lesser extent, the same tactics have been applied to the KGB.

Despite this adept orchestration of liberal policy innovations, costly and even dangerous setbacks could easily occur, and the reformers are now seeking to institutionalize their security approach. This effort follows logically from Gorbachev's earlier decisions to use domestic political liberalization not only to defuse Western fears of the USSR but to dismantle the image of imperialism that has long justified a confrontational Soviet policy toward the West. The liberal leaders are pushing internal political reforms, which they link explicitly with the de-militarization and de-ideologization of Soviet foreign policy, and which they believe will make a reversion to confrontational policies impossible. Apart from the crucial effort to elaborate a new conception of the Soviet national interest, their agenda includes steps to publish a meaningful defense budget and give the general public a significant influence on the development and use of military power abroad—measures which, given rising popular dissatisfaction with the standard of living, will generate strong public pressures to cut defense spending. The liberals' agenda also includes a reduction of state secrecy, a shift in the focus of the KGB's activities from internal toward external affairs, and the establishment of legal restrictions on the KGB's domestic role. Taken as a whole, the reform program constitutes an act of extraordinary daring with a potential to change the USSR's international behavior in ways without precedent in Soviet history.

The emerging linkage between security policy and internal liberalization makes it increasingly clear that Gorbachev and the liberal reformers are seeking a permanent alteration in the superpower relationship rather than a temporary respite. That is almost certainly one meaning of the recent polemics over whether "common human values" must enjoy priority in relations between East and West. In 1985, disciplinarian reformers such as Ligachev and Chebrikov could accept Gorbachev's security strategy because it meshed with the idea that a policy of diplomatic conciliation offered a breathing space during which the regime could put its house in order before returning to a more antagonistic policy toward the West. Today, however, liberal reformers are

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speaking of "common values" between the two camps and implying that there will be a long, open-ended period of East-West cooperation. Even more important, the liberals conceive of these common values not simply as a shared interest in avoiding nuclear war but as the basis for a partial convergence of Soviet political values and institutions with those of the West. Although it remains unclear just how far the reformers are prepared to go, the new emphasis on the rule of law, the creation of an independent judiciary, and public participation in legislatures with real power unquestionably represents a far-reaching effort at political liberalization.

The outcome of this monumental undertaking is completely uncertain. On the positive side of the ledger, Gorbachev has built up tremendous personal power despite the temporary setback of the Yel'tsin affair and the outbreaks of ethnic unrest that appear to confirm some of his critics' warnings. In sharp contrast to the policy-making deadlock of the early 1980's, he has imparted a powerful dynamism to Soviet security policy and has achieved extremely impressive international successes. These successes include four US-Soviet summits, the INF Treaty, substantial progress toward agreement on drastic cuts in strategic arms, and a sea change in Western attitudes toward the Soviet Union brought about partly by the Soviet decision to begin withdrawing from Afghanistan.

At the same time, any balanced assessment must take account of the powerful historical forces that Gorbachev and his liberal backers are seeking to tame. He and his allies are pursuing nothing less than a basic transformation of the Soviet polity and its relationship with the West. In so doing, they are posing profound questions about the troubled historical relationship between a Soviet Union based on a fusion of sectarian ideology with Russian nationalism and Western polities based on more inclusive political and cultural values. Despite the differences separating Gorbachev's generation from its predecessors, it is quite likely that a large proportion of the new generation regards the liberal reformers' efforts with serious misgivings. Xenophobia, dogmatism, and an instinct to fall back on force have deep historical roots in Soviet political culture. Gorbachev and his allies will need finely tuned political timing and an exceptional capacity to persuade the waverers that liberalization represents the correct path. Given the economic hardships and political turbulence already unleashed by the drive for domestic reform, they will probably also need all their political skill to prevent the emergence of a coalition uniting skeptical politicians with soldiers and policemen conviced that the new approach to national security threatens the vital interests and perhaps the survival of the Soviet state. Last but perhaps not least, the reformers will need to be able to produce tangible evidence for their claim that the West can and will respond positively to the prospect of a new era in East-West relations.

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Addressing "Blank Spots" in Polish-Soviet Relations

Thomas S. Szayna

The connection between the domestic reforms in the Soviet Union associated with Mikhail Gorbachev and the changes in Soviet policy toward East European countries has been noticeable.[1] Perhaps the clearest example of this connection is provided by Poland, where the perceived compatibility between the existing domestic policies and the new Soviet reforms has made the Polish regime enthusiastically responsive to the Soviet changes.[2]

One of the most visible signs of the linkage between Soviet and Polish internal processes has been the reexamination of history initiated by the Soviet and Polish regimes, especially the effort to arrive at a more truthful interpretation of past Polish-Soviet relations—the so-called "Campaign to Eliminate 'Blank Spots'."[3] For the first time since the communist regime was established in Poland, the reasons for animosity between Poles and Russians (as well as between Poles and Ukrainians, Belorussians, and Lithuanians) have been addressed officially. In a declaration issued jointly by the Soviet and Polish communist parties in April 1987, the two sides agreed to work together to study and elucidate touchy issues in Polish-Soviet relations in the hope of removing them as sources of friction between the two countries. A number of sensitive topics concerning the USSR's past policies toward Poland and its people have been targeted for discussion.

Rather than view the campaign to eliminate "blank spots" in Polish-Soviet relations from a historical perspective—which sees the events being reevaluated as central (an endeavor of dubious value to the Western reader since the facts are already well known in the West)—I will examine it from a political perspective, one that sees the reinterpretations of events as secondary in importance to the process and mechanics of reinterpretation itself. I will describe the origin and progress of the campaign to eliminate "blank spots" and its results so far, and then discuss the reasons for and implications of the campaign. The focus of my discussion will be on reactions to the campaign in Poland, where the issue of "blank spots" in Polish-Soviet relations has aroused much greater interest than in the USSR.

"Blank spot," a term first used by Solidarity in Poland but then co-opted by the regime, is now part of the communist lexicon. When used in the context of Polish-Soviet relations, it refers to those historical events that the Polish and Soviet regimes in the past had found too embarrassing to discuss openly and honestly. Both regimes either ignored certain events (e.g., the massive deportations from Polish territories seized by the USSR in 1939), or outrightly falsified them (e.g., the Katyn Forest massacre). Strict censorship helped enforce the official version of history.[4]

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[1]For a discussion of this linkage see David S. Mason, "Glasnost, Perestroika and Eastern Europe," *International Affairs* (London), Summer 1988, pp. 431–48; Thomas M. Cynkin, "*Glasnost, Perestroika* and Eastern Europe," *Survival* (London), July/August 1988, pp. 310–31; Ivan Varga, "Opaque Glasnost? Eastern Europe and Gorbachev's Reforms," *International Journal* (Ottawa), Winter 1987–88, pp. 18–34.

[2]For official Soviet comments to this effect, see the statements made in Poland by the head of the Propaganda Department of the CPSU Central Committee, Andrey Grachev, Warsaw Domestic Service, July 8, 1988, trans. in Foreign Broadcast Information Service, *Daily Report: Soviet Union* (Washington, DC—hereafter, *FBIS-SOV*), July 11, 1988, pp. 41–42.

[3]The term *"belyye piatna"* in Russian or *"białe plamy"* in Polish is literally translated as "white spots." Originally it referred to the white spaces on 19th-century maps of interior Africa—the "unexplored territories." The phrase "blank spots" is used in this discussion because it has been the standard Western translation.

[4]For details on Polish censorship guidelines on historical issues, see Jane Leftwich Curry, Trans. and Ed., *The Black Book of Polish Censorship*, New York, Random House, 1984, pp. 318–69.

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The term "blank spot" does not mean necessarily that the scholarly community or the general public had no knowledge of the given event. Since the late 1970's, Polish historians have published fairly accurate works on virtually all "blank spots" in the history of Polish-Soviet relations except the Katyn Forest massacre, which continued to be considered too sensitive.[5] (Naturally, the fairly small circulation and the scholarly nature of these works has limited their audience mostly to a small circle of intellectuals.) At the same time, large segments of Polish society have been made aware of the inaccuracies in official Polish history texts by family members, the independent press, and Western radio broadcasts. Hence, the present campaign to fill in "blank spots" has applied solely to the *popular* treatment of these topics in the official mass media.

Once it is determined that an event represents a "blank spot," it enters a process of reinterpretation consisting of four stages: 1) the press mentions the event that has been previously ignored and calls for its reinterpretation; 2) the event is referred to as a "blank spot"; 3) evidence is published that either sheds new light on the old interpretation or else invalidates it; 4) a new interpretation is produced (usually one closer to the version found in the West). This process is purely political. In most cases, the facts concerning this event had long been widely known, but political constraints had prevented an honest discussion of these facts in the official media.

The Campaign

The prelude. The process of a comprehensive reevaluation of Polish-Soviet relations was set in motion shortly after Mikhail Gorbachev became general secretary of the CPSU. On April 27, 1985, only days after the much-heralded April Plenum that forewarned of major changes in Soviet socioeconomic development, Gorbachev and Polish First Secretary Wojciech Jaruzelski met in Warsaw and discussed economic, scientific, and technological cooperation between Poland and the USSR. The two leaders stressed the need to develop multifaceted contacts between their peoples. According to Polish reports, it was at this meeting that the "need to explain some aspects in the area of Polish-Soviet relations" was raised.[6]

In the course of several subsequent meetings between Gorbachev and Jaruzelski in 1986, the "directions of Polish-Soviet cooperation were outlined . . . [and they] were concretized during the exchange of visits by the heads of the two countries' governments." On January 24, 1987, Soviet and Polish representatives agreed on a program for the development of ideological cooperation between the Soviet and Polish communist parties—the Polish United Workers' Party (PZPR) and the CPSU—that was to be in effect until 1990. The Soviet delegation (which was already in Warsaw to attend an earlier bloc-wide meeting of Central Committee [CC] departmental heads) was headed by CPSU Central Committee secretaries Alexandr Yakovlev, Vadim Medvedev, and Anatoliy Dobrynin. The Polish representation consisted of PZPR Central Committee secretaries Jan Główczyk, Henryk Bednarski, and Andrzej Wasilewski (heads of the Polish CC's international, ideological, and cultural departments respectively).[7]

The agreement envisaged increased comprehensive cooperation in the ideological, political, scientific, technological, production, and social spheres. Cooperation between the educational establishments of the two countries as well as between their communications media was also stressed, as were greater contacts between the youth of both states. These plans predated and anticipated most of the provisions of the April declaration that called for the elimination of "blank spots."[8] Interestingly, the TASS report on the January agreement contained a cryptic statement that "other functions in the sphere of Soviet-Polish scientific, cultural, and ideological cooperation are envisaged under the program."[9] Presumably, this referred to the reevaluation of the history of Polish-Soviet relations.

The agreement on ideological cooperation was fully in line with the policies advocated by the Soviet delegation to the bloc-wide meeting of CC departmental heads that had just taken place in Warsaw. Poland's approval of the agreement, and later its signing of a declaration of mutual cooperation with the USSR, made it the first—and, for a while, the sole—Soviet-bloc country to agree fully to the Soviet proposals for increased cooperation. It also demonstrated the high degree of the Polish regime's support for and identification with Soviet reforms.

[5]The liberalization of Polish historiography is discussed in Elizabeth Kridl Valkenier, "The Rise and Decline of Official Marxist Historiography in Poland, 1945–1983," *Slavic Review* (Austin, TX), Winter 1985, pp. 663–80.

[6]*Trybuna Robotnicza* (Katowice), Apr. 30–May 1, 1987.

[7]For TASS reports on the agreement, see *FBIS-SOV*, Jan 29, 1987, pp. F/1–3.

[8]Interestingly, the original TASS report, at 1648 GMT, on the January 24, 1987, Polish-Soviet meeting mentioned that an agreement had been signed. Within an hour, at 1742 GMT, TASS issued a correction, saying that a cooperation program had been "agreed upon today." The latter version has been repeated ever since. See TASS, Jan. 24, 1987, *FBIS-SOV*, Jan. 29 1987, p. F/1.

[9]Ibid., p. F/2.

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Any issues regarding the Soviet-Polish agreement that were left outstanding after the January meeting were clarified during two high-level Polish-Soviet meetings in March 1987. During that month, the PZPR CC Ideological Department chief, Wladyslaw Lorenc, and the head of the PZPR CC Science, Education and Scientific-Technological Progress (SESTP) Department, Bogusław Kedzia, visited the USSR and met with, among others, Vadim Medvedev, then the head of the CPSU CC Department for Liaison with Socialist Countries, and Alexandr Yakovlev, the chief Soviet ideologist and one of Gorbachev's closest associates in the Politburo.[10] The two visits were clearly linked to the signing of the formal declaration of Polish-Soviet cooperation a few weeks later.

The actual strategy for presenting and implementing the soon-to-be-signed declaration appears to have been outlined for Polish party officials during an April 15, 1987, meeting of the PZPR CC International Commission. The meeting—attended by, among others, Włodzimierz Natorf (the Polish ambassador to the USSR) and many party members who deal with questions of ideology—was specifically devoted to the "rich text and novel character of the program for the development of ideological cooperation worked out on the initiative of leaders of both [CPSU and PZPR] parties, Wojciech Jaruzelski and Mikhail Gorbachev."[11] Clearly, the PZPR party apparatus was carefully prepared for the declaration and the sensitive issues raised in it.

The April declaration. The formal agreement between Poland and the USSR, "The Declaration on Polish-Soviet Cooperation in the Fields of Ideology, Science, and Culture," was signed by Jaruzelski and Gorbachev in Moscow on April 21, 1987. The date chosen for the signing of the declaration had symbolic significance, for it marked the 42nd anniversary of the signing of "The Treaty of Mutual Friendship, Cooperation, and Assistance Between the USSR and Poland," which defined Polish-Soviet relations after World War II. Although many Poles abhor that treaty because it legitimated Soviet control over Poland, spokesmen for the Polish regime have emphasized that the treaty ended traditional hostility between the two countries and secured peaceful and stable Polish-Soviet relations.

Additional symbolic meaning was given to the date of signing by pointing out that it coincided with the April celebrations of Lenin's birthday and "the 70th jubilee of the Great October Revolution."[12] In the case of the Poles, such symbolism reinforced official pronouncements that a new, even better, chapter in Polish-Soviet relations had been opened. In the Soviet case, the symbolism heralded a new development in the evolution of the international communist movement—a period of cooperation, openness, and exchange of views based on Leninist concepts of equality (as opposed to the Stalinist imposition of inequality) in intraparty relations.

The April declaration outlines why and how "blank spots" in Polish-Soviet relations are to be eliminated.[13] It establishes that the socialist world is currently entering a new and crucial stage of development, which requires greater dynamism of the socialist states and economic cooperation with one another. In view of this, and because of the "special" Polish-Soviet relationship (based on a long history of friendship between Polish and Soviet communists), the CPSU and the PZPR have joined in renewing their respective social systems and broadening their economic ties. One of the important steps they have taken in that direction is restructuring in the sphere of the "superstructure"—i.e., increasing ideological and cultural cooperation between the two countries. The document stresses that more extensive ideological and cultural contacts between the Poles and the Soviet people can lead to more fruitful economic cooperation. The areas of cooperation specifically mentioned are the sciences—including the social sciences.

It is in the context of improving the "superstructure" for the purpose of better scientific-technological progress and economic cooperation that the April declaration mentions "blank spots." The declaration states:

The PZPR and the CPSU attach great significance to the joint study of the history of relations between our countries, parties, and peoples. There can be no "blank spots" in it. . . . All episodes [of ties between the two countries], including also the dramatic ones, should receive an objective and clear interpretation, carried out from Marxist-Leninist positions, in line with the current state of knowledge.

Given the inter-party nature of the declaration (its signatories acted solely in their capacities as leaders of their respective parties) and the explicit condition that history be interpreted from Marxist-Leninist positions, it is clear that only the party—through its various bodies and historians—is to have the right to reevaluate Polish-Soviet relations, and that this reevaluation must stay

[10] *Trybuna Ludu* (Warsaw), Mar. 14–15 and 21–22, 1987.
[11] Ibid., Apr. 17–20, 1987.
[12] *Trybuna Robotnicza*, Apr 30–May 1, 1987.
[13] For the full text of the declaration, see *Pravda* (Moscow), Apr. 22, 1987; and *Trybuna Ludu*, Apr. 22, 1987. All quotations that follow are from the declaration.

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within specific methodological bounds. The phrase "in accordance with the current state of knowledge" constitutes a caveat that links the reinterpretation of Polish-Soviet relations to the reinterpretation of Soviet history in the USSR. Inasmuch as the Soviet reevaluation of Stalin is the focal point that determines the "current state of knowledge" about the Soviet state and its actions, this document links the internal processes of the two countries.

The April declaration guards against the possibility that the process of eliminating "blank spots" may evolve into an enumeration of painful episodes, by stipulating that "it is necessary above all to pay tribute to the things that have strengthened the friendship between our parties and peoples and to condemn those things that have caused it harm." Thus, a two-sided, traditional, historical Marxist approach is promoted, which is to produce the definitive judgment on where the two sides have gone wrong. Admitting to the existence of national prejudices, the document notes further that:

History must not be the subject of ideological speculations and the cause of the kindling of nationalist passions. In posing the question in this manner, we are guided by a common responsibility for the future, for the future development of fraternal Polish-Soviet relations. Nothing must mar the friendship and cooperation of future generations of the Polish and Soviet peoples. We must not leave unsolved problems for our children and grandchildren.

One of the basic means the declaration suggests for changing the negative perceptions that Poles and Soviets have of each other is popular media coverage of each other's country. What amounts to media guidelines are spelled out. Clearly, coverage is to be positive and is to emphasize the benefits of socialist cooperation: "Any publication that popularizes useful experience, serves the development of the workers' culture, and contributes to strengthening an internationalist outlook and eradicating nationalist prejudices is valuable." Other means of overcoming nationalistic antagonisms mentioned in the declaration are to significantly expand cultural ties and youth exchanges; and to increase people-to-people contacts between families, workplaces, and cultural/educational centers, and between sister provinces in the two countries. Special emphasis is placed on the internationalist upbringing of Polish and Soviet youth.

The Joint Commission. One of the first concrete results of the April declaration has been the setting-up of a commission of party historians to reexamine the Polish-Soviet past. Officially known as the "Joint Commission of Party Scholars from the People's Republic of Poland and the USSR for Issues in the History of Relations Between the Two Countries," it has held three well-publicized meetings. But before discussing the commission, several caveats are in order. First, a reexamination of the history of Polish-Soviet relations was envisioned in the declaration as merely one component of the "superstructure" of increased Polish-Soviet ties. Efforts have also been made to expand economic, cultural, and educational ties between the two countries and to form joint commissions in several new areas and scientific fields. Coordination between economists, sociologists, and ideologists of both countries has been increased as well.

Second, cooperation between Polish and Soviet historians is hardly extraordinary. The Joint Polish-Soviet Commission of Historians of the Polish Academy of Sciences and the USSR Academy of Sciences has been functioning for many years and has several subcommissions, including a Joint Editing Commission, which has been publishing the multi-volume *Documents and Materials in the History of Polish-Soviet Relations.*[14] What is extraordinary about the latest commission is that it has been formed to address a specific problem that was previously officially ignored—namely, the deep animosity that Poles and Russians often feel for each other on a personal level.

Thus, the formation of the commission and the publicized campaign to eliminate "blank spots" do not really constitute a significant departure from the past. The 13 thick volumes of documents on Polish-Soviet relations published by the Joint Editing Commission are proof of the ongoing efforts of the two regimes to clarify the subject of Polish-Soviet relations. The recent public admission that "blank spots" remain and the formation of a special task force to deal with them are indicative of incremental change and greater political sophistication on the part of both regimes rather than a major turnaround. Even the manner of tackling the issue—establishing a topic-oriented commission—hardly constitutes a change in bureaucratic patterns of behavior, since it entails the continuation of problem-solving by centralization and compartmentalization.

Officially, the commission is charged with reassessing the history of Polish-Soviet relations so as to draw lessons for the future and to ensure that the same mistakes will not be repeated again. It is hoped that the en-

[14]Two members of the Joint Editing Commission (Soviet member V. Yu. Sipols and Polish member General Tadeusz Walichnowski) are also members of the "blank spots" commission.

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Table 1: Soviet Members of the Joint Commission

Name of member (meetings attended)	Affiliation
Georgiy L. Smirnov (chairman) (1,2,3)	Director of the Marxism-Leninism Institute; candidate member of CC CPSU
Valeriy V. Zhuravlev (1,2,3)	Deputy director of the Marxism-Leninism Institute
Valentina S. Parsadanova (1,2,3)	Institute of Slavic and Balkan Studies, USSR Academy of Sciences
Tamara V. Porfir'yeva (1,2,3)	Marxism-Leninism Institute
Oleg A. Rzheshevskiy (1,2,3)	Head of sector at the Institute of General History, USSR Academy of Sciences
Aleksandr O. Chubar'yan (1,2,3)	Director of the Institute of General History, USSR Academy of Sciences
Inessa S. Yazhborovskaya (1,2,3)	Institute of Slavic and Balkan Studies, USSR Academy of Sciences
Col. V. O. Daines (1,3)	Institute of Military History
B. S. Popov (1,3)	USSR Academy of Sciences
Col. P. A. Kochegura (1,2)	Institute of Military History
Aleksey L. Narochnitskiy (1,2)	Department head at the Institute of USSR History, USSR Academy of Sciences
G. A. Trukan (1)	Marxism-Leninism Institute
V. Yu. Sipols (2)	Institute of Slavic and Balkan Studies, USSR Academy of Sciences
Fridrikh I. Firsov (2)	Head of sector at the Marxism-Leninism Institute
R. A. Yermolayeva (3)	Marxism-Leninism Institute
P. F. Kazin (3)	Institute of Archaeology, USSR Academy of Sciences
Ye. M. Kozhevnikov (3)	Marxism-Leninism Institute
V. S. Nevolina (3)	(Affiliation unknown)
Ye. A. Skripilev (3)	Institute of State and Law, USSR Academy of Sciences
V. K. Volkov (3)	Institute of Slavic and Balkan Studies, USSR Academy of Sciences

tire process will bring about greater Polish-Soviet friendship. Yet, if this were its only purpose, the commission would not have had to be formed. Facilitating scholars' access to archives and eliminating the political constraints on the dissemination of their findings would have been sufficient. The commission was formed so that the communist parties of the two countries would control the process of reexamining history, which remains "very much an elite-directed operation."[15]

Forming such a commission was all the more important because the Soviets have been reevaluating their own history with the aim of further delegitimizing Stalin and many aspects of the system he built. Since the current leadership in the USSR is a product of the Stalinist system, any delegitimation of that system can threaten the stability of the regime. Hence, just as *glasnost'* in the Soviet media has proceeded in stages, with new topics being explored successively and gradually, the reevaluation of history has also required careful monitoring and control by the party.

In the final analysis, the Joint Commission has a political purpose: to make certain that the process of reevaluating Polish-Soviet relations is held in check, and to synchronize and coordinate Polish efforts to fill in "blank spots" with similar efforts in the USSR.

The membership of the commission. The political purpose of the commission becomes evident upon examining its membership. Presumably, commission members were selected by the highest party authorities in charge of ideology. Nevertheless, the same members did not attend all three meetings. There were 12 Soviet members listed at the first meeting—11 party scholars and the chairman. The names of 10 Soviet scholars plus that of the chairman appeared in the protocols of the second meeting. The chairman and 14 members were listed for the third meeting. Only seven Soviet scholars attended all three (see Table 1).

Among those attending all three sessions was Georgiy Smirnov, the chairman of the Soviet representation in the commission. As a candidate member of the CPSU Central Committee, Smirnov has a clear link to party policy-making bodies; as director of the Central Committee's Marxism-Leninism Institute, he is in charge of implementing the party's directives on the interpretation of party history. Smirnov is also a corresponding member of the USSR Academy of Sciences.

Most important, Smirnov is closely associated with Gorbachev. He is one of four advisors that Gorbachev brought in soon after his own accession to the post of general secretary. During the first phase of *perestroyka* (until his appointment as head of the Marxism-Leninism Institute in January 1987), Smirnov acted as a consultant to Gorbachev "on ideological affairs."[16] Currently,

[15]Comments by Adam Michnik, "A Battle for the Memory" *Die Zeit* (Hamburg), Apr. 15, 1988.

[16]Alexander Rahr, "Gorbachev's Personal Staff," Radio Liberty-Radio Free Europe (hereafter cited as RFE-RL), *Radio Liberty Research* (Munich), RL 216/87, May 30, 1988.

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he has been entrusted—apparently by Gorbachev himself—with the task of implementing changes in the ideological sphere that would justify the socioeconomic and political changes envisioned by the current Soviet leadership. Under Smirnov's guidance, the Marxism-Leninism Institute has emerged as the forum for discussion regarding the rewriting of the history of the CPSU.[17] Smirnov's closeness to Gorbachev is also evident in his writings. On the occasion of the publication of three volumes of Gorbachev's writings, Smirnov expounded on the correctness of *perestroyka,*[18] and in the summer of 1988, he edited a work that elaborated on Lenin's pro-*glasnost'* views.[19]

Another member who attended all three meetings of the commission is Valeriy Zhuravlev (deputy director of the Marxism-Leninism Institute and an editor of the Institute's journal, *Voprosy Istorii KPSS*). Zhuravlev is a Marxist theoretician rather than a historian.

As high functionaries in the Soviet party-academic establishment, both Zhuravlev and Smirnov not only have written on the current reform process in the Soviet Union, but also have enunciated the party line to select audiences. For example, Zhuravlev recently chaired a seminar concerning party leadership and scientific-technological progress.[20] The presence on the Joint Commission of both the director *and* deputy director of the Marxism-Leninism Institute, plus the personal link between Smirnov and Gorbachev, opens a powerful channel of direct communication between the commission and the highest reaches of the CPSU.

The remainder of the commission's Soviet membership falls roughly into two groups: those from the Marxism-Leninism Institute, and those from the Academy of Sciences. The latter group includes Aleksandr Chubar'yan, an authority on historiographical methodology; Oleg Rzheshevskiy, a specialist on the Soviet role in World War II; and Aleksey Narochnitskiy, an older academician specializing in 18th- and 19th-century European colonial policies toward the Far East, who seems to have been included for reasons of adding prestige to the commission and providing a more balanced institutional representation. The Soviet representation also includes three specialists on Poland who attended all three meetings: Inessa Yazhborovskaya, Valentina Parsadanova, and Tamara Porfir'yeva. Porfir'yeva is from the Marxism-Leninism Institute, while the other two are from the Academy's Institute of Slavic and Balkan Studies. All three are basically specialists on the Polish communist movement and have written mostly on aspects of Polish communist policies.

The other Soviet members of the commission are predominantly scholars of Soviet history, e.g., experts on Lenin's nationalities policy or on the Soviet role in World War II. Two of them, Colonels V. O. Daines and P. A. Kochegura, are military historians.

Virtually all the Soviets on the commission are scholars of party history who have focused on party policies and the role of the party in the development of the Soviet state. While different institutional affiliations provide some diversity in the composition of this group, members from the Marxism-Leninism Institute (which is part of the Central Committee apparatus) predominate.

Such a membership composition ensures that the commission acts as a transmission belt of CPSU control over any historical reevaluation of Polish-Soviet relations. Indeed, as one Polish commission member has admitted, the commission is relying for its own reevaluations on the work of Soviet party historians, including the all-Soviet commission formed by the CPSU Central Committee for the study of improprieties committed in Stalin's time.[21] The new history of the USSR currently being written by Soviet historians will also set the tone for interpretating Polish-Soviet relations, and thus for rewriting Polish history.

The Polish contingent attending the first meeting of the commission numbered eight scholars and the chairman; the representation attending the second meeting consisted of 12 scholars and the chairman; 11 scholars and the chairman attended the third meeting. Eight specialists took part in all three meetings (see Table 2). The chairman of the Polish representation is Jarema Maciszewski, a known historian of the 17th century, president of the PZPR Academy of Social Sciences, long-time PZPR deputy to the Sejm (Poland's parliament), and since March 1972, chairman of the Sejm Commission for Education and Upbringing. In some of his more recent writings, Maciszewski has shown a proclivity to explore why the Poles have the *Weltanschauung* they do, and how it might be reshaped to become more "rational" instead of reflecting a supposed Polish predilection for futile struggles against overwhelming odds.[22]

[17]The Institute's journal reflects the changes; see, for example, N. N. Maslov, "What Sort of Book Should the New Textbook on the History of the CPSU Be?" *Voprosy Istorii KPSS* (Moscow), July 1987, pp. 47–62.

[18]Georgiy Smirnov, "The Creative Theory of Developing Socialism," *Kommunist* (Moscow), No. 12, August 1987, pp. 19–32.

[19]See *Pravda*, June 19, 1988.

[20]See "Party Leadership of Scientific-Technological Progress in Conditions of *Perestroyka*," *Voprosy Istorii KPSS*, March 1988, pp. 148–54.

[21]Interview with Mieczysław Tanty, *Gazeta Lubuska* (Zielona Góra), Apr. 9–10, 1988.

[22]See, for example, the interview with Maciszewski, "Poles: Past, Present, and Future," published in *Człowiek i Światopogląd* (Warsaw), No. 12, 1986, pp. 96–111.

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Table 2: Polish Members of the Commission

Name of member (meetings attended)	Affiliation
Jarema Maciszewski (chairman) (1,2,3)	Rector of the PZPR Academy of Social Sciences; Sejm deputy
Col. Eugeniusz Kozlowski (1,2,3)	Deputy head for scientific research, Military History Institute
Marek Kuczyński (1,2,3)	Academy of Social Sciences (?)
Col. Marian Leczyk (1,2,3)	Institute of Socialist Countries, Academy of Sciences; professor at Military Political Academy
Czesław Madajczyk (1,2,3)	Director, Institute of History, Academy of Sciences
Ryszard Nazarewicz (1,2,3)	Institute of the History of the Workers' Movement, Academy of Social Sciences
Col. Kazimierz Sobczak (1,2,3)	Head of the Institute of Military History; head of Department of Political Science at the Military Political Academy
Bronisław Syzdek (1,2,3)	Director of PZPR CC Central Archives
Mieczysław Tanty (1,2)	University of Warsaw; Institute on the History of the Workers' Movement, Academy of Social Sciences
Włodzimierz Kowalski (2,3)	Writer of popular historical works, television personality
Czesław Luczak (2,3)	University of Poznań
Gen. Tadeusz Walichnowski (2,3)	Rector of the Internal Affairs Academy
Col. Marian Wojciechowski (2,3)	Military History Institute

Maciszewski's devotion to the regime is certain. A rare, uncensored glimpse of it can be gleaned from a recent underground publication of detailed summaries of telephone conferences between high-ranking party officials during the Solidarity era.[23] On September 13, 1980, one of those days of uncertainty following the nation-wide strikes in Poland, Maciszewski, speaking to some of the highest party officials—including Stanisław Kania, then PZPR First Secretary—agreed with the proposal for a "deep renewal" of society, but also proposed tactics designed to maintain the party's hold on the educational establishment, among them guidelines for the censor:

. . . censorship bothers humanists, but we will not allow anything that has an anti-Soviet tinge. . . . [R]egarding censorship: anything can be written except that which may cause harm to alliances or Polish-Soviet friendship.[24]

Given the general absence of anti-Soviet material in the official Polish media in 1980–81, it appears that Maciszewski's comments had their impact.

The rest of the Polish membership is made up of military and party historians. In contrast to the Soviets, and probably in an attempt to give the commission more credibility, Polish official media have seldom listed the scholarly affiliations of the Polish representation, preferring instead to refer to them simply as professors. Thus, it remains a little-known fact that five Poles on the commission are high-ranking military men: one is a general and four are colonels.

The general, Tadeusz Walichnowski, has held many high positions in the party apparatus, including full member of the Central Committee during the 1980's and lately rector of the Internal Affairs Academy[25]—a high position in internal security. He has experience working on "blank spots" in Polish-Soviet relations as a member of the Joint Editing Commission. Seemingly, he is also a member of the Party Historians' Task Force that is part of the PZPR CC's SESTP Department—a little-known group that implements party policy on historical education in Poland.

Walichnowski achieved notoriety in the late 1960's, when he was one of General Mieczysław Moczar's key aides during the latter's attempt to seize power from Władysław Gomułka. As head of the Interior Ministry's "nationalities" section, Walichnowski "drew up lists of people to be purged and . . . authored several explicitly anti-semitic books."[26]

Walichnowski's writings display a distinctly doctrinaire Marxist and sycophantic view of the communist system in Poland and of the party's accomplishments. For example, Walichnowski has written that:

. . . the history of [Polish-Soviet] relations—including also the so-called Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact—does not provide reasons for mutual hatred or distrust . . . . Rather, it works to the benefit of these relations, and the contemporary arrangement of political and military forces

[23] *Poglądy* (West Berlin), No. 12, 1987. The document seems genuine. The details of the conversation—names, dates, facts mentioned—all appear to correspond to the persons identified as being the conversants.

[24] Ibid.

[25] *Rzeczpospolita* (Warsaw), Nov. 26, 1987.

[26] A. Ross Johnson, "Poland: End of an Era?" *Problems of Communism* (Washington, DC), January-February 1970, p. 38.

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in the international arena and the economic situation in the world are favorable to their development.[27]

Like Maciszewski, Walichnowski has shown an interest in shaping the views of Polish youth toward more favorable perceptions of the USSR and socialism, though, as befits his internal-security role, his focus has been on more practical issues.[28]

The other military members of the Polish half of the commission are Col. Kazimierz Sobczak, head of the Military Institute of History and chief of the Department of Political Science at the Military-Political Academy (a quintessential establishment figure, he has been a target of polemics by historians who wanted a more accurate interpretation of 20th-century Polish history[29]); Col. Marian Leczyk, a professor at the Military-Political Academy and a member of the Institute of Socialist Countries at the Polish Academy of Sciences; Col. Eugeniusz Kozłowski, a long-time military historian at the Military History Institute; and Col. Marian Wojciechowski, also a military historian. The presence of two members of the Military-Political Academy and of the chief of the Internal Affairs Academy gives a decidedly internal-security profile to the commission.

Reinforcing this profile on the commission is Bronisław Syzdek, the director of Central Archives of the PZPR Central Committee. As the man in charge of party secrets, Syzdek has to be one of the top functionaries in the internal-security apparatus in Poland. His writings have been basically on the "proper" ideological upbringing of youth.[30]

Other members of the commission also had backgrounds in ideological education of youth. Ryszard Nazarewicz, a party historian affiliated with the Institute of the History of the Workers' Movement at the PZPR Academy of Social Sciences, is also apparently a member of the Main Directorate of the Union of Fighters for Freedom and Democracy (ZBoWiD—an organization of veterans known as the nerve center of Polish Stalinists), where he currently has a leading position on its committee for historical education.[31] Mieczysław Tanty, also a party historian and member of the PZPR CC Task Force for historical education,[32] has written on the ideological upbringing of youth.[33]

At the second meeting of the commission, Czesław Łuczak, a historian who has had little to do with Polish-Soviet relations—having written mainly on western Poland and Polish-German matters—was added to the commission because of his role in implementing the party's policies in historical education. He is the chairman of the above-mentioned Party Historians' Task Force.[34] Also added were Włodzimierz Kowalski, a writer of popular historical works who is known in Poland for his appearances on television programs dealing with historical topics.[35] Czesław Madajczyk, the long-time director of the Polish Academy of Sciences' Institute of History and a bona fide historian whose integrity is generally acknowledged, has lent some measure of respectability to the Polish representation.

Compared to its Soviet counterpart, the Polish representation in the commission shows a larger mix of affiliations, although, like the Soviet delegation, it too is dominated by party historians affiliated with the party's Academy of Social Sciences, a Central Committee body with institutional aspects resembling those of the Soviet Marxism-Leninism Institute. Just as the theoretical-ideological background of the Soviet members is evident, so too is the propagandistic-educational-security background of the Polish members.

The commission's exclusivity rights. The PZPR and CPSU have given the commission the exclusive right of being the reinterpreter of the history of Polish-Soviet relations. Thus, the entire process of eliminating "blank spots" is the commission's domain. Any challenge to its rights constitutes a challenge to the parties' monopoly on the scientific and educational guidance of their countries.

Such challenges, nevertheless, have been made in Poland by both establishment and non-establishment

[27]Tadeusz Walichnowski, *Kryzysy i konflikty społeczno-polityczne w Polsce* (Social and Political Crises and Conflicts in Poland), Warsaw, Akademia Spraw Wewnętrznych, Instytut Historii i Archiwystyki, 1986, pp. 116–17.

[28]For example, during a November 1988 meeting of the Party Historians' Task Force which is part of the PZPR CC's SESTP Department, Walichnowski discussed the extent and influence of the Polish independent press. See *Rzeczpospolita,* Nov. 26, 1987.

[29]See the discussion of five historians, "History: Consciousness and Education," published in *Miesięcznik Literacki* (Warsaw), No. 8/9, 1981, pp. 132–49.

[30]Bronisław Syzdek, "Particularly Much Needs to Be Done. The Traditions of the Workers' Movement in the Area of Ideological Education," in *Za Wolność i Lud* (Warsaw), No. 33, 1987, pp. 1, 7.

[31]*Trybuna Ludu,* June 12, 1987.

[32]Ibid.

[33]See for example, Jarosław Książek, Maciek Dariusz, and Mieczysław Tanty, "Historical Education of Students Not Enrolled in the Field of History," *Życie Szkoły Wyższej* (Warsaw), No.7/8, 1986, pp. 67–80.

[34]As a party functionary, Luczak chaired the January 20, 1988, task force meeting during which the project of popularizing the 70th anniversary of Poland's renewed independence was outlined for historians. See *Rzeczpospolita,* Jan. 21, 1988.

[35]Kowalski's television appearances have gained him the reputation of being a true establishment figure. One interviewer told him that many people considered him to have contributed to the creation of "blank spots." *Odrodzenie* (Warsaw), Apr. 16, 1988. Inclusion of Kowalski in the commission has been greeted with derision in the Polish independent press. See Andrzej Nowak, "Action 'Blank Spots'—A Historical Theme with Variations," *Arka* (Krakow), No. 27, 1988.

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historians. Whether due to a hurt ego because they were not invited to participate in the commission, or because of genuine doubts about the integrity of the commission, Polish historians have manifested a gamut of reaction's to this body that has ranged from a pronounced lack of enthusiasm to open rejection and disgust. Even Eugeniusz Duraczyński, an establishment figure, publicly announced in June 1987, soon after the first meeting, that the institutes of history at the Polish Academy of Sciences and Warsaw University, being the best and most representative associations of Polish historians, were "predestined" to formulate the new program for the study of Polish-Soviet relations. Moreover, he pointed out, preliminary discussions on reevaluating Polish-Soviet relations had already taken place at those institutes.[36]

Other Polish historians expressed skepticism about the commission, especially during the first few months of its existence. Their resentment concerning limits imposed on their own work also came across in their interviews with the press and in their articles. Some explicitly blamed political constraints—and by implication, politicians—for creating "blank spots" in the first place.[37] Historian Roman Wąpinski described the attempt to fill in "blank spots" as just "another progaganda campaign,"[38] while Ludwik Haas, a historian sympathetic to the regime, spoke out against exposing historical truth in doses carefully calibrated by the regime.[39] A third historian, Marian Drozdowski, made disparaging comments about the "new truth" being proclaimed by the establishment.[40]

For their part, historians writing in the Polish Catholic press have greeted the whole campaign to eliminate "blank spots" with derision and biting sarcasm.[41] All in all, only the most pro-regime party historians, who often come from the same milieu as the commission members (especially from the PZPR's Institute of the History of the Workers' Movement), have been supportive of the commission's work.[42]

Doubts about the commission have also surfaced in Poland's governmental bodies. During deliberations of the Council of State, Maciszewski debated a non-party historian, who argued that even at the time of Poland's partitions (in the 18th and 19th centuries), Polish historians did not need international agreements to allow them to work on Polish history, and that the present problem was one of censorship and hypocrisy.[43] On another occasion, Maciszewski bristled at the suggestion that the commission was composed of politicians and not historians.[44]

Clearly, the commission finds itself in a difficult position in Poland. With negative perceptions about it abounding, it cannot expect the Polish community of historians to give it the benefit of the doubt. Does it find itself in a similar situation in the USSR? Perhaps some debates regarding the composition and work of the commission have occurred in the Soviet Union, but if so, they have not been reported in the official media. Since the issue is not as important to the Soviets as it is to the Poles, in all probability little, if any, controversy exists in the USSR regarding the commission.

The commission's meetings. The commission has met officially three times since the signing of the declaration. The first meeting was held in Moscow on May 18–20, 1987. It established that the following events belonged in the category of "blank spots:" the period 1917–20; the dissolution of the KPP (the Communist Party of Poland) in 1938; the events of August and September 1939; the Warsaw uprising in 1944; and the fraternal ties between Poles and Soviets during World War II.[45] Since applying the label "blank spot" to an event implies that the existing interpretation of that event falls short of a full explanation of it, agreement on events to be examined by the commission was a crucial first step. It is notable that in its first meeting the commission did not include in the category of "blank spots" the Katyn Forest massacre or the deportation of Poles into the Soviet interior from lands seized by the Soviet Union in 1939.

According to the communiqué issued after the first meeting, the second meeting was scheduled for November 1987 in Warsaw.[46] Apparently, some disagreement between the Soviet and Polish members of the commission and/or lack of clarity on the Soviet side

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[36]Interview with Eugeniusz Duraczyński, *Polityka* (Warsaw), June 13, 1987; Eugeniusz Duraczyński, "Zones of Silence," *Przegląd Tygodniowy* (Warsaw), June 21, 1987. Interestingly enough, in an interview he gave two months later, Duraczyński was far more subdued and no longer mentioned alternative bodies to the commission. See *Głos Robotniczy* (Łódz), Aug. 21, 1987.

[37]See, for example, an interview with several Polish historians, "Is It the Fault of Historians or Politicians?" *Polityka*, Aug. 15, 1987. One of the historians, Wiesław Wadyka, mentioned that a book he had co-authored about the events in Poland in 1956 was not allowed to be published.

[38]Roman Wapiński, "The Gaps Apply Only to the Particulars," ibid., Dec. 19, 1987.

[39]Ludwik Haas, "Solutions for 'Blank Spots'," *Sprawy i Ludzie* (Wrocław), Dec. 30, 1987.

[40]*Dziennik Bałtycki* (Gdańsk), Sept. 11, 1987.

[41]See, for example, Anna Radziwill, "Blank Spots or Dirty Spots?" *Przegląd Katolicki* (Warsaw), Apr. 3–10, 1988.

[42]See, for example, the interview with Euzebiusz Basiński, *Życie Warszawy* (Warsaw), June 27–28, 1988.

[43]See summary of proceedings of the Council of State on July 17, 1987, in *Słowo Powszechne* (Warsaw), Sept. 24, 1987.

[44]This accusation was formulated by Jerzy Borejsza in *Polityka*, June 2, 1988.

[45]*Pravda*, Mar. 12, 1988.

[46]*Trybuna Ludu*, May 22, 1987.

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about the pace and direction of the reinterpretation of history caused repeated postponements of the second meeting. When the commission finally did meet for the second time—from February 29 to March 5, 1988—it discussed the following topics: the Polish-Soviet War of 1920; the dissolution of the KPP; the deportations of Poles in 1939–41; and the cooperation and assistance between Poles and the Soviet peoples during World War II. Katyn was discussed under the heading of deportations.

The third meeting of the commission took place in Moscow from November 29 to December 1, 1988—more or less as scheduled. The following topics were discussed: the dissolution of the KPP, the events of August and September 1939, the deportation of Poles in 1939–41, Katyn, and Polish-Soviet wartime cooperation. What is particularly interesting to note is the change in topics discussed: the events of August-September 1939 and the Warsaw uprising were dropped from discussion, while the issues of deportations and Katyn were added.

In the period between the first and second sessions of the commission, selected Polish and Soviet members of that body met at less publicized meetings and conferences.[47] The commission agreed to expand this practice at its second formal meeting, and as a result, eight "working meetings" (all dealing with World War II) were held prior to the third formal meeting.

Given the length of its existence, the commission has produced few results. It was not until the fall of 1987 that Polish and Soviet official media mentioned anything new concerning Polish-Soviet relations, and even then, the revelations were for the most part timid, couched in euphemisms, and often still distorted.

The Results

Of the historical topics addressed thus far by the Joint Commission as "blank spots," the Katyn Forest massacre is the event that elicits the greatest emotional response among Poles. As such, it has become the litmus test of the commission's integrity in reevaluating Polish-Soviet history. Given the centrality of the Katyn massacre to the campaign of eliminating "blank spots," I will concentrate on this issue, and only summarize briefly, at the outset, developments concerning the other "blank spots" mentioned above.

The Polish-Soviet War of 1919–21. When World War I ended, disagreement between the Poles and the Soviets over their common border erupted into a border war in 1919. Taking advantage of the civil war in Russia, Poland's Marshal Józef Piłsudski launched a full-scale offensive against the Bolsheviks in the spring of 1920. The Poles managed to seize Kiev, but their push eastward was arrested by the Red Army in the summer of that year, and the Polish army was thrust back as far as Warsaw. A Polish counterattack eventually restored the border to where it was prior to the outbreak of hostilities. The conflict ended with the signing of the Treaty of Riga (1921), which defined the border between Poland and the USSR.[48]

The commission has not had any major problems dealing with the issue of the Polish-Soviet War, although some disagreements surfaced as to whether or not it is valid to treat the Soviet offensive against Poland as an attempt to spread the revolution by means of bayonets. Basically, however, the commission's interpretation approximates what has been written by Soviet historians for the past 25 years.[49] The Polish advance on and seizure of Kiev is still seen as an unnecessary and foolish Polish provocation, while the Polish communists' act of setting up on Polish territories captured by the Red Army a Polish Soviet Socialist Republic governed by a provisional communist government is still interpreted as an act of true Polish patriotism. Polish responsibility for initiating the war remains unquestioned by the commission.[50] The only change has been to shift the blame for the Soviet advance deep into Poland onto Trotsky and Stalin and to exonerate Bukharin and Lenin. Thus, the Polish-Soviet war has been updated to reflect Soviet reinterpretation of Soviet history.[51]

The dissolution of the KPP. In 1918, a unified communist party was formed in Poland. This party changed its name in 1925 to the Communist Party of Poland, or the KPP. Beset by factionalism, lacking a significant following, and suffering from police infiltration, the KPP was disbanded in 1938 by the Comintern on the grounds that it was supposedly a center of Trotskyism

[47]These meetings were sponsored either by mutual friendship societies or by other joint historical commissions. See Radio Warsaw, July 6, 1987, 8:10 a.m., as cited by T.S.S., "Blank Spots in Polish-Soviet Relations," RFE-RL, *Polish Situation Report* (Munich), No. 9, July 24, 1987, pp. 24–25.

[48]For a history of the Polish-Soviet War, see Norman Davies, *White Eagle, Red Star; the Polish-Soviet War, 1919–1920*, London, 1972.

[49]James M. McCann, "Beyond the Bug: Soviet Historiography of the Soviet-Polish War of 1920," *Soviet Studies* (Glasgow), October 1984, pp. 475–93.

[50]In an interview, the Polish ambassador to the USSR expressed what amounted to a strong indictment of the Polish role during the war of 1920. See interview with Włodzimierz Natorf, *New Times* (Moscow), Aug. 10, 1987, pp. 14–15.

[51]Vladlen Sirotkin, "The Riga Peace Treaty," *Mezhdunarodnaya Zhizn'* (Moscow), August 1988, pp. 128–43. A military historian laid the blame for the failure of the Soviet offensive on Stalin and Voroshilov, among others. See Georgiy Isserson, *Druzhba Narodov* (Moscow), No. 3, 1988.

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and Luxemburgism and had become a nest of spies and provocateurs. On orders from Stalin, virtually the entire leadership of the KPP was killed or sent to concentration camps.[52]

Compared to such issues as the Nazi-Soviet Pact, forced deportations, and the Katyn massacre, the dissolution of the KPP has elicited relatively little emotional response among Poles.[53] Mostly of interest to Polish communists, this issue belongs more in the realm of relations in the communist movement than in that of international relations. What is more, ever since the KPP was rehabilitated by the Soviets in 1956, voluminous works on the topic have appeared in Poland.

Since the founding of the commission, a series of documents on Polish Marxists has been transferred from the Archives of the CPSU Central Committee to the Central Archives of the PZPR Central Committee, among them two documents that pinpoint the exact dates of the Comintern decisions to dissolve the KPP (August 16, 1938) and to form a new Polish communist party (May 26, 1939). Moreover, an authoritative work has been published on the dissolution of the KPP which reinterprets this event as a murderous deed of Stalin's, rather than the Comintern's.[54] This work's criticism of Stalin surpasses in vehemence earlier assessments.

Nazi-Soviet Pact. On August 23, 1939, the Soviet Union and Germany signed a non-aggression pact. Aside from its seven public articles, the pact also contained a secret protocol that essentially divided Poland between the USSR and Germany. The pact secured Hitler's eastern flank, and on September 1, 1939, the Germans invaded Poland, thereby beginning World War II in Europe. Shortly thereafter, on September 17, 1939, Stalin declared the Polish state to be nonexistent and sent the Red Army to "protect" Ukrainian and Belorussian minorities in eastern Poland.[55]

The first sign that the commission was reevaluating the pact was an article concerning the outbreak of World War II and the Soviet role in the destruction of Poland (1939) written by Smirnov and published in the Soviet weekly *New Times*.[56] In the article, Smirnov admitted that Poland's defense of itself against Germany in 1939 was a just war and not a war between two imperialist states. He also offered an apology for Soviet Foreign Minister Vyachyslav Molotov's insulting statement, made before the USSR Supreme Soviet in October 1939, that Poland was "a deformed bastard of the Versailles Treaty."

Smirnov's article was hardly earth-shattering. It fully followed what has been the official Soviet line on the war since the 1960's. Smirnov did not mention the secret protocol to the Nazi-Soviet Pact, but repeated the old Soviet interpretation that the Red Army had crossed the Polish border on September 17, 1939, in order to protect Belorussians and Ukrainians living in eastern Poland. He also described the Polish government's flight into Romania after receiving news of the Soviet invasion as desertion and grossly exaggerated the role of Polish communists in defending Warsaw in 1939. Overall, it was an inauspicious beginning to the campaign to fill in the "blank spots."

In October 1987, a 10-part series on the Nazi-Soviet Pact written by Polish commission member Włodzimierz Kowalski appeared in *Życie Literackie*. It contained a translation (from a German version) of the secret protocol, the first to be published in the official Polish press.[57] Kowalski's interpretation of the motives behind the pact did not mark a significant departure from previous official scholarship; he still blamed the Western Allies, among others, for not taking the USSR more seriously as an ally, and therefore contributing to the circumstances that led to the pact. Kowalski's interpretation was criticized by other Polish historians for being biased and for omitting several significant facts.[58]

The publication of the secret protocol—even though with a disclaimer that the document's authenticity was not recognized by the Soviets—lifted the taboo on discussing this issue in Poland. Nevertheless, the topic is

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[52]For a history of the Polish communists in interwar Poland, see M. K. Dziewanowski, *The Communist Party of Poland: An Outline of History*, 2nd ed., Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press, 1976; and Inessa Yazhborovskaya, "From Kiev to Warsaw; The Soviet-Polish War of 1920—One of the 'Blanks' in Our History," *New Times*, No. 48, November 1988, pp. 33–35.

[53]For example, it was reported that during a public lecture on the issue of "blank spots" in Polish-Soviet relations given by a party-affiliated historian in Bydgoszcz in October 1987, a "multitude of prejudices, . . . biases . . . and resentment" regarding the Nazi-Soviet Pact and the deportations was shown by nearly every person in attendance who spoke up. However, only the lecturer raised the fate of Polish communists in the KPP. See *Gazeta Pomorska* (Bydgoszcz), Oct. 23, 1987. Also, during an interview with Polish commission member Walichnowski, the interviewer commented that in comparison with Katyn, the "tragedy of Polish communists really evokes little sympathy today." See *Sprawy i Ludzie*, Mar. 24, 1988.

[54]F. I. Firsov and I. S. Yazhborovskaya, "The Comintern and the Communist Party of Poland," Parts 1 and 2, *Voprosy Istorii KPSS*, Nos. 11 and 12, 1988.

[55]For a history of Soviet foreign policy, see Adam B. Ulam, *Expansion and Coexistence: Soviet Foreign Policy, 1917–1973*, 2nd ed., New York, Holt, Reinhart and Wilson, 1974.

[56]Georgiy Smirnov, "Returning to the Lessons of the Past," *New Times*, Sept. 7, 1987, pp.18–22. Extensive summaries of the article were published in the Polish press.

[57]Włodzimierz T. Kowalski, "The Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact," (Part IX), *Życie Literackie* (Kraków), Oct. 11, 1987. Interestingly, the translation contained a mistake; parts of the first two articles of the protocol were omitted. An erratum, published in the following issue of the publication (ibid., Oct. 18, 1987), rectified the mistake.

[58]See, for example, Ludwik Haas, "More on the Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact," ibid., Jan. 24, 1988.

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still treated with caution. In the Soviet Union, the secret protocol has been published in some of the Baltic republics, but the Russian-language press still adheres to the old line.[59] The Soviets continue to assert that no secret protocol to the Nazi-Soviet Pact has been found in Soviet archives,[60] and to defend the rationale for the Pact.[61] In a note of discord with the Soviets, in September 1988, Maciszewski stated that he, for one, had no doubts that the secret protocol existed.[62]

Deportations and repatriations. The topic of forced deportations from Polish territories seized by the Soviets in 1939 to the interior of the USSR was long clothed in silence.[63] This silence often led to comical references in biographies of official Poles, like Wojciech Jaruzelski, who were said to have suddenly "found themselves" in 1941 in such places within the Soviet Arctic as Kolyma and Vorkuta. However, in June 1987, an article by Jaruzelski in the CPSU theoretical journal *Kommunist* mentioned the deportations and so launched the process of reexamination of this subject.

In early 1988, a publication of the Movement for National Rebirth (PRON) described for the first time four waves of deportations to the Soviet Union involving approximately 1,250,000 people—700,000 of whom were Poles.[64] It listed 270,000 of the 700,000 Poles deported as "missing," i.e., as having died in transport or as a result of harsh conditions in the Soviet interior.

Today, many euphemisms are still applied to the deportations, and attempts to justify Soviet actions are still made. None other than Maciszewski himself has claimed that, according to Polish polls, 98 percent of the Polish deportees believed that the Soviet people had been well-disposed toward them.[65] Such claims create the false impression that the deportations were benign in character. Another Polish commission member has suggested that the term *przemieszczenia* (relocation) be used when referring to Poles who "voluntarily" moved into the interior of the USSR.[66]

The repatriation of some 1,500,000 Poles from the USSR to Poland in 1944–47 is another "blank spot" in this category that has been given some attention. Often treated as the second chapter of the history of Poles deported by the Soviets in 1940–41, the repatriations involved their own share of brutality and hardships for the Poles. In February 1988, the Polish press published for the first time the texts of some of the Soviet-Polish documents that regulated the repatriation.[67] The readers' response was massive, and the letters to the editor often pointed out the inaccurate euphemisms still being used in the media. Many offered personal recollections of the brutalities endured at the hands of the NKVD (the Soviet secret police). Resentment and anger against the Soviet Union were clearly evident.[68]

The discussion of deportations and repatriations of Poles touches upon some contemporary issues as well. According to Soviet figures, 1,150,000 Poles still live in the USSR—although the actual figure may be as high as 3–4 million. Their fate is very much on the minds of their Polish compatriots. This ethnic group lacks Polish cultural and educational facilities, a fact that doubtless contributes heavily to their reportedly very high degree of russification.[69] This matter is extremely delicate since it raises questions concerning Soviet nationality policy in general. Consequently, even though there has recently been more coverage of Poles living in the USSR,[70] it is still subject to censorship, and the Polish offical media manipulates facts to portray the best possible picture of the Poles' life in the USSR.

The Warsaw uprising, August–October 1944. With the Red Army rapidly approaching Warsaw in mid-1944, the noncommunist Polish underground organized an anti-German uprising in the capital, which began on August 1, 1944. The underground hoped that if it—and not the Red Army—liberated Warsaw from Ger-

[59]See *Rahva Haal* (Tallinn), Aug. 10 and 11, 1988, in *FBIS-SOV*, Sept. 16, 1988, pp. 67–74. For a different view, see *Sovetskaya Rossiya* (Moscow), Aug. 24, 1988.

[60]For the Soviet line, see comments by Valentin Falin (then head of Novosti), Warsaw PAP in English, Sept. 15, 1988, in Foreign Broadcast Information Service, *Daily Report: East Europe* (Washington, DC—hereafter, *FBIS-EEU*), Sept. 16, 1988, p. 37.

[61]A. S. Yakushevskiy, "The Soviet-German Non-Aggression Agreement: A Retrospective," *Voprosy Istorii KPSS*, No. 8, 1988, pp. 82–96.

[62]Interview with Maciszewski, *Życie Literackie*, Sept. 25, 1988.

[63]Jan Gross, *Revolution from Abroad, The Soviet Conquest of Poland's Western Ukraine and Western Belorussia*, Princeton, NJ, Princeton University Press, 1987.

[64]Jan Engelgard, "Exodus," *Konfrontacje* (Warsaw), No. 2, 1988. The article was widely publicized and summarized in other journals.

[65]*Trybuna Ludu*, Mar. 7, 1988.

[66]Interview with Mieczysław Tanty, *Głos Robotniczy*, Aug. 13–14, 1988.

[67]"The Repatriation of Poles from USSR: The Modzelewski-Vyshinskiy Agreement," *Życie Warszawy*, Supplement "Historia i Życie", Feb. 19, 1988; "The Course of Repatriations from the USSR in 1946: Report of the Polish Delegation Before the Joint Commission," ibid. (Supplement "Historia i Życie"), Apr. 22, 1988.

[68]"To the Editor of 'Historia i Życie': The Repatriation of Poles from the USSR," ibid., Supplement "Historia i Życie," Mar. 4, 1988.

[69]According to the 1979 Soviet census, only 30 percent of Soviet citizens who declared themselves of Polish nationality considered the Polish language to be their primary language, the lowest proportion of nationality to native language of all the major Soviet nationalities. *Chislennost' i sostav naseleniya SSSR* (The Numbers and Composition of the USSR Population), Moscow: Tsentral'noye Statisticheskoye Upravleniye SSSR, 1984, p.71.

[70]It should be noted that in the past year, a consular agency office was established in L'viv and one will soon be opened in Vilnius. However, this has not helped to desensitize the issue. On the issue of Poles in the USSR, see, T.S.S., "New Treatment of Poles in the Soviet Union," RFE-RL, *Polish Situation Report*, No. 11, Sept. 1, 1987, pp. 21–23.

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man occupation, a noncommunist Polish administration would be established there, enabling underground authorities finally to come out into the open. At first, everything went splendidly. Within a very short time, the Poles successfully drove the Germans out of Warsaw. To the dismay of the insurgents, however, Red Army troops that had been fighting in the suburbs of Warsaw suddenly ceased combat and assumed a defensive position on the eastern bank of the Vistula River. They remained there for the duration of the uprising, letting the Germans systematically destroy the resistance. After 63 days of fighting eight German divisions, the Poles were defeated. On direct orders from Hitler, the city was completely destroyed.[71]

The Soviet refusal to help did not become a major topic of media discussion until the summer of 1988. Although some questions have been recently raised as to its validity,[72] the old Soviet interpretation of the uprising as a politically-inspired anti-Soviet action has been maintained until now.[73] The Soviets have also continued to insist that the Red Army did everything possible to aid the Poles in Warsaw.

Cooperation and friendship. The introduction of positive "blank spots" by the commission in the form of supposedly unknown chapters about cooperation between Polish and Russian (and Soviet) revolutionaries and soldiers has an obvious ring of propaganda to it. Stories of such cooperation have appeared mainly in highly pro-regime journals, for example, *Przyjazn,* published by the Polish-Soviet Friendship Society. Thus, this aspect of the "blank spots" campaign has been relegated largely to the realm of preaching to the converted. Soviet commission member Parsadanova has lately published some articles in this area.[74]

Katyn

The massacre. The issue of Katyn centers on the fate of some 14,000 commissioned and noncommissioned officers of the Polish army and police forces taken prisoner in 1939 by Soviet forces occupying Poland's eastern territories. The prisoners were held in three camps: Kozelsk (near Smolensk), Starobelsk (Ukraine, Lugan oblast), and Ostashkov (Kalinin oblast). All traces of these men were lost in the spring of 1940, a year before the Germans invaded the Soviet Union. In 1943, the Germans found a mass grave in the forest near Katyn (a small town near Smolensk) containing the bodies of 4,143 men who had been interned in Kozelsk. Each victim had had his hands tied behind his back and had been shot in the back of the head at close range. The remaining 10,000 prisoners have yet to be accounted for.[75]

After the bodies were discovered, the Germans and the Soviets began accusing each other of having perpetrated the massacre in Katyn Forest. Although today the Soviets continue to disclaim their guilt, few Western scholar doubt Soviet responsibility for the crime.[76] The evidence against the Soviets has been overwhelming. Not only did shortcomings and inconsistencies in the Soviet version of events became evident during the Nuremberg trials, but several survivors of Soviet camps have pointed a finger at the Soviets. Soviet *samizdat* has also published some incriminating evidence against the USSR.[77] Of course, most Poles have always suspected the Soviets. As early as 1944, incidents of collective refusal to accept the Soviet version occurred among Polish army units fighting alongside the Red Army against the Germans.[78]

As the site of the only mass grave of Polish soldiers murdered by the Soviets to be uncovered thus far, Katyn Forest has taken on symbolic meaning for the Poles. It serves as a reminder of the fate that befell the other Polish officers (they were presumably shot in the same manner as the victims at Katyn) and some 100,000 Polish soldiers (they either perished in Soviet concentration camps or were shot) who were also taken prisoner by the Soviets in 1939–41.[79] It is misleading to describe the victims at Katyn Forest simply as army officers, because they were predominantly reservists who, being among the best-educated and the most skilled Polish citizens, occupied important positions in civilian life and would probably have become the leaders of a reconstituted Polish state after the war. Their murders

[71]For a history of the Warsaw uprising, see J. K. Zawodny, *Nothing But Honour,* Stanford, CA, Hoover Institution Press, 1979.

[72]Interview with Eugeniusz Duraczyński, *Rzeczpospolita,* Aug. 1, 1988.

[73]An authoritative four-part article in *New Times* took such a viewpoint. See Lev Bezymensky, "Why Winston Churchill Said No," *New Times,* Nos. 33–36, August 1988.

[74]V. S. Parsadanova, "The Soviet Union's Help in Restoring the Polish Economy (1944–1949)," *Istoriya SSSR* (Moscow), No. 4, July-August 1988, pp. 62–77.

[75]For a study in English on the topic, see J. K. Zawodny, *Death in the Forest,* London, McMillan, 1962.

[76]Recent scholarly publications suggest that US and British authorities knew all along that the Soviets were responsible, but because the Allies did not want to cause a rift in the Grand Coalition, they suppressed the truth. See Crister S. and Stephen A. Garrett, "Death and Politics: The Katyn Forest Massacre and American Foreign Policy," *East European Quarterly* (Boulder, CO), January 1987, pp. 429–46; Norman Davies, "Britain's Guilty Secret About Katyn," *The Independent* (London), July 7, 1988.

[77]Vera Tolz, "Soviet Historian Calls for Clarification of Katyn Massacre," RFE-RL, *Radio Liberty Research,* RL 401/87, Oct. 7, 1987.

[78]*Za Wolność i Lud,* Aug. 20, 1988.

[79]Z. S. Siemaszko, "War Prisoners (USSR 1939–41)," *Zeszyty Historyczne* (Paris), No. 82, 1987, pp. 86–105.

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are seen as proof that Stalin never envisioned an independent Poland.

The Katyn massacre has also seriously undermined the legitimacy of the Polish communist regime. When the bodies were discovered, the Polish government-in-exile in London refused to accept either the Soviet or the German version of events, but instead demanded that an independent Red Cross commission investigate the matter. In response, the Soviets broke off relations with the London exiles and set up a rival government, composed of Polish communists.[80] Its origin continues to affect the government's legitimacy since many Poles see it as irrevocably linked with the Soviet Union. (Perhaps that is why Władysław Gomułka allegedly refused Nikita Khrushchev's offer to announce Soviet responsibility for the massacre.[81]) The Polish regime's 40-year-old history of perpetuating a patently false interpretation of the Katyn massacre has seriously undermined the government's credibility.

For over three decades, the massacre was an absolutely taboo topic in Poland. The mere mention of the word "Katyn" in public could seriously damage, if not ruin, a person's career.[82] Naturally, the independent press, which has flourished in Poland since the late 1970's, covered officially censored topics, foremost among them Katyn. However, it was not until the legalization of Solidarity that Katyn became widely discussed, and in 1981, Solidarity activists erected a memorial in Warsaw to the Katyn Forest victims with an inscription giving April 1940 as the date of death. They thus openly accused the Soviets of committing the massacre. In 1985, the regime replaced this monument with one of its own, naming the Germans as the culprits.[83] Nothing appeared to have changed.

Joint Commission diffidence. As noted earlier, when the Joint Commission was formed, the Katyn massacre was not one of the topics on its agenda. Although reference to it was made during the first meeting, the Soviets refused to consider it as a "blank spot."[84] The issue, however, continued to be on the minds of many Poles. Ludwik Krasucki, the editor of the party's theoretical journal *Nowe Drogi,* referred to Katyn on several occasions, once even stating that "many of us [party members] think that the Russians did it."[85]

A major push to include the massacre on the commission's agenda came in the fall of 1987 from Yuriy Afanas'yev, a Gorbachev appointee to the post of director of the Moscow Historical Archives Institute and a well-known proponent of a more honest examination of the Soviet past. In an interview with the influential Polish weekly *Polityka*, Afanas'yev emphasized that "Katyn, above all, is a problem that Polish and Soviet historians are duty-bound to deal with." He also criticized Soviet party history for remaining in a state of stagnation:

I affirm that it [party history] is a field that is most conservative and it is affected by dogmatism and doctrinairism to the largest extent. It is here, too, that most blank spots exist and the lack of desire to liquidate them is greatest.[86]

Although he was probably commenting on his well-publicized dispute with Soviet party historians over Soviet domestic issues, his wording and the choice of venue to air his views was directly relevant to the Polish-Soviet commission since the commission includes in its membership some of the top Soviet party scholars.

The explicit call for the reexamination of the massacre by a respected *Soviet* historian proved crucial; the taboo on mentioning Katyn was lifted. Until then, the Poles had maintained a very low-key approach to the issue, with official spokesmen taking great care to dissociate themselves from the topic when it was raised and to relegate it to the realm of historical issues supposedly requiring non-emotional treatment. Thus, when Katyn was mentioned during a televised panel discussion, Maciszewski, a participant, turned away from the cameras.[87] During several press conferences,

[80]Recently, Polish media has carefully broached this topic. See interview with Eugeniusz Duraczyński, *Sztandar Młodych* (Warsaw), Mar. 25–27, 1988.

[81]The Khrushchev-Gomułka interchange has been reported numerous times (lately even in the Polish media), though the origin and accuracy of the report is difficult to trace. See Leopold Jerzewski, "Katyn 1940," *Telex,* p. 47, as cited in Vera Tolz, loc. cit., p. 5.

[82]See Andrzej Litwak's letter to the editor in *Konfrontacje,* September 1988.

[83]The full inscription on the monument reads: "To Polish soldiers—victims of Hitlerite fascism—resting at Katyn." As an indication of public knowledge of Soviet responsibility for the massacre, Poles have made the words "Hitlerite fascism" almost illegible by placing candles on that part of the inscription and, consequently, covering it with wax. Usually, one can also find a scribbled sign on the monument that says the massacre was committed by the Soviets. (Based on the author's own observations and on conversations with Poles, September 1988.)

[84]In an interview, Polish commission member Walichnowski said that the second meeting had the characteristics of a breakthrough because *all* problems considered as "blank spots" in Soviet-Polish relations were discussed. By implication, the first meeting did not consider all the "blank spots" raised by either side. Since Katyn and the deportations were the only issues added to the agenda of the second meeting, it becomes clear that Katyn was a point of contention between the Poles and the Soviets during the first meeting. *Sprawy i Ludzie,* Mar. 24, 1988.

[85]*The Sunday Times* (London), May 31, 1987. Krasucki also raised the topic on the Polish television program, "Controversies." See, Warsaw Television Service, Mar. 12, 1987, trans. in *FBIS-EEU,* May 22, 1987, p. G/10.

[86]Interview with Yuriy Afanas'yev, *Polityka,* Oct. 3, 1987.

[87]"Controversies" program, loc. cit. Maciszewski's action was reported to the author by a Polish viewer.

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Jerzy Urban, the government spokesman, gave evasive answers to questions concerning the massacre.[88]

Following Afanas'yev's interview, however, conflicting views regarding the Katyn issue began to emerge in Polish media. On the one hand, the old interpretation continued to be applied. A three-part fictionalized story about Polish reaction to Katyn written by an old apparatchik blamed the Germans outright and blasted them for exploiting the murders during the war in order to sow discord between Poles and Russians.[89] The same theme was repeated—although less offensively—by historian Jerzy Borejsza in an interview with *Polityka*.[90]

On the other hand, an unmistakable shift in the treatment of the massacre was taking place. For example, a Polish journal published a speech by Walichnowski, delivered at a joint Polish-Soviet historical conference, in which he described at length the Western view of the Katyn massacre. Although Walichnowski called the Western interpretation an "amateurish manipulation of history for political aims," he refrained from identifying the party guilty of the massacre and called for a genuine effort on the part of the Soviets to locate archival documents pertaining to Katyn.[91] Another Polish member of the commission, Czesław Madajczyk, went even further when he stated in an interview for Austrian television that "the documents that have been published so far, incriminate the Soviets more than the Germans. However, Soviet documents are still missing."[92]

Some of the actions taken by the Polish regime also suggested more openness in dealing with the issue. It not only publicized the placement of a wreath at the monument in Katyn by Polish embassy staff on October 12, 1987 (Polish People's Army Day), but also let it be known that for several years, flowers had been placed at the monument on state holidays and anniversaries.[93] The regime also announced that a new monument, designed by Poles, would be erected at the site.[94]

Then, in a stunning turn of events, an article appeared in the December 1987 issue of *Za Wolność i Lud* (a journal published by ZBoWiD),which contained a footnote about the death of a Polish officer in Starobelsk in 1940.[95] Until then, censors had forbidden any mention of the date 1940 in conjunction with the death of a Polish officer in a Soviet prison camp,[96] since it implied Soviet culpability for the massacre (in 1940, the Germans had not yet occupied the Katyn area). Implicit reference to Soviet responsibility for the massacre was also made by a former Polish soldier and Soviet prisoner in 1939–41 in an interview published in early 1988 in *Nowiny*.[97] Nevertheless, an article for the literary journal *Miesięcznik Literacki* explicitly blaming the Soviets for Katyn still could not pass censorship.[98]

Katyn on the Joint Commission's agenda. When the second meeting of the commission convened, Katyn was a major item of discussion. Supposedly after analyzing Western publications on Katyn, the Poles on the commission presented their findings.[99] According to one source, they presented the Soviets with a paper showing exactly where the Soviet version was false.[100] That the Poles were not accepting the Soviet version was evident from Walichnowski's statement to the Polish press after the meeting:

On the basis of what is really documented, it is difficult to state with complete certainty which version of events [Soviet or German] is truthful. . . . both versions, mainly both [sides'] documents made public so far, are considered not to be believable.[101]

Another commission member, Kowalski, echoed these comments and announced that Polish historians considered the Katyn massacre to be an open subject.[102] Following suit, Urban refused to answer a question from the press as to whether or not the Polish government still considered the Germans guilty of the massacre.[103] Such a response would have been unthinkable a few years earlier.

Curiously, Polish members giving interviews to the Polish press after the second meeting stressed the

[88]See transcripts of Urban's press conferences, *Rzeczpospolita*, Mar. 30 and Apr. 27, 1987.

[89]Władysław Machejek, "About Katyn," *Życie Literackie*, Oct. 18, Oct. 25, and Nov. 1, 1987.

[90]Interview with Jerzy Borejsza, *Polityka*, Jan. 2, 1988.

[91]*Sprawy i Ludzie*, Oct. 8, 1987.

[92]Vienna Television Service in German, Nov. 7, 1987, in *FBIS-EEU*, Nov. 9, 1987, p. 46.

[93]Interestingly, regime spokesmen refused to specify for exactly how many years the practice had been going on. See Jerzy Urban's press conference in *Rzeczpospolita*, Oct. 14, 1987; interview with the chairman of the Council for Preserving the Memory of Struggle and Martyrdom, General Roman Paszkowski, in ibid., Feb. 19, 1988; interview with the Polish ambassador to the USSR, Włodzimierz Natorf, *Polityka*, Apr. 30, 1988.

[94]*Rzeczpospolita*, Feb. 19, 1988.

[95]Konrad Siermontowski, "A Cracovian on the Matter of 'Krakusy'," *Za Wolność i Lud*, Dec. 5, 1987.

[96]For censorship guidelines on Katyn, see Curry, loc. cit., pp. 341–42.

[97]Interview with Józef Chciuk, *Nowiny* (Rzeszów), Mar. 4, 1988.

[98]See the question raised by Deborah Seward (*Newsweek*) at Urban's press conference as reported in *Rzeczpospolita*, Mar. 2, 1988.

[99]Interview with Polish commission member Ryszard Nazarewicz, *Kurier Polski* (Warsaw), Mar. 14, 1988.

[100]Author's interview with a prominent Polish sociologist identified with the regime.

[101]*Sprawy i Ludzie*, Mar. 24, 1988.

[102]*Odrodzenie*, Apr. 16, 1988.

[103]*Rzeczpospolita*, Mar. 9, 1988.

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need for new archival documents concerning Katyn.[104] Given the commission's open acknowledgment of its dependence on the Soviet findings, the call for additional archival documents was probably a means of stalling for time while waiting for a political decision on the issue. At the same time, this call put pressure on the Soviets by signaling that the one-sided evidence marshaled by them was not acceptable. From the moment that Katyn was defined as a "blank spot," new evidence was automatically required in order to support or disprove the Soviet version of events.[105]

The communiqués published by both sides after the second meeting are an indication of how different the Soviet and Polish perceptions of the importance of the Katyn issue were. The Soviet communiqué made only an oblique reference to Katyn (it confirmed that the fate of the "interned Polish soldiers needed to be researched"[106]), while all the Polish reports mentioned Katyn directly. Clearly, the issue had proven very problematic for the commission.

The one dubious achievement of the commission with regard to "clarifying" the issue of Katyn was to decide on a euphemism for Poles taken prisoner by the Soviets in 1939. According to the commission, since no formal declaration of war had been made in 1939 by either Poland or the USSR, the term "prisoner of war" was not applicable; instead, the term "internee" was correct. This semantic usage, downplaying the level of hostility between the Poles and Soviets in 1939,[107] was agreed to sometime before the second meeting,[108] but the change was officially announced only after it.[109]

Inadequate effort. The lack of any clear-cut conclusions by the commission regarding the Katyn massacre angered the Poles. Just prior to the commission's second meeting, 59 prominent Polish intellectuals and opposition figures drafted an open letter addressed to 55 prominent Soviet artists and scientists. The letter called for an open Polish-Soviet dialogue, and argued that such a dialogue was only possible if the truth about Katyn was told. It stated that the Soviets were guilty of the massacre at Katyn Forest and called on the Soviet addressees to speak out publicly on the matter and thereby help remove this major obstacle to better Polish-Russian relations. Among the signatories were Lech Wałęsa, most of the prominent Polish opposition figures, some of the best-known writers and actors, and a host of respected professors. The Soviet addressees included many people identified with Gorbachev, for example Tatyana Zaslavskaya, Abel Aganbegyan, Nikolay Shmelev, and Fedor Burlatskiy, as well as prominent Soviet artists and opposition figures.[110]

The "Letter of the 59" was delivered to the Warsaw offices of the Novosti and TASS press agencies on February 29, 1988—the day of the commission's second meeting. The representatives of these agencies refused to accept or publicize the letter. However, Western news agencies obtained copies of it and broadcast the text to Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union two days after the commission had ended its meeting. Moreover, the full text of the letter—but without the names of signatories or addressees—was included in an article published in the Polish party's daily that presented some of the significant statements on "blank spots" that had been made to date.[111] That the entire text of the letter, including the phrase "the crime [at Katyn in 1940], committed by Stalin's and Beria's henchmen, and the later lies about their crimes have poisoned our [Polish-Russian] relations," was published in the party paper was remarkable indeed.

Soon after the letter's publication, the issue of Katyn was raised for the first time in the Sejm. On March 10, 1988, during a debate on Polish foreign policy, Ryszard Bender, a non-party deputy with a well-deserved reputation for outspokenness,[112] urged the government to

[104]As Walichnowski put it, " 'the dead do not lie,' but neither do they talk. Let us then reach into archival sources without any obstacles." *Sprawy i Ludzie,* Mar. 24, 1988.

[105]It was highly unlikely that any new Soviet documents would incriminate the Germans, for if such documents existed, the Soviets would have used them in support of their 1944 declaration blaming the Germans for the murders. In any case, the Soviets would have no reason to withhold such information.

[106]*Pravda,* Mar. 12, 1988.

[107]The official press in Poland seldom refers to any fighting between Soviets and Poles in 1939, and even then, only peripherally. On one of the infrequent occasions that the topic was touched upon, a Polish historian referred to pitched battles lasting several days and presented the figure of Soviet losses in Poland in 1939 as 737 killed and 1,862 wounded (the same inappropriately low figures given by the Soviets in 1939), though he added that the Soviet losses, in relation to the length of action, were not great. See Tadeusz Pióro, "September 17, 1939," *Polityka,* Sept. 19, 1987. More recently, signs of change have appeared. A lengthy description of the execution of a Polish general captured by the regular forces of the Red Army was published. See, Jan F. Lewandowski, "The General Olszyn Affair," *Katolik* (Katowice), May 29, 1988. Maciszewski has also claimed that more objective studies of the military aspects of Soviet entry into Poland will be forthcoming. See *Życie Literackie,* Sept. 25, 1988.

[108]See Smirnov's comments in *Pravda,* Mar. 12, 1988.

[109]For example, Kowalski mentions the "faulty phraseology" used previously. *Odrodzenie,* Apr. 16, 1988. Speaking on Polish television, Smirnov said: "we have dissociated ourselves above all from the incorrect—though generally used—term applied to Polish soldiers: 'prisoners of war'." Warsaw Television Service, Mar. 4, 1988, in *FBIS-EEU,* Mar. 7, 1988, p. 43. Also see Urban's press conference, *Rzeczpospolita,* Mar. 9, 1988.

[110]For the full text of the letter, see *The New York Review of Books* (New York), Apr. 28, 1988, p. 60.

[111]*Trybuna Ludu,* Mar. 12–13, 1988. A companion piece, however, ridiculed some of the signatories of the letter and took issue with several points made in it, but made no mention of who was responsible for the Katyn massacre.

[112]For Bender's background, see R. S., "Deputy Raises the Issue of Katyn in the Sejm," RFE-RL, *Polish Situation Report,* No. 4, Mar. 17, 1988, pp. 25–26. Also see interview with Bender in *Polityka,* June 6, 1987.

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take the political steps necessary to open the archives and fill in the "blank spots." Speaking on issues affecting Polish-Soviet relations, he specifically mentioned Katyn and for emphasis quoted Afanas'yev on the need to clarify this matter. In many instances, he used language similar to that found in the open letter.[113] He was answered by Maciszewski, who assured Bender that "no Polish or Soviet historian on the commission ignores this word [Katyn], one of the most tragic."[114] At the same time, Macieszewski made it clear that outside interference—such as Bender's—into the commission's work was decidedly not welcome.

The introduction of Katyn into the Sejm's debate on foreign policy added impetus to the overall discussion of the issue. Even Foreign Minister Marian Orzechowski commented that the task of clarifying the matter of the massacre was not easy "because of differing views, the absence of documents, and the influence of political prejudices."[115] He thus confirmed that the Soviets were dragging their feet in accepting responsibility.

Realizing that popular expectations were rising, Maciszewski, who openly admitted his dislike for interviews, granted one to the popular Polish weekly, *Perspektywy*. During this interview, he argued that there was a need to examine the fate of Poles in the USSR as a whole and in an integrated manner; after all, the soldiers captured in 1939 (some of whom died at Katyn) were only the first of five groups of deportees. In addition, he pointed out that many Soviet citizens had perished as well during that time and that blame for this was being increasingly attributed to Stalin and his system of repression. Yet, even Maciszewski noted that there was still some conflict within the commission over Katyn. For example, he admitted that "free debate, often polemical in nature," takes place during the commission's meetings and that the party nature of the commission "does not mean that no differences of opinion arise during our debates." Showing some anger when asked when further steps would be taken, Maciszewski replied that "this question should be directed at the Soviet historians, not at me. Opening up the archives is a gradual process. . . . The commission has already prepared its recommendations for the archival services of both our countries."[116] Such comments were clearly aimed at absolving the Polish side of any responsibility for delays in clearing up this "blank spot."

Soon after Maciszewski's interview, a publication of PAX (a pro-regime Catholic organization) featured an interesting article about the whereabouts of the evidence gathered by the Germans at Katyn Forest. According to this article, the Armija Krajowa (the Home Army resistance that owed its allegiance to the Polish government-in-exile in London) had managed to seize several bags of documents in German possession and hide them somewhere in Poland. When attempts were made in 1946 to recover these materials, the Polish security apparatus impeded them; in one case, a man who had tried to recover the archives was murdered.[117] The article clearly implied that the Polish regime tried to cover up the truth, the first such accusation in the official press. (It should be noted that the article never stated that the Soviets were responsible for the massacre.)

Soviet reactions. At about this time—March/April 1988—the Soviet media finally took note of the Katyn issue. On March 22, *Pravda* published a response to the open letter written by the Poles. This response, which had taken two weeks to prepare, contained the first explicit Soviet admission that the massacre was considered a "blank spot."[118] On March 30, the weekly *Literaturnaya Gazeta* reprinted parts of *Trybuna Ludu*'s attack on the letter. That same day, Radio Moscow broadcast Smirnov's comments on Katyn, specifically his reference to it as a "blank spot."[119]

Yet, as if in response, the official Soviet line on Katyn began to turn increasingly recalcitrant. On the anniversary of the Soviet-Polish Treaty of Friendship, *Izvestiya* wrote:

The Joint Commission . . . is working more intensively than before. . . . Western propaganda and the opponents of socialism are gambling on a blatantly anti-Soviet interpretation of facts and events that would poison the atmosphere of friendship and cooperation between our peoples [Poles and the Soviet people]. Their logic is primitive to the point of impudence: let the Soviet Union admit that it is guilty of everything in the past and then everything will be fine. All the indications are they will be greatly disappointed.[120]

Since Katyn had by this time emerged as virtually *the* issue when it came to verifying the most basic facts, and

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[113]*Rzeczpospolita*, Mar. 11, 1988.

[114]Ibid., *Rzeczpospolita Sejm Diary*, March 1988, p. 6, in *FBIS-EEU*, Apr. 20, 1988, pp. 35–37.

[115]Interview with Marian Orzechowski, *Die Presse* (Vienna), Mar. 22, 1988, p. 3, in *FBIS-EEU*, Mar. 25, 1988, pp. 30–31. Also see Orzechowski's news conference, *Rzeczpospolita*, Mar. 12–13, 1988.

[116]Interview with Jarema Maciszewski, *Perspektywy* (Warsaw), Mar. 25, 1988.

[117]Włodzimierz Pazniewski, "Where Is the Katyn Archive?" *Katolik*, Mar. 27, 1988.

[118]*Pravda*, Mar. 22, 1988.

[119]Radio Moscow in Polish, cited in Anna Pomian, "Comments on Katyn in the Independent Press," RFE-RL, *Polish Independent Press Review* (Munich), No. 4, May 18, 1988, p. 9.

[120]*Izvestiya* (Moscow), Apr. 21, 1988.

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had become a source of great contention, the last sentence of the article was a stinging rebuff to the Poles.

An even more authoritative statement appeared in an interview with Miran Mchedlov, a deputy director of the Marxism-Leninism Institute, that was published in the Hungarian publication *Magyarország*. In a statement clearly meant to be a slap in the face for the Poles, he said:

. . . the rumors connected with the resettlement of part of the Polish population or with the Katyn tragedy, all these are more speculations born in the head of some people than evaluations based on "newly discovered proof."[121]

Though Mchedlov was not a commission member, his high position in the Marxism-Leninism Institute lent his statements importance.

The Soviet line on Katyn continued to harden. Participating in a roundtable discussion among nine of the Soviet commission members, Rzheshevskiy, who had emerged as the Soviet spokesman on the massacre, reminded everyone present that in 1944 the world had accepted the Soviet version of Katyn, despite "Goebbels' anti-Soviet propaganda."[122] He also cited three previous ill-intentioned attempts to assign the blame for Katyn to the Soviets: 1) the German attempt at the Nuremberg trials, which he identified as a German ploy to evade responsibility for Katyn; 2) the US attempt in the early 1950's, which he called part of the cold war propaganda campaign; and 3) the attempt by Solidarity in Poland, which he identified as a means of inciting anti-Soviet feelings in Poland. According to him, the current attempt to place the blame on the Soviets was part of a new propaganda campaign aimed at discrediting the work of the commission. After all, Rzheshevskiy maintained, the commission had examined Soviet, Polish, Western, and émigré (presumably Polish) documents and works on Katyn and could not find convincing evidence that would uphold the German version of events. The search of Soviet archives had also failed to turn up anything significant on the matter. (Later, addressing an all-Union seminar on the "Historical Experience of the CPSU in Light of the 70th Anniversary of the Great October," Rzheshevskiy also claimed that attempts to make the Soviets responsible for Katyn were part of a vicious anti-Soviet propaganda campaign launched by the enemies of socialism.[123]

The one gesture by Rzheshevskiy that could be construed as conciliatory was his announcement that measures had been taken to properly mark the site of the mass grave in Katyn Forest.[124] Shortly thereafter, the Soviet press reported that a larger monument had been erected there (with the inscription "To the Polish officers shot by the fascists in 1941") and that the site had been readied for visitors.[125] The latter was apparently done in response to the Polish embassy's requests that the area be made accessible to Poles wishing to visit the site.[126]

The Soviets' tough stance on Katyn was probably influenced by Polish comments, but also by the increasing pressure upon the commission from Soviet intellectuals. Mchedlov's and Rzheshevskiy's comments came soon after the April 1988 Moscow symposium of Polish and Soviet filmmakers on the topic of "blank spots." The stormy gathering was attended by at least one Soviet member of the Joint Commission—Parsadanova.[127] According to several accounts, a series of vehement denunciations of Stalinist crimes were voiced at that symposium. Several members of the Polish delegation brought with them documents (unobtainable in the USSR) that implicated the Soviets in some incidents, primarily the Katyn massacre.[128] The Joint Commission and Parsadanova specifically (since she attended the symposium) were attacked harshly by the Soviet filmmakers for being slow and unproductive in filling in the "blank spots" in Polish-Soviet relations.[129]

Soon, echoes of the Moscow film symposium began to reverberate. In early June, in a move reminiscent of the Afanas'yev interview, the influential Polish cultural weekly *Tygodnik Kulturalny* published an interview with Natan Eidelman—a distinguished Soviet historian, an important spokesman for *perestroyka,* and a participant in the filmmakers' symposium. Eidelman's comments on Katyn constituted the clearest indication thus far that Soviet historians were aware of Soviet responsi-

[121]*Magyarország* (Budapest), Apr. 22, 1988, p. 7, translated in *FBIS-EEU,* May 5, 1988, pp. 35–37.

[122]"The 'Blank Spots' are Clearing Up," *Mezhdunarodnaya Zhizn',* No. 5, 1988, pp. 146–59. The roundtable discussion was given wide coverage by Polish media.

[123]O. Rzheshevskiy, "Some of the Problems in the History of the Great Patriotic War, 1941–1945," *Slovo Lektora* (Moscow), No. 5, 1988, pp. 4–10.

[124]*Mezhdunarodnaya Zhizn',* No. 5, 1988, p. 158.

[125]*Pravda,* Mar 25, 1988; *Krasnaya Zvezda* (Moscow), May 27, 1988.

[126]Interview with the Polish ambassador to the USSR, Włodzimierz Natorf, *Polityka,* Apr. 30, 1988.

[127]*Film* (Warsaw), Aug. 28, 1988.

[128]For example, the Soviet historian Natan Eidelman commented that he was "impressed" by the documents shown to him by the Poles during the symposium. *Tygodnik Kulturalny* (Warsaw), June 5, 1988. Eidelman's speech at the symposium, published in a Polish weekly, was censored in four places. See *Tygodnik Powszechny* (Kraków), Nov. 6, 1988.

[129]See comments by Andrzej Werner and Włodzimierz Motyl in *Tygodnik Kulturalny,* June 5, 1988.

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bility for the massacre. Moreover, Eidelman openly criticized the commission:

I do not think that it is necessary to explain the element of injustice or aggression in the events of 1939. . . . Further research in archives can only explain certain details, but it will not change the assessment as to the nature of the action. I think the same applies to Katyn. . . . It may be that only details have to be explained, but it should not be said—as some historians are saying—"do not hasten us."[130]

The last sentence was unmistakably a reference to commission member Parsadanova's repeated pleas for patience.

Mounting pressure for candor. Pressure from elements outside the party for resolving the Katyn issue grew steadily in Poland. In June 1988, while on a trip to the Soviet Union, Cardinal Józef Glemp, the Primate of Poland, called Katyn the most important issue in the campaign to eliminate "blank spots," and asked for a full explanation of the crime. He also requested that a cross be placed at the Katyn site.[131] Claiming that Poles fully realized that the Polish officers murdered at Katyn were victims of war, Glemp stressed that no one was interested any longer in turning Katyn "into an argument against the Soviet Union."[132] In doing so, he cut to the very heart of the matter: as horrible as the massacre was, it was not so much the event as the deceit, the lies, and the official falsification of history surrounding it that caused Polish bitterness toward the Russians.

Glemp's conciliatory tone, his stress on the extenuating circumstances in which the massacre took place, was reminiscent of "The Letter of the 59," which specifically accused Stalin, Beria, and the Stalinist system itself for the crime and absolved the Russians and the Soviet state of direct guilt; it was the particular stage of development in which the Soviet state found itself at the time and the convulsions that were shaking the world at that point that had led to the massacre. Interestingly, it was precisely this explanation that Porfir'yeva, a Soviet member of the commission, had rejected during a discussion sponsored by *Mezhdunarodnaya Zhizn'*.[133]

In response to Glemp's request for a cross at the Katyn site, a large cross was placed there on September 2, 1988—unfortunately, not by church but by military representatives.[134] Glemp thereby achieved formal recognition of the Church's role in keeping alive the issue of Katyn, a role it had been performing by holding masses commemorating the Katyn massacre each year since the late 1970's in various Polish cities. The most recent services were held on April 10, 1988, and were attended by several thousand Poles.[135]

Solidarity leaders also continued to press on the Katyn issue. Not only did some of them sign "The Letter of the 59," but the union's executive committee issued a statement on the eve of Gorbachev's visit to Poland (July 1988) calling specifically for clarification of "the crimes of which Katyn is a symbol."[136]

At the same time, the Polish-Czechoslovak Solidarity Group, composed of Polish and Czechoslovak opposition figures, met and issued a statement calling for the publication of Soviet documents that would shed light on various Soviet attempts since World War II to trample on the sovereignty of the East European countries (e.g., the Soviet interventions in East Germany, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Poland). With specific regard to Poland, the list included Soviet actions prior to the end of the war, foremost the Katyn massacre.[137] In addition, on August 1, 1988, thousands of Poles staged a demonstration in Warsaw at the official monument commemorating the Katyn massacre and placed a wreath there bearing the inscription: "We demand the truth —Katyn 1940."[138]

With pressure mounting, a working group of the commission met in Warsaw on June 22–25, 1988. Considering the members who attended the meeting—Rzheshevskiy and Chubar'yan from the Soviet side and Maciszewski from the Polish side—Katyn was undoubtedly the main issue discussed. The Soviet members of the commission were supposed to have familiarized themselves by this time with Western sources on Katyn, while the Polish members were supposed to have looked through various Soviet sources.[139] Had such been the case, then an important exchange of information would have taken place: Soviet scholars would have had read materials which Polish scholars had al-

[130]Ibid. The interview was conducted two months earlier, on April 5, 1988. Both the delay and the ultimate surfacing of the interview seem highly significant.

[131]Interviews with Glemp in *Moskovskiye Novosti* (Moscow), No. 25, June 19, 1988; and in *Literaturnaya Gazeta* (Moscow), June 22, 1988.

[132]*Literaturnaya Gazeta*, June 22, 1988.

[133]*Mezhdunarodnaya Zhizn'*, No. 5, 1988, p. 158.

[134]*Słowo Powszechne*, Sept. 20, 1988.

[135]RFE-RL, *Weekly Record of Events, Poland, 9–15 April 1988* (Munich), Apr. 15, 1988.

[136]DPA Hamburg, in German, July 1988, in *FBIS-EEU*, July 11, 1988, p. 27.

[137]*Le Monde* (Paris), July 12, 1988, in *FBIS-EEU*, July 21, 1988, pp. 36–37.

[138]DPA Hamburg, in German, Aug. 1, 1988, in *FBIS-EEU*, Aug. 2, 1988, pp. 14–15.

[139]Urban's press conference, *Rzeczpospolita*, June 29, 1988.

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ready seen (publications of Polish émigrés and scholarly Western books) but which had been inaccessible in the USSR; similarly, Polish scholars would have had a chance to search Soviet archives previously closed to them. Unfortunately, as later comments from commission members suggested, this was not quite the way it happened. The Poles' access to Soviet archival materials, for example, was limited to the paper presented in January 1944 by the Soviet commission that investigated the Katyn massacre. This document had been accessible for many years—indeed, since 1944. As Maciszewski himself admitted, since the founding of the commission, there had been no progress on Katyn in terms of new documentary evidence.[140]

Although it is not clear what exactly transpired at the meeting, Polish government spokesman Urban stated that in keeping with political recommendations, the commission was accelerating the tempo of its work.[141] His statement, combined with some of Maciszewski's comments,[142] was misconstrued by some to mean that the commission was in the process of completing its work on Katyn, and gave rise to hopes that Gorbachev would admit to Soviet responsibility for the massacre during his visit to Poland in July 1988. Aware of such expectations and the importance of the Katyn issue in Poland, Soviet and Polish authorities decided to have Smirnov accompany Gorbachev to Warsaw.

Gorbachev's visit. On the first day of Gorbachev's visit, Smirnov and Maciszewski held a news conference, possibly in an effort to assuage angry Poles. Warsaw Radio broadcast Smirnov's explanation of why Gorbachev had failed to address the issue of Katyn in his speech to the Sejm.[143] The fact that a high-ranking Soviet official had to explain the actions of the Soviet General Secretary in Poland was a sign of definite changes in the outward manner of Polish-Soviet relations, if not of Soviet–East European ties in general.

Gorbachev himself met with Polish intellectuals, at least two of whom raised the problem of "blank spots" and called on the General Secretary to undertake a political decision to speed up the progress of the commission's work. In what were only thinly veiled terms, one of the speakers at the meeting, Marcin Król, referred to Katyn, stating that "many facts [in Polish-Russian relations] require no research."[144]

Yet, to the dismay of Polish intellectuals, Gorbachev never made the widely expected admission that the Soviets were responsibile for Katyn.[145] In an interview with a Spanish newspaper, the historian and Solidarity adviser Bronisław Geremek claimed that Gorbachev's failure to touch on the issue of Katyn meant that a "great opportunity, perhaps the last," to eliminate the problem areas affecting Polish-Russian relations had been missed.[146] Such predictions may have been too gloomy, but there was little doubt that disappointment over Gorbachev's decision to bypass the Katyn issue had lost him some popularity in Poland.

The disappointment with Gorbachev's visit and the growing popular demand for a swift and proper resolution of the Katyn issue caused alarm in both regimes that they might be losing control over the "blank spots" campaign. Indeed, the alarm was significant enough to produce an unscheduled—and little-publicized—meeting of the commission in Warsaw on July 19, 1988. According to comments by Soviet commission member Yazhborovskaya, the chief ideologists of both parties—Józef Czyrek and Vadim Medvedev—spoke at the meeting. Both men assessed the results of the commission's work thus far and "appraised" its future course of action.[147] This constituted the clearest indication yet that the entire process of reevaluating history was being administered from above.

Recent developments. Probably as a result of new media guidelines outlined at the July meeting, the treatment of the Katyn massacre in both countries has become increasingly similar since the summer of 1988. Both Soviet and Polish media have switched from reporting on the historical controversy to discussing the present state of the site. In an attempt to forge a bond of common Polish-Soviet suffering at the hands of the fascists, both often emphasize that the Germans had also executed Soviet soldiers at Katyn (of course, this was later).[148] Their efforts fully agree with the official line (as defined in the April declaration) that the campaign to eliminate "blank spots" should promote Po-

[140]Comments by Maciszewski in *Słowo Powszechne*, June 30, 1988.

[141]*Rzeczpospolita*, June 29, 1988.

[142]Discussion on Polish-Soviet relations (see Maciszewski's comments), *Życie Warszawy*, July 8, 1988.

[143]See Warsaw Domestic Service, July 11, 1988, in *FBIS-EEU*, July 12, 1988, pp. 33–34. Supposedly, it was because of the sensitive nature of the issue and the need for "impartial" consideration of it that Gorbachev did not mention Katyn.

[144]*Trybuna Ludu*, July 15, 1988.

[145]*Przegląd Katolicki*, July 24, 1988; *Gazeta Robotnicza*, July 16–17, 1988; *Polityka*, July 23, 1988. Also see comments in the independent press, e.g., *Tygodnik Mazowsze* (Warsaw), July 20, 1988.

[146]Interview with Bronisław Geremek, *El País* (Madrid), July 15, 1988, in *FBIS-EEU*, July 21, 1988, Annex, p. 1.

[147]Interview with Inessa Yazhborovskaya, *Kurier Polski*, Sept. 23–25, 1988. The meeting was not reported by either the Soviet or the Polish press. Yazhborovskaya's comments two months after the meeting seem to be the only indication of its having taken place. It is not clear whether all members of the commission were present.

[148]The Germans shot several hundred Soviet prisoners of war at Katyn in 1943. See Moscow Television Service, "Vremya," Sept. 1, 1988, in *FBIS-SOV*, Sept. 2, 1988, p. 24; *Izvestiya*, Nov. 6, 1988.

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lish-Soviet friendship and stress the existence of common bonds between the two countries.

As of the fall of 1988, the word "Katyn" had ceased to be unmentionable. The site itself is increasingly treated as a war memorial/cemetery at which frequent wreath-laying ceremonies take place, which are solemnly reported in the media. The first hint of a softening of the official Soviet line on the Katyn massacre came in November 1988 with the publication of a collection of Gorbachev's speeches delivered during his July 1988 visit to Poland. The book includes a postscript by Gorbachev in which he writes:

Many people in Poland are convinced that [the death of Polish officers at Katyn] was the work of Stalin and Beria. The history of this tragedy is now being thoroughly investigated. You can judge from the results of the investigation how correct particular judgments and assessments are.[149]

During the third meeting of the commission, both Polish and Soviet communiqués admitted implicitly that there were shortcomings in the official Soviet version of Katyn events when they mentioned that evidence presented to the commission by the Polish members made it clear that the Katyn issue would have to be thoroughly researched.[150] Interestingly, one of the new Soviet commission members attending the third meeting is P. Kazhin, an archeologist who has written on the utilization of cemeteries for historical research.

To date, the ups and downs in the Polish-Soviet "blank spots" campaign have reflected pretty much the course of internal Soviet debate on reevaluating Soviet history.[151] It appears, therefore, that whether or not the Soviets will accept responsibility for Katyn will depend on the course of the transformations occurring in the USSR.

Future Prospects

According to official pronouncements, the commission hopes to finish its work by 1989–90 at the latest.[152] In the interim, several monographs based on some of the commission's findings on "blank spots" are being prepared, among them a joint work on the deportations (which will treat the issue as part of Stalin's nationality policy), and several works on the cooperation between Polish and Soviet communists and the friendship between the Poles and Soviets during World War II.[153]

A number of works on the Nazi-Soviet Pact and the dissolution of the KPP have already appeared in print; nearly all of them blame Stalin for any wrongdoing on the part of the Soviets. In the case of the Nazi-Soviet Pact, the Soviets continue to defend the rationale for the Pact, but admit that the Soviet Union made a mistake in establishing close ties with the Germans after the Pact was signed.

With regard to the Warsaw uprising and the Katyn Forest massacre, these issues continue to be perceived as "difficult," because of their implications for the Polish and Soviet communist regimes. It remains to be seen whether news about a forthcoming study on these issues will be released in the near future.

The continuing lack of access to archival sources has demonstrated vividly the absence of political will to examine some topics. Presumably, the Soviet side, with its direct channel of communication to Gorbachev through Smirnov, will have access to the necessary archives if and when a political decision to open them is made. Until now, however, only archival sources pertaining to less controversial topics have been released, leaving much material still inaccessible. The decision as to which materials were to be made available seems to have been political. What is more, entire sections of the NKVD and the Foreign Ministry archives have not been opened at all,[154] and it remains unclear whether documents on Katyn even exist. Poles, however, believe that somewhere in the basement of the NKVD's archives, faithful functionaries are still guarding complete files on the Katyn massacre.[155] This belief may be an-

[149]See *Za Rubezhom* (Moscow), Nov. 8–24, 1988, trans. in *FBIS-SOV*, Nov. 30, 1988, specifically pp. 23–24.

[150]*Pravda*, Dec. 3, 1988; *Trybuna Ludu*, Dec. 3–4, 1988.

[151]For an assessment of the first two years of Gorbachev's tenure and their impact on Soviet historiography, see Stephen Wheatcroft, "Unleashing the Energy of History, Mentioning the Unmentionable and Reconstructing Soviet Historical Awareness: Moscow 1987," *Australian Slavonic and East European Studies* (Melbourne), Vol. 1, No. 1, 1987, pp. 85–132; and idem, "Studying the Energy of History and Probing the Limits of Glasnost', Moscow, July–December, 1987," ibid., Vol. 1, No. 2, 1987, pp. 57–114. For another treatment of the debates over the reexamination of history, see Thomas Sherlock, "Politics and History under Gorbachev," *Problems of Communism*, May-August, 1988, pp. 16–42.

[152]Interestingly, this is when the January 1987 Polish-Soviet agreement on ideological cooperation (the precursor of the April declaration) is to expire.

[153]For information as to which topics will be covered, see Warsaw PAP in English, June 29, 1988, in *FBIS-EEU*, June 30, 1988, pp. 33–34; Warsaw Domestic Service, July 11, 1988, in *FBIS-EEU*, July 12, 1988, pp. 33–34; interviews with Mieczysław Tanty, *Gazeta Lubuska*, Apr. 9–10, 1988, and *Głos Robotniczy*, Aug. 13–14, 1988; interview with Maciszewski, *Życie Literackie*, Sept. 25, 1988.

[154]Smirnov was reported to have said that the commission had no access to old NKVD archives (Urban's press conference, *Rzeczpospolita*, July 20, 1988), and Chubar'yan's statements made it clear that access to Foreign Ministry archives was limited (*Mezhdunarodnaya Zhizn'*, No. 5, 1988, pp. 153–54).

[155]Author's interview with a high-ranking Polish party scholar. The Poles' confidence has some justification. Remarkable documents bearing Stalin's signature and ordering whole lists of people (including "wives of enemies of the nation") to be executed were found and publicized during Khrushchev's time. See V. M. Kuritsyn, "1937 in the History of the Soviet State," *Sovetskoye Gosudarstvo i Pravo* (Moscow), No. 2, 1988, p. 118.

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other reason for Polish perseverance in asking for new Soviet sources.

So far, only those Polish historians who are members of the commission have been allowed access to Soviet archives,[156] but even they have been restricted to certain archives and selected materials. For example, archives regarding purely military actions that took place in the USSR in 1943 and in which Polish Army units had participated remain inaccessible.[157] Soviet commission members have complained of having even more restricted access to archives. For example, Parsadanova openly admitted that her "Polish colleagues have a much easier life,"[158] while Churb'yan complained that "strange as it may seem, we have relevant German, French, and British documents, but few Soviet ones."[159] However, the recent opening of Comintern archives to foreign researchers (Yugoslavs, East Germans, and Italians) is a welcome, if somewhat limited, improvement. Moreover, calls for additional openings of Soviet archives have increasingly appeared in the Soviet press, and further progress now seems likely.

Motivations for the Campaign

The decision by the Soviet and Polish regimes to initiate a reexamination of their relations was motivated by political and economic considerations. The increasing distance between the USSR and the industrialized West in terms of technology is one of the main problems facing the Soviet Union today. To counter the increasing slide backward of the USSR in relation to the West —and even to newly industrializing countries of East Asia—the Soviets have taken drastic political and economic steps under Gorbachev. A rapprochement with the West, designed to reduce the military burden, and the drive for domestic political liberalization to spur individual initiative in selected industrial sectors have been the most noticeable recent changes.

The Soviets have also launched an all-out effort to increase the efficiency of the Soviet bloc and to speed up the development of bloc technology by sponsoring a host of new agreements on science and technology, both at the multilateral level through the Council for Economic Mutual Assistance (CEMA) and at the level of bilateral relations with individual countries. The first country to respond to their efforts has been Poland. Not only did it sign a far-reaching agreement on scientific, technological, and economic cooperation, but it also agreed to work with the USSR to eliminate all historically based prejudices that might impede full cooperation between the two countries.

Clearly, the Soviet leadership has come to realize that in order to reap more benefits and achieve greater efficiency in economic relations with Eastern Europe, it must foster a new atmosphere in Soviet–East European relations. The leadership's emphasis on treating the experience of other socialist countries seriously, its repeated statements of acceptance of the equality of other communist parties, and its willingness to take up difficult issues in Soviet–East European relations all reflect an attempt to make Soviet policy more sensitive to the needs of East European countries and to give Soviet allies a status more respectable than that of mere satellites. One analyst has described the change as the "Yugoslavization" of Soviet ties with Eastern Europe.[160]

In many ways, the changes in the atmosphere of Soviet–East European relations are due to the extension by the Soviets of *perestroyka* and *glasnost'* to East European affairs. Soviet commission member Parsadanova has commented that *perestroyka,* and specifically the restructuring of history, was the most important reason for the examination of Polish-Soviet "blank spots."[161] Thus, it follows logically that the campaign to eliminate "blank spots" in Polish-Soviet relations emerged primarily from Soviet domestic motivations: to improve Soviet-Polish relations in order to increase scientific-technological cooperation and strengthen the cohesion and viability of the Soviet bloc.[162]

[156]For example, Ryszard Nazarewicz has published an article on how the Soviet Army was greeted in Poland in 1944–45. See *Polityka,* Feb. 13, 1988. His account is based on archival sources—notes and memoranda prepared by Soviet political officers (attached to Soviet line units) for their superiors regarding the reactions of Poles to the Red Army. Nazarewicz touches upon some cases of negative reactions, but he downplays them and his article falls into the category of propagandistic positive filling of "blank spots" that emphasize friendship and cooperation.

[157]*Trybuna Robotnicza,* Oct. 12, 1987.

[158]Interv ew with Valentina Parsadanova, *Argumenty i Fakty* (Moscow), July 30–Aug. 5, 1988.

[159]A. Chubar'yan, "Historical Science, Foreign Policy and *Perestroyka,*" in *Mezhdunarodnaya Zhizn',* No. 10, October 1988, pp. 44–47.

[160]Vladimir V. Kusin, "The 'Yugoslavization' of Soviet–East European Relations," RFE-RL, *Background Report* (Munich), No. 57/88, Mar. 29, 1988.

[161]*Argumenty i Fakty,* July 30–Aug. 5, 1988.

[162]The Soviets are now actively pushing their own reforms upon the entire Soviet bloc; hence it should only be a matter of time before other East European countries also become involved in reevaluations of bilateral relations with the Soviets. Indeed, it already seems to be happening in the case of Hungary. A Soviet-Hungarian agreement that provides for joint research on the history of relations between the communists of Hungary and the USSR was signed in August 1988. The agreement was signed by Smirnov for the Soviets. See *Pravda,* Aug. 6, 1988. Apparently, a new director of the Hungarian Party History Institute has been appointed to oversee the new task. See Budapest Domestic Service, Aug. 8, 1988, in *FBIS-EEU,* Aug. 9, 1988, p. 11. The declassification of some Hungarian party archives concerning the period 1945–56 suggests that reassessment has begun in Hungary. See *Népszava* (Budapest), Oct. 17, 1988, as translated in Joint Publications Research Service, *East European Report* (Washington, DC), Nov. 30, 1988, p. 9.

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To sum up, Soviet efforts to join the scientific-technological revolution taking place in the industrialized West have led to an opening up to the West and the maximization of efforts to improve the efficiency of Soviet-dominated countries—in other words, to turn them into an economic asset rather than a liability for the USSR.[163] Thus, Soviet motivation for reevaluating some of the embarrassing moments in Polish-Soviet relations has been due more to a sense of self-preservation than to a search for historical truth.

The Polish regime has its own reasons for wishing to eliminate "blank spots" in Polish-Soviet relations. Chronically unable to gain more than a modicum of legitimacy (and sometimes not even that), the Polish regime has endured the ultimate humiliation: a massive workers' uprising and involuntary power-sharing. While the challenge mounted by Solidarity was subdued by military force, the fact that the Polish regime continues to have a low level of popular acceptance has adversely affected its ability to implement policies. Thus, the cycle of ineffective policies and popular unrest is being perpetuated.

One of the fundamental reasons for the regime's unpopularity has been its identity with the Soviet Union. Anti-Russian feelings have been at the heart of Polish nationalism.[164] These feelings, plus the history of Soviet trampling on Polish sovereignty—especially under Stalin—and the role that Polish communists have played in it, have been major obstacles to popular acceptance of communist rule in Poland. The regime's obvious falsification of history, exposed by the independent press in Poland, by family education, and by Western Polish-language radio broadcasts, have helped to delegitimize the regime.

The accession of Gorbachev to power and the resulting Soviet reforms, which have led to a reevaluation of the history of the Soviet Union and the discrediting of Stalinist structures, offered the Jaruzelski regime an opportunity to win some credibililty in Poland. By initiating a similar de-Stalinization campaign in Poland, it could finally deal openly with embarrassing and previously taboo subjects in Polish-Soviet history. That the campaign was mostly an attempt to win popularity in Polish society is confirmed by the fact that Polish members of the commission are mostly educator/propagandists who play a significant role in the internal-security apparatus.[165]

Though complementary, Soviet and Polish motivations for the campaign are not identical. Consequently, conflicts have arisen during the process of reexamining "blank spots." The Soviets have hoped that the campaign to eliminate "blank spots" would eventually establish a new modus vivendi in Soviet–East European relations—that the process would become synchronized with reforms in the USSR and would produce a mutual demonstration of goodwill and "new political thinking." Thus, they prefer to treat the elimination of Polish-Soviet "blank spots" as the international dimension of their own internal reexamination of Soviet history. The subject of Soviet deportations of Poles from areas seized in 1939 does not present a problem for them since it easily fits under the heading of Stalinist excesses toward Soviet nationalities, which are now being discredited; the same holds true for Stalin's dissolution of the KPP, which is subsumed in the discussion in the Soviet Union concerning the rehabilitation of many Comintern figures. However, Moscow shuns any topic that falls outside the boundaries of what is being discussed in the Soviet Union and that affects the international standing of the USSR—for example, the secret protocol to the Nazi-Soviet Pact (because it questions the manner in which the USSR acquired the Baltic republics) and Katyn (because, as an international crime, it has the potential of discrediting the Soviet state).

In contrast, the Polish regime's motives—internal stability through a demonstration of sovereignty and independence vis-à-vis the USSR—have made it interested in dealing with a broader range of topics and uncovering as much truth as possible, without, of course, implicating itself.[166] The regime hopes that it can thereby dissociate itself from the policies of previous Polish regimes, particularly from their subservience to Moscow.

A paradoxical situation has emerged in the process: some of the most devoted apparatchiks and Stalinists in Poland have entered into open conflict with the Soviets over the issue of "blank spots." Among them is Henryk Bednarski, once the secretary in charge of the

[163]On Soviet economic policies in Eastern Europe, see Keith Crane, *The Soviet Economic Dilemma of Eastern Europe*, R-3368-AF, Santa Monica, CA, RAND Corporation, May 1986.

[164]For a good discussion of Polish nationalism, see Peter F. Sugar and Ivo J. Lederer, Eds., *Nationalism in Eastern Europe*, Seattle, WA, University of Washington Press, 1969, especially the chapter by Peter F. Sugar on "External and Domestic Roots of Eastern European Nationalism" and that by Peter Brock on "Polish Nationalism."

[165]Not only did the Ministry of the Interior have one of its top men on the commission (Walichnowski), but various regional ministries of the interior engaged in frequent discussions of "blank spots." For example, in October 1987, the Soviet consul-general in Kraków, Petr Sardachuk, discussed Polish-Soviet "blank spots" at a meeting of the party activists of the Kraków Voivodship Ministry of the Interior. See *Dziennik Polski* (Kraków), Oct. 28, 1987.

[166]The few voices calling for an examination of post–World War II Soviet interventions in Polish affairs (including such topics as the unequal economic relations between Poland and the Soviet Union up to 1956, Soviet pressure on Poland in 1956, and the Soviet role in the events of 1981) have been disregarded by the regime.

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PZPR CC's Ideological Department and, until recently, minister of education. Currently the head of the Polish-Soviet Friendship Society, Bednarski influences the selection of participants in meetings of Soviet and Polish historians and keeps a watchful eye on educational and cultural exchanges between Poland and the USSR.

Bednarski's Stalinist background is well documented. He was the party boss in Bydgoszcz in March 1981, when several Solidarity activists were beaten up by the police as part of an attempt by party hard-liners to force Jaruzelski into declaring martial law.[167] He is also a founding member of the "Grunwald" Patriotic Movement, an organization of the extremist, anti-Semitic, and very nationalistic Stalinist *Beton* (cement) group within the PZPR.

Bednarski has had an extensive and long-lasting working relationship with Maciszewski; in fact he has a personal link to the Polish commission's chairman.[168] Although he has been removed from the post of minister, he remains an important figure in the process of clearing up the "blank spots." In fact, the publishing house of the Polish-Soviet Friendship Society has been given the task of publishing the Polish translations of many works previously banned but now being published in the USSR.[169]

Besides Bednarski, there are other Stalinist elements on the commission—the various military-political figures, internal-security personnel, party apparatchiks, and ZBoWiD functionaries. And there is Walichnowski, an unrepentant protégé of General Mieczysław Moczar, the former leader of the "partisans"—a native communist wing of the PZPR with strong nationalistic views and deeply embedded resentment of the Soviets' overbearing influence in Poland. These hard-line and nationalistic Stalinist elements are using the campaign to fill in the "blank spots" to advance their own ends. The fact that "blank spots" has now become a part of the political education of Polish army conscripts only serves the purpose of these nationalistic elements who control that education.[170]

Conclusion

Although the Polish press has recently reported that relations between Poles and Russians working together on joint economic projects have improved,[171] it is highly unlikely that national prejudices and biases that have accumulated over generations and form a part of the national psyche can be erased overnight by fiat. In fact, the current campaign to eliminate "blank spots" in Polish-Soviet relations may actually backfire on the Soviets if they do not accept responsibility for Katyn, for expectations in Poland have risen high. There is also the possibility that tension betwen the two regimes will become accentuated if, on the one hand, the Soviets come to perceive Polish pressure for resolving the Katyn issue as ill-intentioned, and if, on the other hand, the Poles come to view Soviet recalcitrance on that issue as a return to Soviet overbearance and condescension toward Poland.

If the Soviets do accept responsibility for Katyn, the impact, while not major, will nevertheless be favorable; the admission will persuade some Poles that important fundamental changes have indeed taken place in the USSR. The impact on the Soviets of such an admission, however, may well be adverse. Certainly, anti-reform elements in the USSR will be enraged. Blaming Stalin for injustices against true communists or for brutal policies toward the peasants is one thing, but exonerating the Nazis of a war crime and shifting blame for it onto the Soviet state is another matter altogether.

Examined within the larger context of the Soviet political system, the latest attempt to eliminate "blank spots" in Soviet-Polish relations is a peculiar by-product of the ideological content of the Soviet political model. In a state founded on Marxist-Leninist ideology, any leadership wishing to introduce new and dramatically different policies has to validate them by discrediting the former policies. Hence, it initiates a process of reevaluating history—designed to show that the previous regime had departed from ideology and, therefore, that its policies were bad—even while it attempts itself to return to the original roots of that ideology. In the process, old villains are rehabilitated and new villains created, although some old villains continue to be villified. This phenomena of reevaluating the past is a recurrent one; it has occurred in the course of each of the major Soviet

[167]Bednarski's false statements about the incident are documented in summaries of telephone conferences between him and other party leaders. See *Poglądy*, No. 12, 1987.

[168]As minister of education, Bednarski was the chairman of the Directive Council of the PZPR Academy of Social Sciences headed by Maciszewski. In April 1988, Bednarski chaired the meeting that outlined the future activities of the academy. *Trybuna Ludu*, Apr. 29, 1988.

[169]*Wprost* (Poznań), Aug. 14, 1988.

[170]This topic was raised at a recent meeting of the Defense Ministry Social Sciences Council on new trends in political education of the conscripts—attended by, among others, the director of the Main Political Directorate of the Polish Army, General Tadeusz Szaciło. Jerzy Wiatr, an important party social scientist, emphasized the importance of discussing "blank spots" by political officers in the Army in order to gain a greater co-relationship between the regime and the new soldiers. *Żołnierz Wolności* (Warsaw), Feb. 27–28, 1988. Another meeting that emphasized, among other aspects, the role of "proper" historical education in "correct" patriotic upbringing was attended by General Szaciło, Józef Baryła (PZPR CC Secretary), and Henryk Bednarski. See *Sztandar Młodych*, Apr. 18, 1988.

[171]See, for example, the interview with Ivan Bondarenkov, professor at the Agricultural Academy in Volgograd, *Gazeta Robotnicza*, Aug. 10, 1987.

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successions: Nikita Khrushchev's, Leonid Brezhnev's, and now Gorbachev's. Whether the previous general secretary's tenure is referred to as a "period of mistakes and errors" or as a "period of stagnation" is only a matter of semantics.

Control by top party organs over this process of re-evaluating history ensures that events viewed for any number of reasons as threatening will not be discussed or will simply be distorted in a different direction. In the case of the "blank spots" campaign, the passage of time and the increasing irrelevance of some events for Gorbachev's regime may actually produce a more honest interpretation of those events. However, one can feel certain that as long as the Soviet regime adheres to a centrally-directed, secretive political model, as long as it feels that it has a monopoly on truth and remains distrustful of independent initiative, elimination of past misunderstandings negatively affecting contemporary Polish-Soviet relations will remain an elusive goal.

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The Aging of China's Population

Judith Banister

The People's Republic of China (PRC) has undergone some profound changes from a demographic perspective since 1949. The 1950's saw a sweeping mortality decline and, after a temporary but jolting setback during the Great Leap Forward of 1958–61, mortality rates continued to improve in the 1960's and 1970's, albeit at a slower pace.[1] Life expectancy at birth in China rose from only about 24 years in 1929–31 to approximately 63 years by the mid-1970's and, by 1981, to around 66 years.[2] According to official sources, it has risen still further in recent years.[3]

China's decline in mortality was accompanied by some increase in fertility as birth rates recovered from their repressed World War II level. A moderately high fertility rate of five to six births per woman was maintained until the mid-1960's in urban areas and until the mid-1970's in rural areas.[4] In conjunction with the drop in mortality discussed above, this level of fertility caused China to experience two decades of rapid population growth that raised its population from 583 million according to a 1953 census to 830 million at the end of 1970 according to permanent registration reports.[5] Since improvements in mortality came disproportionately at young ages, China's population was not only growing but it also was becoming younger.

In the 1970's, however, China experienced an extraordinary fertility decline that began to slow population growth and age China's population. The decline was due in large part to the government's pervasive family planning program, which developed with considerable innovation and great speed in the 1970's, and incorporated a strong element of compulsion.[6] It required late marriages, promoted the use of contraceptives, and popularized the ideal of a two-child family. This program, as well as some societal changes engineered by the government that also promoted fertility decline,[7] resulted in a total fertility drop from 5.8 births per woman in 1970 to 2.7 in 1978.[8] (Since then the total fertility rate has vacillated between 2.7 and 2.1 births per woman.[9]) This steep drop heralded the shift of a

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[1] Judith Banister, *China's Changing Population,* Stanford, CA, Stanford University Press, 1987, p. 376. On the causes of the great improvements in China's health and mortality, see Chs. 3 and 4.

[2] George W. Barclay, Ansley J. Coale, Michael A. Stoto, and T. James Trussell, "A Reassessment of the Demography of Traditional Rural China," *Population Index* (Princeton, NJ), October 1976, p. 620; Judith Banister and Samuel H. Preston, "Mortality in China," *Population and Development Review* (New York), March 1981, p. 105; Judith Banister, *China: Recent Trends in Health and Mortality*, Center for International Research, Staff Paper No. 23, 1986, Washington, DC, US Bureau of the Census, Appendix Tables B-1, B-2, B-3, and B-4.

[3] China, State Statistical Bureau, Statistical Division, "The Life Expectancy of China's Population Has Increased," *Renmin ribao* (Beijing), Aug. 24, 1986, p. 4.

[4] Barclay et al., loc. cit., p. 621; China Population Information Centre, *Analysis on China's National One-per-thousand-population Fertility Sampling Survey* (Beijing), 1984, pp. 55, 159–67.

[5] Banister, *China's Changing Population,* p. 377.

[6] Ibid., p. 165.

[7] Ibid., p. 121.

[8] China Population Information Centre, op. cit., pp. 160–61.

[9] Ibid., p. 57; US Bureau of the Census computer reconstruction of China's population trends since the 1982 census based on official birth rate data.

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fifth of the world's population from a high fertility and mortality pattern to one of low fertility and mortality[10]—a shift that will dramatically age China's population. By the mid-21st century, China will have to cope with a huge number of elderly people constituting an unprecedented proportion of its total population.

As dramatic as this drop in China's fertility was, it was not seen as sufficient by China's leaders, who were alarmed by the expert briefings they were receiving. China's emerging statisticians and demographers argued that the existing huge bulge in the age structure at teen and young adult ages ensured that China's population would continue to grow at over one percent annually even if replacement fertility (an average of just over two births per woman) was maintained. The prospect of seeing recent hard-won production increases negated by continuing population growth was totally unacceptable to the leadership, and they responded quickly by adopting the one-child policy in 1978.[11]

This one-child policy, which relies heavily on incentives, disincentives and coercive techniques to promote compliance, [12] has been so successful in lowering China's birthrate that if maintained, it will make the dramatic aging of China's population in the 21st century (already made certain by the fertility decline of the 1970's) more severe. A totally successful policy of one child per couple would ensure that by 2050, China's total population would be much smaller than it is now, but over 40 percent of China's population would be age 65 or above. For every 100 people in the productive ages of 15–64, there would be 89 dependents, nine-tenths of them elderly dependents (see Table 1). Even if the one-child policy is relaxed, as is happening in some rural areas, those localities where the one-child limit has already produced fertility averaging only 1.0–1.4 births per woman will experience severe future aging of their populations unless rising fertility or in-migration of young people counteracts the currently ongoing aging process. Many of China's cities face this dilemma.

In the 21st century, China's elderly, who have traditionally relied on their families for financial and personal support, will have far fewer near relatives to care for them than is the case today. Their care and support looms as a major problem in China's future.

[10]Banister, *China's Changing Population*, p. 11.
[11]Ibid., pp. 183–84.
[12]Ibid., Ch. 7.

Table 1: Projected Elderly Population (Ages 65 and Above) and Dependency Ratios, 1985–2050

	One-child projection[1]			Two-child projection[2]		
Year	Elderly as percent of total	Dependency ratio[3]	Elderly as percent of dependents	Elderly as percent of total	Dependency ratio[3]	Elderly as percent of dependents
1985	5	54	15	5	54	15
1990	6	41	20	6	47	18
1995	7	35	25	6	46	21
2000	8	30	33	7	45	23
2005	8	29	38	8	43	27
2010	9	29	42	9	42	29
2015	11	29	50	10	43	33
2020	15	32	60	12	48	38
2025	17	35	67	14	51	41
2030	22	42	74	16	55	46
2035	28	55	79	19	61	51
2040	34	69	83	22	66	55
2045	38	79	85	22	67	55
2050	41	89	87	22	67	54

[1]The one-child projection assumes a total fertility rate of 1.0 birth per woman from 1990 to 2050. If achieved, the total population would peak at 1.11 billion in the year 2005 and decline to 708 million by 2050.

[2]The assumptions of this projection are that a two-child policy is gradually implemented in both urban and rural areas between the years 2000 and 2010 and then maintained to 2050, that urban areas have a total fertility rate of around 1.3 from now to 2000 rising to 1.8 births per woman from 2010 to 2050, and rural areas have a total fertility rate that never drops below 2.2 births per woman from now to 2000 and rises to 2.5 for the period 2010–2050. This projection results in a total population size for China of 1.24 billion in the year 2000, rising to 1.44 billion in 2020 and peaking at 1.56 billion in 2048. A slow decline in population size then begins.

[3]The population in the dependent ages (under 15 plus 65 and above) per 100 people in the working ages (15–64).

SOURCES: Judith Banister, *China's Changing Population*, Stanford, CA, Stanford University Press, 1987, p. 372; US Bureau of the Census, International Data Base.

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Population Aging

What exactly does the aging of a population mean? Simply stated, it is the process by which an increasing proportion of the total population becomes elderly—sometimes defined as age 60 and above, and sometimes as age 65 and above. As smaller birth cohorts grow up to be children and then adults, they constitute much smaller proportions of the total population than did the children in earlier high-fertility periods. The elderly then constitute a correspondingly higher proportion of the population. In addition, when a population has already achieved low mortality, further mortality improvements primarily extend the survival of older age groups, which in turn tends to increase the aging of the population.

For example, in 1973–75, of the babies born alive in China, over 70 percent were expected to live up to or beyond age 60 and over 50 percent were expected to live at least until 70 years of age.[13] Based on the improved mortality conditions of 1981, 76 percent of the babies born alive were expected to live to or beyond age 60; 56 percent were expected to survive at least to age 70, and over one-quarter of those born were projected to live to age 80 or beyond.[14] Clearly, larger proportions of China's population are now going to live so long that they will join the ranks of the elderly. It is also reasonable to assume that there will be further mortality improvements that will extend survival at the upper end of the age range.

Figure 1, the population pyramid from China's 1982 census, shows the smaller cohorts of babies up through age 7, born in the recent period of low fertility. Children aged 0–7 comprised only 15.5 percent of China's 1982 census population, in contrast to the 1953 and 1964 censuses, when they constituted 22.6 percent and 22.3 percent, respectively, of the total count.[15] China's 1982 population pyramid also shows bulges in the age structure at ages 8 to 19 (consisting of those born between 1962 and 1973) and at ages 24 to 30 (those born in 1951–57), caused by a rise in fertility and a drop in infant and child mortality in the years mentioned and a sharp drop in fertility in the periods immediately following. Those who were ages 8 to 30 in 1982 will be 26 to 48 at the turn of the century, swelling the ranks of the middle-aged working population. By the year 2015, the oldest cohorts in today's age bulge will be 60 and older. As today's huge cohorts of teenagers and young adults become elderly after about 2015, China will have an enormous aged population to provide for. The number of people age 60 and above will increase from 77 million counted in 1982 to about 298 million in the year 2025, and further to 430 million by 2050. Nothing, short of a catastrophic rise in adult mortality, can change this trend, because the aged of the middle decades of the 21st century have already been born. What can change are the fertility levels between now and the second quarter of the 21st century, which in turn will determine whether or not there will be a sufficient number of working-age adults to provide and care adequately for the predictably numerous elderly.

[13]From the adjusted life tables in Banister and Preston, loc. cit., p. 105; and Banister, *China: Recent Trends in Health and Mortality*, Appendix Tables B-1 and B-2.

[14]From adjusted life tables in Banister, *China: Recent Trends in Health and Mortality*, Appendix Tables B-3 and B-4.

[15]China, State Council Population Census Office and State Statistical Bureau Department of Population Statistics, *Zhongguo 1982-nian renkou pucha ziliao (dianzi jisuanji huizong)* (Data from China's 1982 Population Census [Results of Computer Tabulation]), China Statistical Publishing House, Beijing, 1985, pp. 272, 505—hereafter cited as *Zhongguo 1982-nian renkou pucha ziliao*; China, State Council Population Census Office and State Statistical Bureau Department of Population Statistics, *The 1982 Population Census of China (Major Figures)*, Economic Information & Agency, Hong Kong, 1982, pp. 37, 40, 60.

Denial of the Aging Problem

Chinese authorities were slow to recognize that the government's efforts to control population growth were leading inexorably to a dramatic aging of China's population. The evidence available suggests that until the mid-1980's—several years after the institution of the one-child policy—China's local and national leaders failed to perceive that elderly dependency was or would ever be a problem. For instance, a group of gerontologists from the United States who visited China in 1978 noted:

Our Chinese hosts said the needs of their aging population were not a problem in their country. When we inquired about the probability that the "graying of China" might become a problem as it has in the Western world (when their birth rate is reduced and their lifespan lengthened), they could not visualize the needs of the aged as separate from the needs of the whole population.[16]

Why did China's leaders see no difficulty in providing for the elderly? In the first place, as is the case in most developing countries, the aging of China's population has not yet proceeded very far; it is hard to acknowledge a problem of which you have not yet seen any

[16]Grace Jacobs, "Speaking of Seniors," in *Long Life, Aging in China, notes of a delegation of gerontologists to China*, mimeo, 1978, p. 206.

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Figure 1: The Civilian Population of China, by Age and Sex: July 1, 1982*



*NOTE: This population pyramid was created from China's 1982 census data by Doug Grossman, Precision Charts, Newport News, VA. It is reproduced here with permission. The numbers beside the pyramid are the ages below which are one-quarter, one-half, and three-quarters of the population of each sex.

SOURCE: China, State Council Population Census Office and State Statistical Bureau Department of Population Statistics, *Zhongguo 1982-nian renkou pucha ziliao (dianzi jisuanji huizong)* (Data from China's 1982 Population Census [Results of Computer Tabulation]), China Statistical Publishing House, Beijing, 1985, pp. 272–81.

signs. From the 1953 census to the 1982 census, the percent of the total population age 60 and above increased only slightly, from 7.2 percent to 7.6 percent.[17]

Second, among China's population age 60 and above, the 1982 census showed that fully 63 percent were in the relatively vigorous age range of 60–69.[18] In other words, the process of aging *within* the elderly age groups had not progressed very far. However, China's

(Fns. 17 and 18 follow on p. 66.)

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elderly population is expected to shift toward an ever-older age structure as time passes (see Table 2, p. 75).

Third, by laying the burdens of caring for the elderly as fully as possible on their children, China's local and national governments so far have successfully minimized public social security costs.

Fourth, it is very common for older people in China, particularly the numerous rural elderly, to cut back on physical labor only gradually and to continue to contribute to family production, housework, and child care in their old age. Productive people in their sixties and older are not likely to be seen as dependents and a burden.[19] Also, urban retirement ages are so young that men and women often just take up a different job while drawing a pension.

Fifth, the study of demography was taboo in China until 1978, and the work of the PRC's few trained demographers was suppressed. Since then, official suspicion and control of demographic research have lessened, but major population policy decisions such as promoting the one-child policy in rural as well as urban areas were apparently made without the sophisticated demographic projections that would have clearly shown future age-structure results of alternative fertility levels. From the information available, it appears that the one-child policy decision was based primarily on the results of several alternative population projections showing the relationship between different total fertility rates for China's population and different future population sizes.

When confronted with the argument that population aging would follow if all Chinese couples actually did have only one child, numerous officials and scholars, prior to the mid-1980's, responded by denying that the one-child policy would ever cause a problem of providing for the aged. This was the official line from 1980 through about 1984.[20] For example, in late 1983, the then-director of the State Family Planning Commission stated: "It is without any foundation to worry about the danger of population aging in the promotion of one child per couple."[21]

Recognition of an Aging Problem

By 1984, Chinese government leaders had become much more sophisticated about the causes of population aging and the need to face this phenomenon and plan for it. Many official statements began to portray aging both as an urgent current problem and a long-term planning problem. For example, a member of China's State Planning Commission published an article in December 1984 entitled, "Fully Recognize the Importance and Urgency of China's Population Aging Problem," which included these comments:

. . . China is facing an unavoidable problem of population aging. For this reason, we should overcome various kinds of muddled thinking, further recognize the urgency and the importance of China's aging problems, and lose no time in carrying out the work well . . . . It is incorrect to avoid the problem of aging. It is also incorrect to become pessimistic and to take an attitude that nothing can be done.[22]

Several developments contributed to the growing attention paid the aging problem in official circles in the last half of the 1980's. Burgeoning social security expenditures due to a sharp increase in retirees was one. After Mao Zedong died in late 1976, millions of young adults who had been sent out of China's cities started an unapproved "wind of returning to the cities," thus swelling the ranks of the visibly unemployed urban population.[23] In an attempt to create vast numbers of job opportunities, cities instituted in 1978 a system of mandatory retirement at the long-standing legal retirement ages of 60 for men, 50 for female blue-collar workers, and 55 for female white-collar workers.[24] (Previ-

[17]In the 1953 census, of the directly enumerated population of 574.2 million, 41.5 million were age 60 and above, given the assumption that the entire military was below age 60. See China State Council Population Census Office and State Statistical Bureau Department of Population Statistics, *The 1982 Population Census of China (Major Figures)*, loc. cit., pp. 38–39, 60. In the 1982 census, 76.7 million of the total population of 1,008.2 million were age 60 and above. See *Zhongguo 1982-nian renkou pucha ziliao*, pp. 272–81, 505.

[18]*Zhongguo 1982-nian renkou pucha ziliao*, pp. 272–81, 505. In Sweden, by contrast, at the end of 1986, people age 60 and above already constituted 23.1 percent of the total population, and only 47 percent of the elderly were in their sixties. See *Statistisk arsbok for Sverige 1988* (Statistical Abstract of Sweden 1988), Stockholm, Statistiska Centralbyran, 1988, p. 33.

[19]Lillian Liu, "Mandatory Retirement and Other Reforms Pose New Challenges for China's Government," *Aging and Work* (Washington, DC), Vol. 5, No. 2, 1982, pp. 121, 128; Deborah Davis-Friedmann, *Long Lives, Chinese Elderly and the Communist Revolution*, Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press, 1983, pp. 15–33; and Jersey Liang, Edward Jow-Ching Tu, and Xiangming Chen, "Population Aging in the People's Republic of China," *Social Science & Medicine*, Vol. 23, No. 12, 1986, p. 1354.

[20]Details in this paragraph are documented in Banister, *China's Changing Population*, pp. 12–20, 183–84, 368–76.

[21]"Qian Xinzhong Talked About the Problem of Resisting Spiritual Pollution on the Family Planning Front. Vigilance Must Be Maintained Against the Erroneous Thought of 'Population Determinism'," *Jiankang bao* (Beijing), Nov. 1, 1983, p. 1.

[22]Qie Jianwei, "Fully Recognize the Importance and Urgency of China's Population Aging Problem," *Renkou yu jingji* (Beijing), No. 6, December 1984, pp. 28–33.

[23]For details, see Banister, *China's Changing Population*, pp. 335–48.

[24]See "Growing Old in China," in Su Wenming, Ed., *From Youth to Retirement*, Beijing, Beijing Review Special Feature Series, China Today, No. 4, 1982, p. 84; Lillian Liu, "Recent Social Security Developments in the People's Republic of China," *Social Security Bulletin* (Washington, DC), Vol. 50, No. 4, April 1987, p. 76.

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ously, retirement at these ages had been prescribed and allowed, but in practice it had been optional.) In addition, the "*dingti*" (substitution) system in some factories, which guaranteed an employee's adult son or daughter an immediate job in the same unit when the parent retired, swelled the ranks of retirees by encouraging voluntary, early retirement.[25] Mandatory retirement of state workers—an important component of Deng Xiaoping's policy of easing older party members (especially aging Maoists) out of powerful positions and promoting rapid, smooth generational turnover to younger leaders thought more likely to be open to reform ideas—also increased the number of retirees in China.[26] As a result of mandatory retirement by age 60, the number of pensioners nationwide has multiplied rapidly from 3 million in 1978 to 8 million in 1981, 13 million in 1983, and 16.4 million people in 1985. Social security expenditures grew from 7 billion yuan in 1978 to 21 billion yuan in 1984.[27]

The saliency of the aging problem has also been increased by peasant objections to the one-child limit on the grounds that without at least one surviving son they will lack care and support in old age, since a daughter customarily moves away to live in her husband's village. In response to this sensible concern, the government has, on the one hand, encouraged localities to institute some form of social security system, and on the other hand, has modified the one-child program for rural couples. In many areas today, rural couples with a firstborn daughter may have permission to bear a second child. This easing of the one-child policy may also have been prompted by official concern about the renewed occurrence of female infanticide in China in the years since the policy began.[28]

Finally, the long-range population projections of numerous foreign and, more recently, Chinese demographers repeatedly confirming that success in the one-child policy would achieve the goal of curtailing China's population size, but at the expense of producing very severe population aging in the middle decades of the 21st century, have had a cumulative impact on Chinese officialdom.[29] This became evident with the publication in 1984 of the authoritative Chinese study *China in the Year 2000,* which projected that a total fertility rate of 1.0 birth per woman continued indefinitely would produce an age structure with 45 percent of the population age 65 and above by the year 2040. The study estimated that if fertility is kept at 1.7 births per woman (still below replacement level), China's population size would peak in 2035 at 1.3 billion, then decline, but that 8 percent of the population would be age 65 and older in the year 2000, 15 percent in 2020, 31 percent in 2040, and 36 percent in 2080. According to the projection used in the study, even a two-child average per couple from now on would mean that 26 percent of the population would be age 65 or older by the year 2040, and 29 percent by the year 2080. In other words, as the study pointed out, China's population will age under any likely scenario, but the lower the fertility level, the more severe the aging.[30] Since no country has yet had more than 18 percent of its population in the 65 and older category, and many developed countries are already experiencing strain financing old-age support, the prospect of an elderly population comprising 30 to 45 percent of the total population is daunting. This is particularly true because China has so little in the way of institutional structures or resources to deal with the aging problem.

Support and Care for China's Elderly

Financial support for China's elderly currently depends almost completely on their families. China does have an official pension program, but it covers only em-

[25]Alice S. Rossi, "Growing Old in China," *Social Science Research Council Items,* (New York), Vol. 39, No. 3, September 1985, p. 37; Liang et al., loc. cit., pp. 1359–360; Alice Goldstein and Sidney Goldstein, "The Challenge of an Aging Population: The Case of the People's Republic of China," *Research on Aging* (Beverly Hills, CA), Vol. 8, No. 2, June 1986, pp. 188–89; Liu, "Recent Social Security Developments in the People's Republic of China," loc. cit., p. 76.

[26]"Efforts to Streamline Bring Substantial Changes in Government and Party," *The Asia Record,* June 1982, p. 21; Frank Ching, "China Renews Purge of 'Ultraleftists': Party to Reexamine 40 Million Members," *The Wall Street Journal* (New York), Sept. 30, 1982, p. 34; Theodore H. White, "China: Burnout of a Revolution," *Time* (New York), Sept. 26, 1983, pp. 30–49; Tang Tsou, "Political Change and Reform: The Middle Course," in Norton Ginsburg and Bernard A. Lalor, Eds., *China: The 80s Era,* Boulder, CO, Westview Press, 1984, pp. 27–69; "Deng Xiaoping Stresses Promoting Younger People," *Foreign Broadcast Information Service, Daily Report: China* (Washington, DC—hereafter, *FBIS-CHI*), Nov. 3, 1986, pp. K/8–10.

[27]Liang et al., loc. cit., p. 1359; "The Care of the Elderly Must be Changed," *Beijing Review,* Nov. 3, 1986, p. 31 (a translation of an article that originally appeared in *Yangcheng wanbao*); Liu, "Recent Social Security Developments in the People's Republic of China," p. 77.

[28]Chinese reports about female infanticide in the 1980's are documented in Banister, *China's Changing Population,* pp. 220–21. China's July 1987 sample census documented the high sex ratio of 110 boys per hundred girls age 0–4 in the national population. China, State Statistical Bureau, Department of Population Statistics, *Tabulations of China's 1% Population Sample Survey, National Volume,* Beijing, *Zhongguo tongji chubanshe,* 1988, p. 135.

[29]The leaders of China have also begun to deal with the future aging of its population in response to United Nations meetings, such as the 1982 World Assembly on Aging. The China National Committee on Aging was formed in 1982 with the support of the UN, and subsequently, 26 provincial committees on aging were set up. See Marsel A. Heisel, "Aging and the Developing World," in *Populi* (New York), Vol. 11, No. 2, 1984, p. 14, and Tao Liqun, "Developing Undertakings for the Aged of China," *China Population Newsletter* (Beijing), Vol. 3, No. 4, August 1986, pp. 4–6.

[30]*Gongyuan 2000 nian de Zhongguo* (China in the Year 2000), Beijing, Science and Technology Documents Publishers, 1984, trans. in *Joint Publication Research Service, China Economic Analysis,* JPRS-CEA 86-023 (Washington, DC—hereafter *JPRS-CEA*), Mar. 6, 1986, pp. 9–10.

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ployees of the state apparatus, workers in state-owned enterprises, and workers in large urban collective enterprises who have worked for the same unit without interruption for the 10 years immediately prior to retirement. Each unit is responsible for funding its own pensioners; there is no central fund that issues social security payments, though some localities are now trying to pool pension funds from many work units.[31]

As of 1985, 18 percent of employed workers in China worked for state-owned units, which have the most generous pension schemes. In addition to free medical care, those retiring from state-owned units receive monthly payments equal to 60–90 percent of their final paycheck, depending on how long they worked for the unit. Continuous work for 10–15 years can bring a pension equivalent to 60 percent of final salary. The 7 percent of employed workers (as of 1985) who worked for urban collective units also are covered by pension schemes, but ones with a much lower level of benefits. In all, only 123.6 million workers, or about one-quarter of China's total workforce, were covered by these pension schemes in 1985, with 16.4 million people actually receiving state or urban collective retirement pensions. This means an average of eight workers supporting each pensioner.[32]

Even though they often have the resources to live independently, urban pensioners usually live with a son and his family or a daughter and her family. Several factors explain this: the severe urban housing shortage, the need for support services unavailable outside the family, the assumption that the elderly will provide child care for their grandchildren, and, finally, a preference for living in a multi-generation family household.[33]

In contrast to most urban workers, the great majority of rural workers coming to the end of their laboring years are not part of a pension scheme. As of 1984, only 663,000 rural aged people, living in economically advanced rural areas, received some sort of modest pension.[34] Therefore, the government expects—indeed requires—that sons and their spouses and children provide financial support and all necessary care for their aged relatives,[35] and so far, Chinese traditional cultural values have supported this requirement. This usually means that the rural elderly live with or very near one or more of their sons.

The Reforms and the Elderly

Although the political and economic reforms instituted in China beginning in 1978 have enlivened the economy and raised living standards—thus indirectly benefiting many elderly—they have at the same time undermined or weakened those welfare programs that were in place in rural areas in the 1960's and 1970's and have created new problems for China's urban elderly as well. However, their full effect on the elderly is still unclear, and may depend on their family situation, personal work history, and geographical location.

Before the reforms, although there was no formal pension system in rural areas, the people's communes had paid elderly workers about half the workpoints of the best male workers and provided them with enough grain for subsistence. In addition, about 90 percent of the production brigades in the late 1970's claimed to have a cooperative medical system, a form of medical insurance and care subsidized by the brigade welfare fund.

Gradually, in the early 1980's, elements of this safety net for the rural elderly began to unravel. The commune system was replaced with a system of household agricultural production contracts that has been so effective in providing incentives to produce that peasant living standards have doubled in just a few years.[36] Although the rural elderly have benefited from this increasing prosperity, and often contribute greatly to the house-

[31]Liu, "Mandatory Retirement and Other Reforms Pose New Challenges for China's Government," pp. 119, 121, and 125; Liang et al., loc. cit., pp. 1358–59; Liu, "Recent Social Security Developments in the People's Republic of China," p. 76; Ministry of Labor and Personnel, Bureau of Insurance and Welfare, *Tuixiu jijin tongchou yu tuixiu zhigong quanli wenti* (The Overall Planning for Retirement Funds and the Management of Retired Employees and Workers), Beijing, Laodong renshi chubanshe, 1985, p. 3.

[32]China, State Statistical Burau, *Statistical Yearbook of China 1986*, Hong Kong, Economic Information & Agency, p. 92. The percentages of workers with pension plans were the same at year end 1986. See China, State Statistical Bureau, *Zhongguo tongji nianjian 1987* (Statistical Yearbook of China 1987), Beijing, *Zhongguo tongji chubanshe*, 1987, p. 115. See also Liu, "Mandatory Retirement and Other Reforms Pose New Challenges for China's Government," p. 122; "Growing Old in China," in Su Wenming, op. cit., p. 84; and "The Care of the Elderly Must be Changed," loc. cit., pp. 31–32.

[33]See Davis-Friedmann, op. cit., pp. 34–46.

[34]Lin Xiuzhen, "China's Old-Age Welfare Undertakings Are Developing Rapidly," *Jiankang bao—jihua shengyu ban* (Beijing), July 19, 1985, p. 1, trans. in Joint Publications Research Service, *China Report: Political, Sociological and Military* (Washington, DC—hereafter *JPRS-CPS*), No. 85-104, Oct. 10, 1985, p. 5–6. See also, *FBIS-CHI*, Nov. 16, 1979, p. O/12; Goldstein and Goldstein, loc. cit., pp. 191–92; "Figures on Elderlies," *China Population Newsletter* (Beijing), Vol. 3, No. 6, December 1986, p. 13; Liang et al., loc. cit., p. 1359; and Li Shuqing, "Current Status and Trends in Social Support of the Aged in China," *Renkou yu jingji* (Beijing), No. 3, June 25, 1987, pp. 26–29.

[35]The Constitution and the Marriage Law require that children support their elderly parents. In rural areas, however, the custom is for a daughter to marry out of her native village and join the family and village of her husband. Thereafter she has no separate income or wealth with which to support her natural parents. See Liang et al., p. 1359.

[36]Jeffrey R. Taylor, and Karen A. Hardee, *Consumer Demand in China: A Statistical Factbook*, Boulder, CO, Westview Press, 1986, pp. 21–23.

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hold budget by carrying out sideline activities like raising pigs or chickens that are profitable for the family,[37] former welfare functions of the collective system have been weakened or abandoned. By the end of 1985, only about 34 percent of rural brigades still had some form of cooperative medical service.[38]

Old people in the rural areas now must depend even more on family financial support than they did under collective agriculture. Those rural elderly whose families are doing very well economically have plenty to eat and can afford to pay for medical care and other needs, but those whose families are not doing so well may have lost some of their former security.

For those older people who have no living sons, the rural society has only a few back-up methods of providing support. Some people, especially women, focus on developing pseudo-kin relationships with adults in the village who might be willing to care for them when they are old.[39] Communities are also supposed to collect welfare funds to pay for the "five guarantees" (housing; food and fuel; clothing; medical treatment; and burial) for the small percentage of rural elderly who are indigent and have no sons. However, only about 3 million elderly people in rural areas receive these "five guarantees."[40]

Very few of China's aged, just those who are alone and destitute, live in homes for the aged or nursing

[37]Davis-Friedmann, op. cit., 1983, pp. 16–22.
[38]Banister, *China: Recent Trends in Health and Mortality*, p. 15.
[39]Davis-Friedmann, op. cit., pp. 11–13, 92–95.
[40]On the "five guarantees," see "Growing Old in China," in Su Wenming, op. cit., p. 88; "Childless Elders Have Security," *China Daily* (Beijing), Feb. 10, 1983, p. 1; Lin Xiuzhen, loc. cit., pp. 5–6; "Hubei Adopts Regulations on Rural Households," *FBIS-CHI*, Mar. 28, 1986, p. 2; Li Shuqing, loc. cit., p. 26.

Residents at a newly-built home for the aged in Tangfang commune, Fengnan county, Hebei province in November 1982.

—New China Pictures from Eastfoto.

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homes. As of 1984, only 241,000 rural and 41,000 urban old people were in homes for the elderly, less than half of 1 percent of the 83 million people age 60 and above nationwide.[41] Altogether, fewer than 4 million older people received any form of social security in rural areas; they constituted just 6 percent of the 59 million people age 60 and above in rural China in 1984.[42]

In urban areas the number of retirees on pension has mushroomed. For them, conditions under the reforms are relatively good so far. They may enjoy their leisure or take on another job while receiving their pension. However, the constant and growing problem in the reform period of rising inflation threatens their security in the future. Already, sharp rises in the cost of living have hurt retired people, whose pensions are fixed at a specific sum when they retire.[43]

Reforms in urban areas have also greatly weakened the financial base from which the pensions of state-owned enterprises are paid. Before the adoption of the urban sector economic reforms, state enterprises were responsible for paying out pensions to their own retired workers, but they also paid their profits into the state budget, and in return, the state covered any deficits they incurred. Therefore, if an enterprise operated at a loss, the pensions of its retirees were guaranteed and paid for by the state. But under the economic responsibility system that is gradually being adopted in urban areas, enterprises are accountable for their own financial viability, and the state does not promise to cover their deficits.

As it exists at present, the system of funding retirement pensions is inadequate to cope with the escalating pension costs. Because individual enterprises are responsible for supporting their own pensioners and also, under enterprise reforms, for showing a profit, the older enterprises with many retirees are financially reeling under heavy pension burdens while newer enterprises with a young workforce have only minimal pension costs.

To cope with some of the effects of China's economic reforms, the government is now attempting to figure out a way to share the retirement pension burden more equitably. The Seventh Five-Year Plan, for 1986–90, gave this guideline: "We must reform the social welfare management system, integrating socialized administration with work unit administration, but emphasizing the former."[44] So far, establishing a national social security fund for retirees from enterprises is only under study. As one Chinese analyst commented in 1987: "It is a flying leap to establish a retirement security fund under a unified social management system in comparison with the system of self-collection and self-management by enterprises."[45] However, in 1985, the provinces of Guangdong and Fujian, as well as scattered counties and municipalities elsewhere, tested various ways to consolidate the pension funds of enterprises in the same branch of industry.[46] In 1987, Shanghai Municipality established a pooled common pension fund for its enterprises which is working well.[47]

As of late 1987, some 200 cities and counties had implemented some version of what is known as "the reform of the social security system." This particular reform applies only to the state-owned enterprises in a municipality or county. "Under the system, each enterprise pays a certain percentage of its employees' wages before taxes to the local labor insurance department, which will then pay out pensions for all retirees at local enterprises."[48] Such pooling of pension funds helps lighten the otherwise overwhelming pension burden of older enterprises with many retirees while obliging newer enterprises with a younger work force to help support current pensioners in the locality. If this effort is not successful, resentment between workers and retirees of the older enterprises lacking money for bonuses or discretionary expenditures may become a problem.

State-owned enterprises are also trying to replace the former system of permanent employment guaranteeing a life-long "iron rice bowl," by hiring new workers on a contract basis with the understanding that they can be fired or laid off. The number of new contract workers is comparatively small but growing rapidly. According to a December 1987 report:

State-owned enterprises in China have employed 5.91 million contract workers since the new labor system became official in October 1986. Of every 100 workers recruited in recent years, 61 are contract workers, who now account for 10 percent of the work force in a dozen big cities, including Qingdao, Shenyang, Wuhan, and Canton. Half of the workers in textile, metallurgy and

[41]Lin Xiuzhen, loc. cit., p. 1, "Figures on Elderlies," loc. cit., p. 13.

[42]US Bureau of the Census urban-rural computer reconstruction and projection of China's demographic trends, 1982–2050.

[43]Nie Lisheng, "Foundation Established for Welfare of the Aged," *China Daily*, May 15, 1986, p. 3.

[44]"Details of the Seventh Five-Year Plan," *Summary of World Broadcasts*, (Reading, England) No. FE/8235/C1/1–34, Apr. 17, 1986, p. 32.

[45]Wang Wenying, "On Some Issues Concerning Population Aging," *Renkou yu jingji*, No. 2, Apr. 25, 1987, p. 45.

[46]Ministry of Labor and Personnel, Bureau of Insurance and Welfare, op. cit., p. 3.

[47]According to a June 1987 interview conducted at a Shanghai factory by Jeffrey R. Taylor, economist at the US Census Bureau's China Branch.

[48]Wu Naitao, "Old-Age Care in Reform," *Beijing Review*, Dec. 28, 1987–Jan. 3, 1988, p. 31.

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construction industries and commerce are contract workers.[49]

A retirement system applicable to contract workers is still being developed. National regulations of July 1986 stipulate that each month state enterprises must deposit a sum equivalent to about 15 percent of their total contract wage bill into a special retirement fund bank account. In addition, each month the enterprises may deduct up to 3 percent of the pay of individual contract workers and put it in the retirement account. Upon retirement, contract workers are to receive a monthly pension based on how long they worked for the enterprise and how much money they or their employer paid into the account for them.[50] A contract worker who is employed only a short time is supposed to receive a lump-sum payment when he leaves the enterprise. This system remains untested because it is too new to have qualified annuitants.

Another recent policy modification has been a new focus on discovering the unmet needs and desires of the elderly and attempting to meet some of them. For instance, surveys of the urban elderly have found that many of those retired on a pension want to have socially and intellectually stimulating things to do with their leisure time. Therefore some social clubs and sports associations have been set up, along with 70 "universities for the elderly" in cities.

Also, to allay the fears of couples of childbearing age about their own old age and to make the one-child program more acceptable generally to these couples, many urban and rural communities have organized teams of youths to go around helping out old people, especially the childless elderly. According to a 1985 report: "Tens of thousands of volunteer groups of young people have been organized throughout the country to help the aged with various chores, such as cooking and washing; aiding them to get medical treatment, and carrying grain, fuel or water."[51] The needs of the elderly are acute, in large part because the service sector is so poorly developed in the Chinese economy that those not strong enough or mobile enough to take care of themselves have few places to turn for help.

Debating Demographic Policy

Given the underdeveloped state of China's systems for the care and support of citizens of advanced years and its inability to institute a comprehensive social security system in the foreseeable future, a major focus of debate regarding the aging of the population has centered around issues of demographic policy. Official recognition of the probable impact on population aging of fertility rates well below replacement level has led to questioning of the unpopular one-child policy. This has stimulated a lively debate in professional journals and in the media about whether population aging is a false alarm, a good thing, a bad thing, inevitable so why worry about it, or something China can safely ignore now and deal with a few decades in the future.

Those who strongly defend the one-child policy generally argue that the absolute number of elderly in the early and middle decades of the next century is fixed and a change in fertility now cannot alter it; that even in the future when the elderly are very numerous, the overall dependency ratio including children will not be intolerably greater than it is now (Table 1); and that the long-term solution to aging and all other population problems is rapid economic development combined with control of population size. They also point out that an increase in the proportion of aged in the population is caused by good things like greater longevity, low fertility, and control of population growth, and results in good things like a busy, happy old age for most people, the mutual benefits of multi-generation families, and a population with greater maturity and experience.[52]

In contrast, those who are alarmed by the potential of severe future aging of the population are usually more willing to consider present or future modifications of the one-child policy to modulate its effects. They point out the grim prospects for rural and even urban couples who raise an only daughter, including possible lack of financial support and personal assistance and care in old age, and the threat of family dissolution. They contend that fertility must be just high enough so that future adults of working age will be able to provide adequately for the hundreds of millions of old people. They point out that child dependency is very different from old-age

[49]"Employment of Contract Workers," *Summary of World Broadcasts*, No. FE/W0006 A/4, Dec. 23, 1987, p. 4.

[50]"Tentative Regulations on the Implementation of the Labor Contract System in State Enterprises," promulgated by the State Council on July 12, 1986, in *Guowuyuan fabu gaige laodong zhidu sige guiding* (The State Council Promulgates Four Regulations on Reform of the Labor System), Beijing, *Laodong renshi chubanshe*, 1986, pp. 7–8, trans. in *Summary of World Broadcasts*, No. FE/8367/C1/1, Sept. 18, 1986, p. 1.

[51]Liu Dizhong, "Guaranteed Welfare Plan Eases Minds of Elderly," *China Daily*, July 30, 1985, p. 1.

[52]"By the End of This Century, the Elderly Population of China Will Be Around One Hundred Million Persons," *Jiankang bao—jihua shengyu ban*, Jan. 31, 1986, p. 1; "Minister Wang Wei on Family Planning Policy and Population Aging," *China Population Newsletter*, August 1986, pp. 1–4; Ma Yingtong, "The Positive Role of Population Aging in Social and Economic Development Must Be Fully Affirmed," *Jiankang bao—jihua shengyu ban*, Aug. 29, 1986, p. 2; "Family Planning and Population Aging Have No Quantitative Relationship," *Renkou yanjiu* (Beijing), Mar. 29, 1987, p. 59.

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"One-baby" mothers at Shanghai's Ruijin Hospital.

—Hiroji Kubota/Magnum.

dependency, with the elderly being frail longer and requiring many times the quantity and cost of medical care that children require. Such observers further caution that China's enormous elderly population in the next century will consist of a lower proportion in their vigorous sixties or early seventies and a much higher proportion of the "oldest old" than in today's elderly population. They also note that most countries with rapid or extreme aging of their populations are and will be highly developed countries that have ample wealth to cope with the problem, while China, in contrast, may be forced to confront severe aging at a lower level of economic development because its sharp mortality and fertility declines came unusually early in its modernization history.[53]

Among those who now agree that the one-child policy must be modified in the future to ameliorate the aging problem, the debate continues regarding when to revert to a two-child policy: soon, around the turn of the century, or a few decades into the 21st century.

For instance, in response to projections of the population of Guangdong province in South China, a Guangzhou scholar made the following strong statement about future fertility for the province:

In order to prevent excessive aging of the population, it is necessary to appropriately raise the fertility rate at the beginning of the next century and to gradually adopt a policy of two children per couple to achieve a reasonable and stable population age structure.[54]

Officials of some of China's leading cities, too, are cautiously discussing the possibility of a two-child policy, since these cities now tend to have older age structures than the whole country or most provinces: fertility declined a decade earlier in the cities than in rural areas, so the huge cohorts will pass their peak childbearing years sooner. When smaller cohorts begin to bear children, the fertility limit in these cities may be raised to two children. The Tianjin Statistical Bureau, for

[53]See Eduardo Arriaga and Judith Banister, "The Implications of China's Rapid Fertility Decline," in *International Population Conference, Florence, 1985,* Liege, Belgium, International Union for the Scientific Study of Population, 1985, Vol. 2, pp. 165–80; Bian Yanjie, "Problems for Aged in One-Child Families Analyzed," trans. in *JPRS-CPS,* No. 86-027, Mar. 26, 1986, pp. 65–71; Wu Cangping, "Family Planning and the Aging of the Population," *Zhongguo laonian* (Beijing), No. 5, June 1986, pp. 37–38, 29; Liang et al., loc. cit., p. 1358; Zhao Lilan and Jiang Chun, "Some Thoughts on the Problem of Population Aging," *Jingji wenti* (Beijing), No. 12, 1986, pp. 58–59; Goldstein and Goldstein, loc. cit., pp. 179–99; *Gongyuan 2000-nian de Zhongguo,* pp. 10–13; Jiang Shaogao, "China's Population Age Structure is Turning Toward the 'Aged Pattern'," *Renmin ribao,* Sept. 18, 1986, p. 1; Wu I-chuan, *Aging in a Changing Population: China in the Twenty-First Century,* Louvain-La-Neuve, France, Université Catholique de Louvain, 1986, pp. 1–22; Zhang Kaimin and Chen Xianhuai, "Economic Development and Population Aging," *Renkou yu jingji,* No. 6, Dec. 25, 1986, pp. 7–12; Tianjin Statistical Bureau, "A Study of Population Aging in Tianjin Municipality," *Tongji yanjiu* (Tianjin), No. 2, April 1987, pp. 50–54; Li Yingming, "Trends, Problems, and Solutions—Future Problems of China's Population," *Weilai yu fazhan* (Beijing),No. 3, June 15, 1987, pp. 53–55; "Features of China's Aging Population," *Beijing Review,* Aug. 17, 1987, pp. 28–29, excerpted from Guo Yanquan, "Population Aging and Reform of the Social Security System," *Jingji ribao* (Beijing), June 13, 1987, p. 2.

[54]Lin Daoshan, "Population Aging and Measures to Cope With It," *Zhongshan daxue xuebao* (Guangzhou), Social Science Edition, No. 3, 1987, p. 31.

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example, noted that the future aging of its population could be modulated if, beginning in the middle of the 1990's, a gradual rise in the fertility rate to replacement level were allowed.[55]

At the national level, the State Family Planning Commission has officially continued to hold to the population target of 1.2 billion Chinese in the year 2000 (a goal closely associated with the one-child policy),[56] but the feasibility and desirability of holding China's population to that limit at the turn of the century seems to be increasingly questioned, in part out of concern for the aging trend. Many policy statements now emphasize joint goals of controlling China's population *and* minimizing the aging of the population. In 1987, a member of the Territorial Planning and Research Center of the State Planning Commission stated:

Currently, we already have a target of controlling the population within 1.25 billion persons by the end of this century. However, we should undertake some measures to assure that the target will be met. From the present to the end of this century and to the early years of the next century, the principal task of family planning work is to resolutely control the excessive birth rate and to vigorously promote and encourage one child per couple. The key task at present is to go through the third birth peak smoothly, to analyze the effect of this birth peak on population growth in the next century, to formulate guidelines and policies to assure that the size of the population in the year 2000 stays within the target of 1.25 billion, to level a possible fourth birth peak in the next century, to strive to stabilize the population at around 1.45 billion in 2020 and thereafter, to realize zero population growth in 2030 and thereafter, and to reduce the population gradually starting with 2040. To achieve all these, we must organize specialists in the fields of demography, sociology, and economics to carry out ample theoretical discussions and research, to consider options with a comprehensive perspective, and to make careful decisions between reducing the population growth rate and the problem of population aging and by fitting the fertility level to socioeconomic conditions.[57]

Many Chinese officials have taken this position further and suggested that China's one-child policy may only remain in place until the huge current bulge of population in the childbearing ages passes. A member of China's State Family Planning Commission has stated:

The promotion of the policy of one child per couple is a temporary and transitional measure. It is a policy for one generation of people. At an appropriate time in the future we will carry out readjustments of this policy. This will be beneficial to overcoming the several negative effects from implementing the policy and enabling the age structure of the population to become more reasonable and the population to become stabilized and stationary.[58]

In many rural areas, where the government has met the strongest resistance to the one-child policy and has had the least success in enforcing it despite the use of coercive measures, the policy is in practice already becoming a thing of the past. The pressure on rural couples to have only one child has vacillated considerably in the last few years.[59] For example, in some areas, rural couples whose first child is a daughter may apply for and receive official permission to have a second child. Moreover, many second and higher parity children are born to rural couples because local cadres are often unable or unwilling to implement the harsh measures that would be required to meet birth "quotas" handed down from higher authorities. Indeed, over half of the rural births in 1986 would have been an infraction of a strict one-child limit.[60]

China's Aging in Perspective

Because of the sheer numbers involved, any discussion of China's population problems runs the risk of magnifying those problems. While in some ways the problems China faces are, indeed, unusually serious, in other important respects they are not unlike those of many other developing countries. China's recent demographic transition, triggered by a rapid mortality decline in the 1950's, followed first by peak population growth rates for more than two decades and then by

[55]Tianjin Statistical Bureau, "A Study of Population Aging in Tianjin Municipality," loc. cit., p. 53.

[56]"Birth Control Program Reported Success," *FBIS-CHI*, Feb. 28, 1986, p. K/23.

[57]Li Yingming, loc. cit., pp. 54–55.

[58]Xi Jianwei, "Adhering to the One-Child Per Couple Policy Assures the Fulfillment of the Population Plan in the Seventh Five-Year Plan," *Renkou yu jingji*, No. 1, Feb. 25, 1987, p. 5. See also Joyce K. Kallgren, "Family Planning in China," *Current History* (Philadelphia), September 1986, p. 270.

[59]Discussed in John S. Aird, "Coercion in Family Planning: Causes, Methods, and Consequences," in US Congress, Joint Economic Committee, *China's Economy Looks Toward the Year 2000, Volume 1: The Four Modernizations*, Washington, DC, US Government Printing Office, 1986, pp. 184–221; and Banister, *China's Changing Population*, Chs. 7 and 10.

[60]*China News Analysis* (Hong Kong), No. 1372, Nov. 15, 1988, p. 3; China, State Statistical Bureau, Department of Population Statistics, *Tabulations of China's 1% Population Sample Survey, National Volume*, loc. cit., pp. 648–49.

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Figure 2: Percent of Population Age 65 or Older Projected for Selected Countries, 1987 to 2050



SOURCE AND METHODOLOGY: US Bureau of the Census, International Data Base. Projections for the various countries were based on the following assumptions:

PRC. This projection assumes that a two-child policy is gradually implemented in both urban and rural areas between the years 2000 and 2010 and then maintained to 2050 (see Table 1, p. 63).

Japan. This projection assumes that the 1985 total fertility rate of 1.80 will decline gradually to 1.74 in 2050. No net migration is assumed.

India. This projection assumes that India's total fertility rate will decline from 4.5 births per woman in 1983 to 3.0 in 2000, 2.5 in 2010, and 2.0 in 2050.

United States. This is the "Middle Series" of US population projections, which assumes 1.9 ultimate lifetime births per woman from now on and 450,000 net immigrants per year. These assumptions are consistent with recent US experience. Gregory Spencer, *Projections of the Population of the United States, by Age, Sex, and Race: 1983 to 2080*, Current Population Reports, Series P-25, No. 952, Washington, DC, US Bureau of the Census, 1984.

West Germany. This projection assumes that West Germany's current total fertility rate of only 1.3 births per woman will rise gradually to 1.7 in 2000 and 1.8 in 2050.

fertility declines, is not unusual in the developing world. What distinguishes it is the rapidity of its fertility decline and its implications for the aging of the population, particularly given that China is a populous and heavily rural country. Although China currently has only a small percentage (5.5 percent) of its population age 65 and above, and, like other developing countries, will not have an "old" population structure in the immediate future, by the mid-21st century it will.

China is not, however, alone in having to face the problem of the aging of its population—its aging pattern resembles that of developed countries which will experience rapid or severe aging of their populations in the early part of the next century.[61] As shown in Figure 2, developed countries already have a much older age structure than China—between 10 percent and 18 percent of their populations are age 65 or above. Because fertility is expected to remain near or below replace-

[61]For further detail see Barbara Boyle Torrey, Kevin Kinsella, and Cynthia M. Taeuber, *An Aging World*, International Population Reports Series, P-95, No. 78, Washington, DC, US Bureau of the Census, 1987.

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ment level in these countries, projections show that as much as 25–30 percent of their populations will be 65 and above by 2040. Japan's aging, for example, will be rapid. The proportion of Japan's population age 65 and above is likely to increase from 11 percent in 1987 to about 27 percent in 2050. If China returns to a two-child policy after the year 2000, the aging trends in Japan and China will be roughly parallel, but China's population age 65 and above will shift from 10 percent to 22 percent of the total population three decades later than the same shift occurs in Japan.[62]

With about 22 percent of its population in the age range of 65 and above by mid-century, China would have the same proportion of elderly as the United States is expected to have by then. China's total population would peak at about 1.56 billion and begin declining. If China's fertility level in the next century is lower than assumed here, however, the proportion of elderly will be higher.

Although the percentage of its population 65 or above will be similar to that of the US and other developed countries, it is important to keep in mind that China might not have the same per capita resources to cope with the needs of its elderly as today's more developed countries do. However, like these countries, China will have to shift its institutions and values away from emphasizing caring for its young and focus on caring for its old.

China will face particular problems dealing with its elderly population age 80 and above, a trend already seen in developed countries. (Table 2 shows the expected increases in China's oldest old population, both in absolute numbers and as a proportion of the whole elderly population.) The oldest old tend to be more frail, to require more medical attention, to need more assistance in getting about and more personal care than do elderly people in their sixties and seventies.

So far, the societal burden that this segment of the population will impose on China has barely been discussed. China's medical system is not well equipped now to deal with the kinds of chronic diseases found more commonly among older than among younger people.[63] Great improvements in medical insurance coverage and in the quality and availability of medical care will be needed to cope with the medical problems of the rapidly increasing oldest old population.[64]

China continues to rely, as it has for centuries, on the family system to provide for the vast majority of the elderly. Whether this will continue to be possible is open to question. Escalating migration, encouraged by economic reforms, differentially affects the population aging process of the sending and receiving areas, and is beginning to threaten this traditional way of coping with the care of the elderly. In China, as in many developing countries, there is concern that the massive rural-to-

[62]Similar conclusions were independently drawn by Toshio Kuroda, "Population Aging in Japan, with Reference to China," *Asia-Pacific Population Journal* (Bangkok), September 1987, pp. 3–22.

[63]Dean T. Jamison, et al., *China, the Health Sector*, Washington, DC, The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/The World Bank, 1984, pp. 21–27, 96–97; also, Banister, *China: Recent Trends in Health and Mortality*.

[64]Discussed in Gui Shixun, "Population Aging and Reform of Medical Fees," *Shehui* (Shanghai), No. 4, 1987, pp. 18–20.

Table 2: China's Elderly, 1985–2050

Year	China's total population (in millions)	Population 65 or older (in millions)	Elderly as percent of total	Population 80 or older (in millions)	Population 80 or older as percent of 65 or older
1985	1,046.2	54.1	5	6.1	11
1990	1,114.5	64.4	6	8.2	13
1995	1,180.0	76.5	6	10.5	14
2000	1,242.3	90.9	7	13.4	15
2005	1,293.2	104.4	8	17.1	16
2010	1,343.8	117.2	9	21.5	18
2015	1,394.5	138.6	10	26.8	19
2020	1,441.3	175.7	12	31.5	18
2025	1,482.3	206.7	14	36.6	18
2030	1,511.3	247.2	16	46.6	19
2035	1,530.8	297.9	19	63.3	21
2040	1,545.0	335.3	22	72.9	22
2045	1,554.0	342.5	22	90.1	26
2050	1,554.9	340.9	22	111.1	33

SOURCE: US Bureau of the Census, International Data Base. This projection assumes a return to a two-child policy in both urban and rural areas after the turn of the century. A national total fertility rate of 1.75 in the year 2000 is assumed; it is also assumed that this rate will rise to 2.1 by 2009 and remain at that level for decades. Expectation of life at birth is assumed to rise from 66 years in 1982 to 81 years in 2050.

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urban migration of young adult workers will not only exacerbate the aging problem in rural areas, but also undermine traditional family support systems that will remain essential for coping with future population aging.[65]

Chinese observers fear that a significant number of only-children or children with just one other sibling will be personally and financially unable to care for their elderly rural parents, and those who move away may abandon such responsibilities altogether. According to one commentator:

The burden of the peasants will increase. Since peasants are not covered by a retirement fund, an increase in the number of the elderly will increase their burden. By the year 2000, it is very possible that the children of peasants would have to spend one-third or one-half their income to support their parents. It is probable that some of them would be incapable of shouldering this burden. Following the development of industrialization, labor force movements will accelerate. It will become increasingly difficult to rely simply upon the family to give financial security to the elderly. In addition, antagonistic feelings are liable to increase between the two generations when they have to share the income. This is often detected already in the rural areas.[66]

Another article observed:

The rural old age social security system is an extremely serious and complicated problem due to an underdeveloped economy and a large population. The concept of "having four generations under one roof" and of "having sons for support in old age" . . . are naturally not worth having, but some young people in rural areas now are blindly worshipping the concept of having a small family. They are unwilling to support their elderly. The role of family support and care has been greatly weakened. This tendency will become even more acute as a result of rural labor force transfer in coming years.[67]

Still another account predicted:

The flow of the rural labor force into cities will weaken the role of the family in old age support.[68]

In a positive light, this migration of young adult workers to urban areas, if it is steady and substantial, would ameliorate the predicted severe aging of the populations in China's cities and towns, where fertility rates have been well below replacement level every year since 1974.[69] Population projections such as that for Shanghai, which anticipates that the population age 60 and above will increase from 13 percent of the total in 1985 to 38 percent in 2030, even with a return to a two-child policy at the beginning of the century,[70] apparently have assumed very little in-migration.

In conclusion, it is important to remember that although China currently lacks the resources that developed countries have to cope with population aging, it does, like other developing countries, have time. It will be several decades before a high proportion of its population is made up of the elderly. These years can be used to set up systems designed to cope with the needs of China's inevitably huge elderly population.

The lack of any formal retirement system for the majority of China's workers is a particular area of concern. Many observers expect that the state will gradually have to take over more of the burden of providing financial support and personal services to the elderly, and part of the necessary funds will have to be deducted from the salaries of workers. But some analysts caution that China will never be able to afford to "copy the methods of the welfare states."[71] Rather, they suggest that individuals will have to save for their own retirement, and the enormous burden of paying for old age support must be shared among the aging persons themselves, their families, employers, neighborhoods, local governments, and the national government. No single means will suffice.[72]

In urban areas, analysts have begun to discuss reversing course and raising the retirement age in order to hold down the growth in the pension burden and usefully employ vigorous people in their fifties and sixties. This, of course, runs counter to efforts to provide work for young entrants into the labor force. A Chinese mag-

[65]Torrey et al., op. cit., pp. 24–25.

[66]Zhao and Jiang, loc. cit., p. 58.

[67]Zhao Xia, "With the Out-Migration of Rural Labor, We Must Attach Importance to Studying the Aging of the Rural Population," *Zhongguo laodong kexue* (Beijing), September 1987, pp. 30, 39.

[68]Lu Zhongyuan, "The Population Explosion and Aging Demand That the Social Security System Be Reformed," *Jiankang bao,* Aug. 2, 1987, p. 3.

[69]Total fertility rates through 1981 refer to the urban nonagricultural population only, and are based on the 1982 nationwide retrospective fertility survey. See China Population Information Centre, op. cit., pp. 162–64, 169, 172. For 1982 data, see Zhao Xuan, "Report of a 1982 Sample Survey on First Marriage and Fertility of Women," *Renkou yu jingji,* No. 4, August 1985, p. 33. For 1983 data, see Wang Wei, "Questions Concerning Family Planning Work," ibid., No. 2, April 1986, p. 4.

[70]Gui, loc. cit., p. 18.

[71]Zhao and Jiang, loc. cit., p. 59.

[72]See, for example, "Birth Drop 'Grays' China's Population," *Beijing Review,* June 24, 1985, pp. 7–9; Wang Ruiying and Li Beibiao, "A Brief Analysis of the Trend of Population Aging and Measures to Cope With It," *Guizhou shehui kexue* (Beijing), No. 4, Apr. 20, 1987, pp. 15–21; Wang Wenying, loc. cit., pp. 43–46, 13; Li Shuqing, loc. cit., pp. 26–29; Li Yingming, loc. cit., pp. 53–55; Lu Zhongyuan, loc. cit., p. 3; "Co-ordination Urged in Social Security," *China Daily,* Dec. 2, 1987, p. 4.

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azine put it this way: "How to give younger people a chance, but still enable their seniors to continue to exercise their talents, has become a matter of concern."[73] Most authors counsel a flexible approach, so that those who wish to retire at the currently stipulated ages may do so, but those who are healthy and willing to work may continue to work with the consent of their employer and doctor.[74]

The task of solving current problems in the urban retirement system is a great challenge, but it pales before the challenge of providing any coverage at all for those who currently have none. Minister of Civil Affairs Cui Naifu candidly admitted that "it is imperative to arrange social insurance for employees of collectively-owned and township enterprises and private businesses, since they will not receive retirement benefits from the state."[75] Indeed, the biggest unsolved aging problem in China is how to provide better social support for those rural, town, and city people who do not qualify for any formal system of pension and medical coverage.

Chinese officials are generally cautious about promising more than can be delivered in the future. For example, in 1986, Minister Cui reaffirmed the long-term responsibility of the family to care for the old, even while urging reform of the social security system. A *China Daily* article summarized his views as follows:

In view of China's huge population and low standard of industrialization, its social security programmes should be modest in scope and standards. The main task should be a guarantee of basic daily needs and medical care. Because the concept of the family remains strong among the Chinese people, there is no need to shift insurance functions from the family to society. Responsibility for supporting old people should be shouldered by the family, Cui said, adding that 90 percent of older rural residents are supported by their families.[76]

But the low fertility China has already achieved will weaken the system of family support for the elderly, and greater success with a one-child limit would undermine it still further. Those who continue to promote vigorously the policy of one child per couple argue that China's population situation is so desperate it has no choice. The country does, however, have a range of choices, and a one-child limit is neither necessary nor adequate to guarantee a prosperous and secure future for China's people. Indeed, although it would solve the problem of rapid population growth, the success of this policy would create a new problem for China—a population with a huge proportion of its people age 60 and over. As this author has observed elsewhere, it would be a "sad irony if China's people were forced to severely limit the reproduction of their families, on which they depend for their welfare and happiness, only to discover that per capita living standards remained depressed well into the 21st century anyhow."[77] To avert this fate, China must not only limit population growth, but must also continue on its course of improving economic management, promoting agricultural and industrial production, and meeting the needs and aspirations of its people.

[73]"China's Senior Citizens," *China Reconstructs* (Beijing), July 1986, p. 6.

[74]See, for example, Zhu Shizhong, "Symposium on Aging of Shanghai's Population Held," *JPRS-CPS*, No. 85-102, Oct. 2, 1985, p. 62; "The Care of the Elderly Must Be Changed," loc. cit., pp. 31–32; "A Study of Population Aging in Tianjin Municipality," loc. cit., p. 54; Lin Daoshan, loc. cit., pp. 29, 31; Wang Wenying, loc. cit., pp. 43–46, 13; "Elderly Intellectuals Should Stay on Jobs," *China Daily*, Aug. 20, 1987, p. 4.

[75]See interview with Dong Lisheng, "Cui Urges Reform of Social Security," *China Daily*, May 13, 1986, p. 4.

[76]Ibid.

[77]Banister, *China's Changing Population*, p. 379.

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Agricultural Crisis in China

Joseph Fewsmith

For years, the modernization program of Deng Xiaoping found its brightest successes in rural reform and growing rural prosperity. Nowhere was the rural success story more evident than in rapidly increasing grain production—an activity traditionally accorded the highest priority by the Communist leadership. Since the mid-1980's, however, the glow of this success story has dimmed as problems have appeared in the agricultural sector. Last year, pork rationing was reimposed temporarily, and there have been declines in cotton and sugar production. Most serious, and most politically sensitive, grain production has stagnated—opening up a gap between limited supplies and growing demand—and the relative economic position of the Chinese peasantry has begun to decline.

This reversal both reflects and informs a major policy debate within the Chinese leadership regarding agriculture. China's leaders find themselves oscillating uncertainly between the old administrative ways of managing the procurement and sale of agricultural products and the new market structures that have begun to take shape.

This patchwork of contradictory policies—manifest at the November 1988 rural work conference—has so far not pulled agricultural production out of the stagnation into which it had fallen and appears unlikely to do so soon, suggesting that new and more intense policy disputes could be in the offing as China moves toward the post-Deng era. It would be a great irony if the agricultural sector, the flagship of the Dengist economic reforms, were to founder and give rise to a wave of reaction that would significantly alter the orientation of reform set by Deng.

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From Success to Crisis

Initially, increases in procurement prices and the institution of the household responsibility system in the countryside spurred annual increases in grain production. The annual grain harvest grew by one-third between 1978 and 1984—from 305 million to 407 million metric tons. Average annual rural income rose even more sharply in the same period, from 134 to 355 yuan per capita, narrowing the gap between rural and urban standards of living. In 1981, the ratio of urban to rural income was 2.24:1; by 1983, it had fallen to 1.86:1.[1]

Since 1984, however, growth of the agricultural economy has slowed significantly, with declining grain production a principal factor. In 1985, grain production fell by some 28 million tons from its 1984 high, to 379 million tons—a drop of 6.9 percent, the second largest decrease in the history of the People's Republic of China (PRC).[2] Despite strenuous efforts by the state, grain production recovered only partly over the next two

[1]Statistics on grain production and rural income are from State Statistical Bureau, "Statistics on the Achievements of Economic Structural Reform over the Last Eight Years," Parts 2 and 8, *Hongqi* (Beijing), July 16 and Oct. 1, 1987; and *Renmin ribao* (Beijing), Mar. 14, 1987. The ratio of urban to rural income comes from Chen Xiwen, "China's Rural Economy: The Change from Supernormal Growth to Normal Growth" (hereafter, "China's Rural Economy . . ."), *Jingji yanjiu* (Beijing), December 1987, p. 24. Figures on grain production here and henceforth are given in metric tons.

[2]The largest decrease came in 1959, when grain output fell by 30 million metric tons. See Zheng Zhong, "A Look Back at Grain Production Since the Founding of the PRC," *Nongye jingji wenti* (Beijing), February 1988, pp. 3–6.

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Figure 1: China's Grain Output, 1978-86



SOURCES: State Statistical Bureau, "Statistics on the Achievements of Economic Structural Reform over the Last Eight Years," Parts 2 and 8, *Hongqi* (Beijing), July 16 and Oct. 1, 1987; Chen Xiwen, "China's Rural Economy: The Change from Supernormal Growth to Normal Growth," *Jingji yanjiu* (Beijing), December 1987, p. 24; and *China Daily* (Beijing), Jan. 6, 1989.

years, to 391 million tons in 1986 and 402 million tons in 1987.[3] The situation did not improve in 1988, as bad weather and continued problems with policy implementation contributed to a disappointing harvest; grain production reportedly declined by some 8 million tons (see Figure 1).[4]

Even while grain production stagnated or fell, grain consumption has continued to grow in response to population growth and rising rural and urban income. Partly because of efforts to expand grain consumption through increasing fodder and alcohol production after the bumper crop of 1984, demand exceeded supply by 1.6 million, 1.8 million, and 2.1 million tons in 1985, 1986, and 1987 respectively, accumulating a deficit of more than 5.5 million tons over the three years.

Although there is a debate about the rate at which demand is likely to grow in the next decade or so—with some arguing that demand is beginning to level off—it seems likely that greater affluence, changing dietary habits, and population pressure will cause grain consumption to increase by 10-12 million tons a year through the end of the century, reaching nearly 540 million tons by the year 2000. Given this high rate of growth of consumption, one study concludes that even "under the best of conditions, the gap between supply and demand will increase at a rate of 1.5-3.5 million tons a year."[5]

Unless current trends change, it will be practically impossible for the PRC to realize its stated production goal of 450 million tons of grain in 1990 and increasingly unlikely for it to achieve its goal of 500-540 million tons in the year 2000. Even if China were to achieve these production goals, grain consumption would still be only 400 kilograms per capita—the same as it was in 1984 and still below the current world average of 430 kilograms per capita.

Failure to achieve these goals will mean not only that food consumption and diet will remain poor for the foreseeable future, but also that economic development and economic reform as a whole will be more difficult. Not only are agricultural products essential raw materials for China's light industry, but also the rural market is an important outlet for China's industrial goods. If rural incomes continue to lag behind urban incomes and the "price scissors" requires the countryside to pay dispro-

[3]Chen Xiwen, "China's Rural Economy . . . ," loc. cit.
[4]*China Daily* (Beijing), Jan. 6, 1989.

[5]Grain Problem Group of the Policy Research Center under the Agriculture, Animal Husbandry, and Fishery Ministry (hereafter, Grain Problem Group), "The Grain Shortage and the Readjustment of Economic Policies," *Nongye jingji wenti*, May 1988, pp. 3–9.

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portionately more for production inputs than it receives for output, Chinese peasants will be unable to purchase either agricultural inputs or consumer goods, causing the light industrial sector to suffer vis-à-vis the heavy industrial sector, thereby perpetuating old imbalances in the Chinese economy.[6]

Already, the growth of rural incomes has slowed. Whereas the per capita net income of peasants increased an average of 17.6 percent a year from 1978 to 1984, the figure was only 11.8 percent in 1985, 6.9 percent in 1986, and 5.5 percent in 1987 (see Figure 2).[7] (And even these rates of growth were sustained not by income from grain production, but by proceeds from sideline activities and rural industry.) As a result, the income gap between urban and rural areas has begun to widen again. In 1985, it rose to 2.07:1, and by 1986, it had increased to 2.33:1—worse than it had been in 1981.[8]

Although difficulties in the rural sector have not raised the specter of mass starvation (grain reserves remain more than adequate to take care of the sort of shortfalls China has experienced in recent years), they do show that the smooth implementation of rural reform has stalled and that failure to take adequate steps soon could lead to a genuine crisis. For now, China faces a crisis of policy-making, which if not resolved, is likely to lead to intense political conflict and serious economic difficulties.

As background for discussion of the policy debate, it is useful to examine the factors that have contributed to the stagnation of grain production. These can be grouped into two broad, if somewhat artificially separated, categories: secular trends, and specifics of policy implementation.

Secular Trends

The first group of factors, while not unrelated to specific policy decisions, are of a more fundamental, long-term nature. These include a sharp drop in agricultural investment, decreasing returns on grain production, increasing opportunity costs of grain production, and a decline in the amount of arable land.

Declining investment in agriculture. China's problems with investment in agriculture can, ironically, be traced in part back to efforts made at the beginning of

[6]Vice Premier Tian Jiyun underscored this point in his address to the November 1988 rural work conference. The full text of the speech was released belatedly in December. See Tian Jiyun, "It Is Necessary to Pay Full Heed to and Greatly Develop Agriculture," *Renmin ribao*, Dec. 17, 1988.

[7]Liu Zhongyi and Li Li, "Keep Up the Momentum of Sustained Growth in Peasant Income," *Ban yue tan* (Beijing), Feb. 10, 1987, pp. 15–17, trans. in Foreign Broadcast Information Service, *Daily Report: China* (Washington, DC—hereafter, *FBIS-CHI*), Mar. 13, 1987, pp. K/18–20.

[8]Chen Xiwen, "China's Rural Economy . . . ," loc. cit., p. 24.

Figure 2: Trends in Chinese Rural Income, 1978–87

(yuan per capita, and percent change)



SOURCES: *Renmin ribao* (Beijing), Mar. 14, 1987; *China Official Annual Report* for 1981 and 1982–83, Hong Kong, Kingsway International Publications, 1981 and 1982; *People's Republic of China Yearbook*, 1984, 1985, 1986, and 1987, Hong Kong, Xinhua, 1984–87; and PRC State Statistical Bureau, "On the 1987 Statistics of National Economic and Social Development," Xinhua (Beijing), Feb. 23, 1988, trans. in Foreign Broadcast Information Service, *Daily Report: China* (Washington, DC), Feb. 25, 1988, pp. 17–24.

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the Dengist period to stimulate grain production. Faced with a stagnant agricultural economy, reformers offered incentives to grain producers, steadily raising the procurement price of grain and offering to purchase above-quota grain at 50 percent more than the price for quota deliveries. These moves stimulated a rapid growth of grain production. However, since the state did not accordingly raise the price of grain to the urban consumer, for fear of causing political instability, state subsidies rapidly increased. Subsidies for domestic grain increased from 3,631 million yuan in 1978 to 26,459 million yuan in 1985, and are now about 32,000 million yuan.[9]

Staggering under the weight of this subsidy burden, the state began to cut investment in agriculture. During the Fifth Five-Year Plan period (1976-1980), state investment in agricultural capital construction totaled 24.6 billion yuan, or 10 percent of total state investment in capital construction. During the Sixth Five-Year Plan period (1981-1985), state investment in agriculture fell almost 28 percent to 17.8 billion yuan, or 5.2 percent of total state investment in capital construction. Under the Seventh Five-Year Plan (for 1986-1990), agriculture is supposed to receive only 14.7 billion yuan—or 3.9 percent—of a total of 375 billion yuan budgeted for state investment in capital construction.[10]

Contrary to the leadership's original expectations, this decline in state investment has not been offset by increases in investment by local governments, collective organizations, or households. With the breakup of the commune system, the role of the collective in accumulating and investing funds in the agricultural infrastructure has declined sharply. According to one survey, collectively owned agricultural fixed assets have decreased in 85 percent of the villages in China; in 13 provinces and regions, this decline has been greater than 60 percent. Moreover, collective investment in agriculture varies widely from province to province. In only six provincial-level jurisdictions—Beijing, Tianjin, Liaoning, Shandong, Shanghai, and Henan—does collective investment comprise more than 55 percent of total agricultural investment (the national average). In eight provinces and regions, collective investment accounts for less than 10 percent of total agricultural investment, and in such important agricultural areas as Jiangxi and Hunan, the share is a mere 0.6 percent and 0.3 percent respectively.[11] By 1985, according to one source, collective investment funds amounted to only 4 billion yuan, 40 percent less than in 1975. The much ballyhooed efforts to "use industry to support agriculture" have also had little effect. In 1979, such funds had reached 2.7 billion yuan, but by 1985, they had decreased by two-thirds, to 880 million yuan.[12]

Implementation of the household responsibility system in the late 1970's and early 1980's shifted much of the burden of agricultural investment to individual households; they now provide about 40 percent of total investment in agricultural production. But peasant interest in investing in grain production has clearly declined in recent years. According to one survey, peasant investment peaked in 1983, when the average peasant household spent 5.7 percent of its income on fixed assets. The following year, this figure dropped to 4.7 percent, and in 1985, it was 3.8 percent. In this decline, "the tendency for input into crop planting to decrease was particularly marked."[13] A central government survey concluded that total peasant expenditures on productive fixed assets in 1986 were 31.6 percent lower than in 1984.[14]

Part of the reason for this decline, as will be discussed below, is that the comparative returns on investment in agricultural—particularly, grain—production are low as compared to those from other rural economic activities. Another reason is that individual households, despite the increased incomes of recent

[9]In addition, state subsidies for imported grain rose from 550 million yuan in 1978 to 3,438 million yuan in 1982 before declining to 2,200 million in 1984 and 864 million yuan in 1985. See Wang Yongzhi, "Grain Production, Commoditization of Grain, and Grain Prices," *Jingji kexue* (Beijing), No. 1, 1988, pp. 46–51; and Chen Xiwen, "Improve the Urban-Rural Interest Relationship and Deepen the Rural Economic Reform," *Nongye jingji wenti,* April 1988, pp. 17–21. Over the period in question, the value of the yuan fell from about 2 to the $US to more than 3 to the $US.

[10]*Nongye jingji xiaoguo* (Beijing), No. 2, Apr. 25, 1987, pp. 2–5, trans. in Joint Publications Research Service, *China Report* (Washington, DC—hereafter, *JPRS-CAR*), No. 87-014, July 2, 1987, pp. 65–71. The figures for investment during the Seventh Five-Year Plan period come from Geng Zhi, "Raising the Share and Readjusting the Composition of Agricultural Investment," ibid., No. 6, Dec. 25, 1986, pp. 1–3, trans. in Joint Publications Research Service, *China Report: Economic Analysis* (Washington, DC—hereafter, *JPRS-CEA*), No. 87-043, May 19, 1987, pp. 78–82. See also Chinese Academy of Agricultural Sciences, "Problems in Development of a Commodity Economy in Agriculture and Policies for Dealing with Them" (hereafter, "Problems in Development of a Commodity Economy . . ."), *Nongye jishu jingji,* December 1986, pp. 1–5, trans. in *JPRS-CEA,* No. 87-034, Apr. 20, 1987, which gives slightly different figures, indicating that state investment in agricultural construction during the Sixth Five-Year Plan period amounted to 6 percent of total state investment in capital construction.

[11]"Comprehensive Report of a Representative Survey of Rural Society and Economy Throughout the Nation (Excerpts)," *Nongye jingji wenti,* June 1986.

[12]Shi Bing, "An Exploration of the Need to Increase Agricultural Inputs," ibid., January 1987, trans. in *JPRS-CAR,* No. 87-007, June 16, 1987.

[13]Lu Mai and Dai Xiaojing, "An Analysis of the Economic Activities of Peasant Households at the Present Stage," *Jingji yanjiu,* July 1987, p. 68. The term "fixed assets" (*guding zichan*) is not altogether clear. It evidently refers to necessary expenditures for ongoing operations rather than investment that could increase the size or efficiency of operations in the future.

[14]Qiu Youlai, "Why Do High Consumption and Low Accumulation Emerge in the Countryside," *Jingji ribao* (Beijing), Aug. 20, 1988, trans. in *FBIS-CHI,* Sept. 8, 1988, p. 43.

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years, do not have sufficient savings on average to invest significantly in the agricultural infrastructure. Moreover, the distribution of peasant income is highly uneven, so that even if some can afford to invest, many cannot.

According to a survey conducted by the CCP's Rural Policy Research Office, the average peasant household in 1984 had a gross income of 3,089 yuan. After various costs were deducted—family enterprise costs of 893 yuan, taxes of 54 yuan, collective accumulation funds of 77 yuan, purchases of fixed assets of 152 yuan, living expenses of 1,591 yuan, and "other" expenses of 119 yuan—the average household had a total of only 203 yuan remaining that could be used for capital construction or for consumption (42 yuan per capita, based on an average household of 4.8 people). Households where the per capita income was under 300 yuan (or some 1,440 yuan a household)—which comprised 47 percent of the sample—not only had no surplus that could be used for capital investment, but rather, had a 28 yuan deficit. The survey showed, in fact, that only after household income reached 5,000 yuan or more a year did the propensity to make production investments increase significantly[15]—a conclusion that leaves little ground for optimism regarding prospects for increasing household investment in grain production in the near future.

The declining levels of state, collective, and personal investment in agriculture suggest that critics of China's reform policies have a point when they say that the agricultural sector in recent years has been "living off old capital" (*chi laoben*). This tendency to neglect the refurbishing of the agricultural infrastructure is making China increasingly vulnerable to the vicissitudes of nature. According to one author:

A substantial number of our more than 80,000 reservoirs are in disrepair and dangerous. Of the existing 80 million horsepower in irrigation and drainage machinery, one-quarter is obsolete. . . . Many of our 2.4 million mechanized wells have reached the end of their service life and need to be replaced; we need to replace 100,000 wells a year.[16]

The negative impact of the decline in agricultural investment has also been intensified by a sharp change in the uses of investment. Before 1980, two-thirds of the state's agricultural investment went to build and maintain irrigation facilities and the other third was divided between flood control on major rivers and mining work. In recent years, these proportions have been reversed, so that now only one-third of state agricultural investment goes to basic water control works used directly for agricultural irrigation.[17]

Although the party has recognized the severity of the problem of declining agricultural investment and vowed to reverse the trend, it apparently has been unable to deliver on its promises. In September 1979, the 4th Plenum of the 11th Central Committee adopted a "Draft Resolution on Certain Problems in Accelerating Agricultural Production," which declared that "in the next three to five years, the proportion of overall capital construction investment devoted to agriculture must gradually rise to about 18 percent."[18] Five years later, the party adopted a similar proposal at the 3rd Plenum of the 12th Central Committee in October 1984, resolving to raise agriculture's share to 11–18 percent of total state investment in capital construction.[19]

Declining returns on grain production. One of the reasons that peasant investment in agriculture has failed to increase sufficiently to fill the void left by declining state and collective investment is that returns on grain production have been declining sharply, due in large part to a rise in the cost of agricultural inputs.[20] Peasants are unwilling to invest in what is an increasingly unprofitable venture.

In recent years, the rising input costs have largely reversed the economic gains registered by the peasants in the late 1970's and early 1980's, when procurement prices were raised. According to one source, "more than half" the benefit that peasants had received from increased procurement prices has been dissipated by the rising costs of agricultural inputs.[21] According to the State Statistical Bureau, peasant income increased 290 yuan per capita from 1979 to 1985, reportedly due to increases in procurement prices for agricultural and sideline production. But in the same period, peasants spent an additional 146 yuan per capita because of the rising costs of the means of production. Because of this, the economic returns per unit of land have report-

[15]"Comprehensive Report of a Representative Survey . . . ," loc. cit. The 152 yuan spent on "fixed assets" is presumably money spent on operating expenses (see fn. 13 above), for the article makes clear that only the per capita 42 yuan of savings would be available for investment in "expanded reproduction" (*zai shengchan*), i.e., the addition of buildings or equipment.

[16]Shi Bing, loc. cit.

[17]Ibid.

[18]Geng Zhi, loc. cit.

[19]See Zhang Hulin, "Several Problems in Deepening Reform [and] Comprehensively Developing the Rural Commodity Economy," ***Lilun yuekan*** (Beijing), February 1987, pp. 22–26.

[20]Chinese Academy of Agricultural Sciences, "Problems in Development of a Commodity Economy . . . ," loc. cit.

[21]Shi Bing, loc. cit. See also Chinese Academy of Agricultural Sciences, "Problems in Development of a Commodity Economy . . . ," loc. cit.

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edly declined 30-40 percent.[22]

The declining returns on agricultural production have also been reflected in a decrease in the number of specialized households, particularly those engaged in grain production and animal husbandry. For instance, one source states that there were over one million fewer specialized households in 1985 than in 1984; 65 percent of this decrease was accounted for by households specializing in grain farming and animal husbandry.[23]

Increased opportunity costs. Another reason for declining peasant interest in grain cultivation has been that the economic returns from other ventures are greater than those from raising grain. For most peasants, it just does not make economic sense to devote more than minimal resources to grain production. Decrying the failure of cultivators to increase grain yields per mu, one author said bluntly, "The fundamental reason why unit yields have not climbed is that the comparative benefits of grain cultivation are low."[24]

Peasants in Chongqing show off their surplus grain in 1985.

—Mike Theiler from Reuters/Bettmann Newsphotos.

This is borne out by a survey of agricultural returns conducted by the Jiangsu Price Bureau in 1985. The average per mu net profits for various agricultural products were: grain, 55.71 yuan; oil crops, 64.59 yuan; hemp and similar crops, 231.94 yuan; and vegetables, 323.4 yuan. Moreover, on average, a peasant doing industrial work could earn 1,000 yuan a year, while one engaged solely in agricultural production could earn only 400 yuan.[25] Such income disparities have almost certainly increased since 1985, given the declining returns from grain production and the increase in the number of rural enterprises.

Decline in arable land. The lack of investment in agriculture, the poor returns on agricultural production, and the rapid expansion of rural industry have all encouraged the shifting of land from agricultural purposes, especially from grain production, to other uses. As a result, both the amount of irrigated land and the overall amount of arable land have declined rapidly in recent years. The amount of irrigated land declined some 12–15 million mu during the Sixth Five-Year Plan period—nearly half of that decline coming in 1985 alone.[26] From 1978 through 1984, grain acreage was reduced by more than 7.3 million hectares (approximately 119 million mu), and in 1985 alone, grain acreage was reduced by more than 4 million hectares (65 million mu). This factor alone is reported to have caused a 14.4-million-ton reduction in grain output.[27]

Problems of Procurement Policy

While such trends suggest the magnitude of the difficultly confronting Chinese grain production in the com-

[22]*Jingji yanjiu,* No. 9, 1987. See also Duan Yingbi, "There Must Be Major Reforms in the Grain Marketing System," *Nongye jingji wenti,* November 1986, pp. 37–40, trans. in *JPRS-CEA,* No. 87-023, Mar. 23, 1987, pp. 67–73.

[23]*Nongye jingji xiaoguo,* No. 2, Apr. 25, 1987, trans. in *JPRS-CAR,* No. 87-014, July 2, 1987, pp. 65–71.

[24]Zhou Binbin, "An Analysis of the Grain Situation," *Jingjixue zhoubao* (Beijing), Mar. 1, 1987, trans. in *JPRS-CAR,* No. 87-012, June 30, 1987, pp. 91–92.

[25]Duan Yingbi, loc. cit.This survey was also the subject of a Nov. 4, 1985, *Renmin ribao* article.

[26]"China's Rural Economy Makes Innovative Progress—Extracts From the State Statistics Bureau Statistical Report No. 25," *Jingji cankao* (Beijing), Sept. 10, 1987, trans. in *FBIS-CHI,* Sept. 23, 1987, pp. 23–25. *Nongye jingji xiaoguo* of Apr. 25, 1987, says that the effectively irrigated area nationwide was 660,500,000 mu (or approximately 40.5 million hectares) as of the end of 1985, which was 6.26 million mu less than in 1984 and 13.94 million mu (or 2.1 percent) less than in 1978.

[27]Chinese Academy of Agricultural Sciences, "China Must Not Have Less than 400 Kilograms of Grain Per Capita," *Nongye jishu jingji,* August 1986, pp. 12–15, trans. in *JPRS-CEA,* No. 87-002, Jan. 12, 1987.

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ing years, they do not in and of themselves explain the sudden and dramatic decline in grain output in 1985 or the relatively slow recovery since then. To understand this development, one must look at specific policies, particularly the introduction of the contract procurement system and the simultaneous institution of a unified grain purchase price in 1985.

In 1984, China reaped its largest grain harvest in history. The abundance of the harvest was both a blessing and a curse. On the one hand, the surge in grain production gave reformers the policy success and grain reserves they needed to move to abolish the three-decade-old state monopoly procurement system. On the other hand, the very size of the harvest made policymakers overly optimistic, leading them to adopt measures intended to relieve some of the pressure on the state treasury. The latter created strong disincentives for peasants to grow grain, thus paving the way for a serious reversal of grain production gains.

The replacement of the state monopoly procurement and sale system with the contract procurement system in 1985 was intended to transform the relationship between the state and peasant from one of compulsory exaction based on administrative fiat to one of economic equality based on purchases at market value. Initially, the state was to contract for the purchase of 75 to 80 billion kilograms (37.5 to 40 million tons) of grain; peasants were to be free to sell on the open market any grain produced in excess of the amount they had contracted to sell to the state.[28]

This contract procurement approach established a "dual-track" system whereby the state would purchase the grain needed for urban consumption and state industry at artificially low prices while surplus grain could be sold freely at market prices. The initial intention of reformers was that, over time, the price the state paid for grain would be raised while the amount procured by the state would be reduced, thus gradually eliminating the difference between the two tracks.

Because of the burden of grain subsidies on state finances, the state also moved to eliminate the system of state purchases of above-quota grain at a price 50 percent above the price of quota grain. In place of this system, the state instituted the so-called "inverse 3:7" price ratio, meaning that *all* state grain procurements would be at a single unified price calculated as a composite of 30 percent of the former state monopoly purchase price plus 70 percent of the former above-quota purchase price. For the country as a whole, this worked out to an increase of 1.8 percent in the total paid for state grain procurement, but since the cost of agricultural inputs increased 7 percent in 1985, it actually translated into a net 4.9 percent decrease in income for that year alone.[29]

Even disregarding the increased costs of agricultural inputs, the effect of the "inverse 3:7" ratio on peasant receipts for grain varied from place to place, depending on the previous grain quota and the amount of grain sold to the state. For instance, peasants in Jiaxing prefecture of Zhejiang province benefited somewhat from the new policy, but those in Jinhua prefecture of the same province, which had a somewhat lower grain quota than Jiaxing, received less than they had previously received for grain sold to the state.[30] Similarly, institution of the "inverse 3:7" ratio had an adverse affect on peasants in Hengyang city of Hunan province. In 1983, the average price was 34.38 yuan per 100 kilograms of commodity grain sold to the state (including standard purchases, purchases exceeding the contracted amount, and negotiated purchases). In 1985, under the "inverse 3:7" ratio, the average price per 100 kilograms fell to 31.18 yuan, reducing peasant income in the area by a total of 16.7 million yuan.[31] Overall, the price paid to peasants declined in approximately half of China's regions.[32] According to one source, "every jurisdiction reports strongly that the 'inverse 3:7' ratio grain price caused losses for grain farmers."[33]

The adverse impact of the new pricing system was exacerbated by the rising price of grain on the free market. In August 1984, the market price of grain—influenced by the record-breaking harvest of that year—was below the state purchase price. By the spring of 1985, however, as the new contracts were to be signed, the market price had rebounded and was above the contract price.[34] In 1986, grain output was some 10 million tons greater than in 1985, but despite this increase in supply, the market price of grain continued to rise,[35] and it remained substantially above the

[28]The state's intention to purchase 150–160 billion jin (or approximately 75–80 million metric tons) of grain on a contract basis left only about 10 billion jin (5 million tons) to be sold on the market. The remainder is consumed locally. See Joseph Fewsmith, "Rural Reform in China: Stage Two," *Problems of Communism* (Washington, DC), July-August 1985, pp. 48–55.

[29]Hu Changnuan, "Evaluating the Successes and Failures of the Agricultural Product Price Policy over the Past Nine Years," *Nongye jingji wenti*, June 1988, pp. 7–11.

[30]Ibid.

[31]Chinese Academy of Agricultural Sciences, "China Must Not Have Less than 400 Kilograms of Grain Per Capita," loc. cit.

[32]Hu Changnuan, loc. cit.

[33]Duan Yingbi, loc. cit.

[34]Comprehensive Problems Section of the Development Research Center (hereafter, Comprehensive Problems Section), "Peasants, Markets, and System Renewal," *Jingji yanjiu*, January 1987, pp. 3–16.

[35]Gao Xiaomeng, "The Question of Grain Prices and Reform of the Circulation Structure," *Liaowang*, May 25, 1987, p. 16, trans. in *FBIS-CHI*, June 10, 1987, pp. K/21–23. In some places, according to Gao, the price of grain on rural markets rose by more than 10 percent between October and December 1986. "Grain output and grain prices have increased at the same time," Gao said, adding, "This has not happened since 1954."

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state purchase price in 1987.[36]

The differential between the open-market price of grain and the lower price paid by the state for its grain procurements constituted, in effect, a tax on grain production—and a highly visible one at that. Whereas the state had long extracted investment funds from the rural areas through the "scissors effect," the implementation of the dual-track system "gave the peasants a clear standard of equal exchange, making the hidden grain production tax open." Moreover, this "tax" has the perverse tendency to increase when there is a shortage of grain—driving up market prices—so that, precisely at the time when increased output is most needed, the peasants feel exploited and thus have a marked disincentive for meeting contract obligations to the state.[37]

For these reasons, the contract purchase system has been unpopular from the outset. Even in early 1985, the first year of the new system, there were reports of peasant resistance. For instance, peasants in Sichuan province were reported to be "still watching the rise and fall of grain prices on the market" in late April and not signing contracts "even after stalling for a long time."[38] Similarly, Hunan province reported that "contracts on the purchase and sale of agricultural products have been signed slowly," and Guangdong province reported that people had the "mistaken" idea that "they would sign the contracts if they think they are suitable and refuse if they are not. This simply will not do."[39] Though the unusually bad weather in 1985 contributed to the decline in grain production, the way the contract purchase system and the "inverse 3:7" ratio purchase price were applied was judged to be the primary reason for the sharp production decline.[40]

Shaken by this decline, the state took two measures. On the one hand, it attempted to ease the inequity of the "inverse 3:7" formula by linking the sale of scarce production inputs—diesel fuel, fertilizer, and pesticide—to the delivery of grain purchased through contracts, a policy that came to be known as the "three linkages"—after the three production inputs involved. On the other hand, the state took harsh administrative measures in an attempt to increase the amount of land sown in grain and to force the peasants to sign and fulfill contracts to sell grain to the state. Neither approach was well received at the local level.

The basic problem with the "three linkages" policy was that the peasants were either not able to purchase the quantity of inputs to which they were entitled or, when they were able to purchase them, to get them in time to meet their seasonal needs.[41] To make matters worse, the system lent itself to corruption, as various departments took advantage of their power to resell production inputs for large profits. Thus, an April 1987



A fertilizer shipment leaves the Quzhou Chemical Works in Zhejiang province in March 1979.

—China Photo Service from Eastfoto.

Renmin ribao Commentator article complained that "in order to buy some diesel fuel, peasants have had to beg again and again," and that corrupt supply departments "seriously cheated peasants who had diesel-fuel coupons but no way to buy the diesel fuel."[42]

The newspaper's complaints apparently had little effect. Three months later, another Commentator article in the party daily complained of the serious, adverse effects that the corruption engendered by the "three

[36]Guo Yuhai, "Several Opinions on the Grain Problem," *Renmin ribao*, May 18, 1987, trans. in *FBIS-CHI*, June 2, 1987, pp. K/22–24.

[37]Grain Problem Group, loc. cit.

[38]Chengdu radio, Apr. 30, 1985, trans. in Foreign Broadcast Information Service, *China Report: Agriculture* (Washington, DC), No. 85-018, June 10, 1985, pp. 126–27.

[39]Changsha radio, Apr. 2, 1985, trans. in *FBIS-CHI*, Apr. 3, 1985, p. P/2; and *Guangzhou ribao* (Guangzhou), May 18, 1985.

[40]Chinese Academy of Agricultural Sciences, "Problems in Development of a Commodity Economy in Agriculture and Policies for Dealing with Them," loc. cit.

[41]"Letter" from Sun Enjian and Liu Wenbao, "Distortion Is Not Permitted in the Implementation of the System of Contract Purchases," *Renmin ribao*, May 25, 1987; and Commentator article, "No Withholding of the Party's Concern for Peasants," ibid., June 17, 1987, trans. in *FBIS-CHI*, June 19, 1987, pp. K/26–27.

[42]"Cheating Peasants Is Impermissible," *Renmin ribao*, Apr. 30, 1987, trans. in *FBIS-CHI*, May 7, 1987, pp. K/23–24.

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linkages" policy was having in the countryside:

Many people with real power have taken advantage of chemical fertilizer and diesel fuel to establish personal relationships and seek personal gains, thus undermining relations between the party and the masses and between the cadres and the masses. Some departments purchased chemical fertilizer and diesel fuel at the original price and sold them, without authorization, to peasants at a higher price, which increased the burden of the peasants. Even worse, some lawless elements obtained chemical fertilizer and diesel fuel purchased at the original price and used this as "capital" to exploit the peasants and seek exorbitant profits. . . . The scramble for fertilizer and diesel fuel has also led to disturbances undermining social order. . . .[43]

Based on such considerations, a study conducted by the agriculture ministry recommended doing away with the "three linkages" policy. "The benefits of this sort of exchange," it said, "are very small, and the methods very complex; so the incentive for peasants is very small."[44]

More serious, the use of administrative measures to enforce the contract purchase system as an "obligation" undermined the intention of the original reform—by strengthening administrative controls over the peasants at the expense of the newly emerging market relationship between state and peasant—and in effect resurrected the previous monopoly procurement system. This, in turn, stirred peasant resentment. According to one article, "the unified procurement and sale system was thrown out through the front door and the 'contract system' came in through the window." The only difference between the two was seen in the fact that "the quantities covered by the contracts are greater than under unified procurement, and the demands on agricultural varieties are stricter." Peasants complained that "contracts are more unified than the unified procurement system."[45]

This conclusion was corroborated by a survey conducted by the Chinese Academy of Agricultural Sciences. Investigating 30 counties in 20 provinces, the group concluded:

Everywhere, fixed procurement contracts or commissioning of assigned procurement became mandatory quotas or even exactions as a practical matter, and many places closed their grain markets. Following a loosening of restrictions on cash crops such as tea, a regional level-by-level tightening occurred in many places, with the result that commodities that had been invigorated came to be "controlled to death."[46]

Another survey, conducted in the major grain-producing provinces of Hunan and Hubei, found that "sharp declines" in grain production were prevented "mainly by administrative intervention."[47] In some places, administrative organs levied arbitrary fines on peasants for failure to meet contract obligations and "even mobilized the militia to carry out searches [for grain]." If such high-handed methods continue, the author noted with Marxist-Leninist understatement, they not only will dampen peasant "enthusiasm" for grain production, but they will "also influence the worker-peasant alliance."[48] According to another report, grain contracts have become coercive exactions, causing peasants in some areas to lose 20 yuan for every 100 kilograms of grain sold to the state.[49]

Indeed, the peasant response to such compulsion was reported to be "extremely bad."[50] According to the survey of Hunan and Hubei, "the peasants are being exploited (*boxue*), and . . . they more and more obviously distrust the government and nurse a mood of defiance."[51] A report from Jiangxi province stated that in recent years, relations between peasants and local cadres "have been getting tense, and there have been more contradictions between them."[52] Other sources corroborate that this rising cadre-peasant tension is both serious and widespread.[53]

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[43]Commentator article, "No Withholding of the Party's Concern for Peasants," loc. cit.

[44]Grain Problem Group, loc. cit.

[45]See Comprehensive Problems Section, loc. cit. By "demands on agricultural varieties," the author presumably meant both specification of strains and quality of grain, and of permissible amounts of production of other crops, e.g., cotton, sugar cane, oil seeds, etc.

See also Zhou Binbin, Liu Yunzhou, and Li Qingzeng, "The Challenges and Alternatives Facing Agriculture," *Nongye jingji wenti,* December 1986, pp. 35–39, at p. 35.

[46]Chinese Academy of Agricultural Sciences, "Problems in Development of a Commodity Economy . . . ," loc. cit. See also Lu Wen, *Nongye jingji wenti,* November 1987: "The unwillingness of peasants to fulfill their contracts led administrative organs and the grain purchasing departments to 'rigidly fix' the area to be sown to grain and to 'use compulsory methods' to purchase grain."

[47]Guo Xianwen, Huang Yanglue, and Yi Kailin, "Investigation of Rural Areas in Five Central and Southern Provinces and Regions," *Nongmin ribao* (Beijing), Aug. 11, 1988, trans. in *FBIS-CHI,* Aug. 24, 1988, p. 52.

[48]Lu Wen, loc. cit.

[49]"How the Rural Areas Can Free Themselves of Difficulties and Enhance Their Vitality," *Guangming ribao* (Beijing), Sept. 5, 1988.

[50]Duan Yingbi, loc. cit.

[51]Guo Xianwen et al., loc. cit.

[52]Hua Guiqin, "Putting Rural Contradictions in Proper Perspective," *Ban yue tan,* July 25, 1988, pp. 17–19, trans. in *FBIS-CHI,* Aug. 16, 1988, p. 39.

[53]Grain Problem Group, loc. cit. Dai Zhanyin states, "The contract purchase system has become obligatory, and the peasants resent it greatly. . . . (It) causes peasant-cadre relations to be tense." See "Some Problems in Raising the Economic Efficiency of Agriculture," *Lilun yuekan,* May 1988, pp. 35–39. See also Su Suining, "There Are Many Causes of Strained Relations Between Cadres and the Masses in Rural Areas," *Nongmin ribao,* Sept. 26, 1988, trans. in *FBIS-CHI,* Oct. 7, 1988, p. 12.

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Divergent Prescriptions

The obvious difficulties in China's agricultural sector have provoked intense debate and conflict among China's policy-makers and their advisors. The most obvious expression of such conflict came in September 1985 in the wake of the sharp decline in grain production, when senior economic policy-maker Chen Yun issued a sharp reminder to the Conference of Party Delegates about the importance of grain production. Criticizing the growth of rural industry at the expense of grain production, Chen told the conference that "some peasants are no longer interested in growing grain," because "in their opinion, there can be 'no prosperity without engaging in industry'." Chen warned that "grain shortages will lead to social disorder" and added ominously that "we cannot afford to underestimate this matter."[54]

A wide variety of opinions have been expressed regarding the causes of and remedies for the problems with grain production, but there appear to be three main currents of thought.[55] The first—and that most hostile to the Deng-era reforms—holds that the household responsibility system has exhausted its potential for expanding grain production and that some sort of re-collectivization is necessary. This view points to the unwillingness or inability of individual households to invest in grain production, to the parcelization of land under the current system, and to the neglect of the rural infrastructure as evidence that the state must take a firmer hand in the countryside.

Recently, a proposal for rural reform submitted to the Chinese leadership at the summer meetings at Beidaihe summarized the attitude of those who hold this view:

They believe that the scarcity of China's per capita agricultural natural resources and the backwardness of the agricultural mode of production are two basic reasons why it is difficult for a fundamental change to occur in a short period of time. Because of this, China will face the difficult economic problem of agricultural supplies being tight for a long time. Based on this perception, those holding this view believe that subjecting the relationship of supply and demand of agricultural produce to the market mechanism, at least for quite some time to come, is a facile plan not in accordance with China's national characteristics. The social turbulence [that such a change] would bring about definitely could not be compensated by the increased incomes of peasant.[56]

It is difficult to identify this view with specific individuals or institutions for the obvious reason that this approach negates the whole thrust of the Dengist rural reform, and hence cannot be openly pushed.[57] Nevertheless, there is indirect evidence that those holding such views continue to remain influential. As efforts were being made in the spring of 1987 to blunt the campaign against "bourgeois liberalization" and to launch a counterattack against "leftism," *Renmin ribao* and the agricultural paper *Nongmin ribao* lashed out at opponents of the household responsibility system. For example, a May 18th Commentator article in *Nongmin ribao* stated that "some comrades still have some wrong ideas," thinking that "the deepest root of bourgeois liberalization comes from the economic sphere" and that "the contract system based on households with payment linked to output destroys the basis of the collective economy."[58] Two weeks later, the same newspaper berated "some comrades" who still "think that the guideline of 'taking grain production as the key link in agriculture' [a slogan associated with the mass mobilization and communization of the Cultural Revolution period] is not wrong." In the view of such people, it continued, "the system of state monopoly purchases should not be changed, or at least not changed so quickly."[59] Shortly thereafter, the party daily weighed in, saying that "recently some people have reproached the rural reform." Such people, it said, maintain that the household responsibility system has "undermined the basis of the collective economy" and that "developing the commodity economy is a practice of capitalism."[60]

Apart from this view, which cannot be directly advo-

[54]Xinhua, Sept. 23, 1985, trans. in *FBIS-CHI*, Sept. 23, 1985, pp. K/13–16.

[55]For a recent survey of the different approaches to rural problems, see Lin Li, "Discussions on Deepening the Rural Economic Reform," *Jingji yanjiu*, June 1988, pp. 74–78, 16.

[56]Problem Group of the Development Research Institute of the Rural Development Center of the State Council, "Outline of Structural Reform of the Chinese Rural Economy in the Medium Term (1988–1995)," *Zhongguo gaige da silu* (Major Ways of Thinking About Chinese Reform), Shenyang, Shenyang chubanshe, 1988, pp. 242–43.

[57]However, some writers who apparently hold this view can be identified. See, for instance, Shi Bing, loc. cit.; Zhou Zhixiang, whose views are cited in two seminars sponsored by the editors of *Nongye jingji wenti* and appearing in the April and June 1988 issues of that journal; and Xie Qizhu, "Agriculture Calls for Centralization of Land Operation," *Guangming ribao*, May 28, 1988.

[58]Commentator article, "This 'Framework' Must Not Be Broken," *Nongmin ribao*, May 18, 1987, trans. in *FBIS-CHI*, June 5, 1987, pp. K/15–16.

[59]Commentator article, "It Is Also Necessary to Emancipate the Mind in Carrying Out Rural Reforms," ibid., June 2, 1987, trans. in *FBIS-CHI*, June 12, 1987, pp. K/22–23.

[60]Commentator article, "The Party's Rural Policies in Force Are Correct and Stable," *Renmin ribao*, June 5, 1987, trans. in *FBIS-CHI*, June 8, 1986, pp. K/11–14.

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cated in the press, there are two other views: these latter dominate public discussion. The first of these argues that the primary difficulties facing Chinese agriculture stem from China's "national conditions." As a heavily populated, land-poor nation, China must exert long-term efforts to promote the steady, but not spectacular, increase of grain production. The steady decline in investment and consequent damage done to the rural infrastructure make this a particularly difficult task. According to this view, the rapid growth in grain production in the early 1980's was caused by a one-time release of pent-up energy brought about by the breakup of the overly rigid commune system. Following this spurt of "supernormal" growth, grain production has settled back into a period of "normal" growth, characterized by slow but steady increases in output. There are no quick fixes; the glory days of the early 1980's are gone forever.[61]

One of the chief exponents of this view, Chen Xiwen of the Development Research Institute of the Rural Development Research Center under the State Council has argued that the primary factor behind the rapid growth of agricultural production in the early 1980's was the constantly increasing price paid for grain. Since this circumstance could not be sustained forever, state grain prices started dropping in 1984. Chen believes that the circumstances of economic development have changed and that people's thinking should change accordingly. They should not, he says, "unrealistically follow the illusion that a new document or some new policy can change the entire agricultural situation overnight." On the contrary, it is necessary to "consolidate and enlarge the results already achieved by rural econornic reform through realistic and even more meticulous work."[62]

In a like vein, Wu Xiang, deputy director of the State Council's Rural Development Research Center, has written that "with the implementation of the contract system in 1985, agricultural growth entered a period of normal, stable growth" but that "there was insufficient mental preparation for this." Because the second stage of rural reform is more complicated than the first, he argues, it will take a long time to resolve the inevitable contradictions between the old administrative system and the new market order.[63] In addition, Huang Daoxia of the CCP Rural Policy Research Center has maintained that for China, with its large population, "an ample supply of grain will be temporary, while shortages will continue for a long time to come. This is not caused by any mistake or reform. Instead, it is determined by our basic national conditions."[64]

A third school of thought believes that the slow development of grain production in recent years is due first and foremost to problems in policy implementation since 1985. Pointing to the economic disincentives of the contract purchase system, proponents of this view emphasize the importance of further reforms to reinvigorate the agricultural sector. Contrary to the somber view held by those who see slow increase in grain production as normal, these people are optimistic that the high growth rates of the early 1980's can be resumed.

For example, Gao Hongbin, Li Qingzeng, and Zhou Binbin of the agriculture ministry's Policy Research Office argue that the fluctuations in grain production in recent years were "avoidable." It would be more realistic, they say, to characterize the change in recent years as marking a turn from "normal growth to abnormal growth" rather than from "supernormal growth to normal growth." The crux of the problem in their view is that as the state reduced its investment in agriculture, it did not create sufficient incentives to encourage peasant investment to fill the gap. In particular, they argue, continuing uncertainty about the stability of rural policy not only discourages peasant investment, it encourages consumption.[65]

At the core of this debate are perceptions regarding the value of the dual-track system and the role of a market economy. Those who believe that grain production has entered a period of normal growth view the dual-track system as a long-term, necessary measure to guarantee adequate urban consumption and ensure social stability. Those who oppose this view see the coercive aspects of the contract procurement system as the very core of the problem and urge that the dual-track system be eliminated as quickly as possible so that China can move rapidly toward a genuine market system for the procurement and sale of grain.

In the first vein, Chen Xiwen says that the rapid development of rural reform in the early 1980's severely disrupted the old interest structure, particularly the administrative regulations and bureaucratic structures that regulated the relationship between urban and rural interests, but argues that "this contradiction cannot be

[61]Although this school of thought seems to be distinct from the first view described, one cannot rule out the possibility that some people who appear to be advocating it are in fact trying to promote more "leftist" proposals.

[62]Chen Xiwen, "China's Rural Economy . . . ," loc. cit.

[63]Wu Xiang, "Deepen Reform and Strengthen the New Structure of the Rural Economy," *Nongye jingji wenti*, January 1988, pp. 9–11.

[64]"Why Has Grain Production Continued to Fluctuate in Recent Years?" *Shijie jingji daobao* (Shanghai), Feb. 8, 1988, trans. in *FBIS-CHI*, Mar. 2, 1988, pp. 34–35.

[65]Economic Growth Study Group of the Policy Research Center under the Agriculture, Animal Husbandry, and Fishery Ministry, "Normal Growth [or] Stagnating Development," *Jingji yanjiu*, September 1987, pp. 48–55. Gao, Li, and Zhou are identified as the authors in an endnote. See also Zhou Binbin, et al., loc. cit.

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resolved all at once." For Chen, the maintenance of social stability requires the "change in interest relations to lag behind economic growth," that is to say, much of the old administrative structure—including presumably the system that procures grain from the peasants at artificially low prices—should stay in place as long as possible to ameliorate social conflicts arising from economic growth.[66]

Those who see policy errors as the primary cause of the current slowdown in grain production view the dual-track system not as a means of providing a smooth transition between a planned economy and a market economy—which is what it was originally intended to be—but rather as an obstacle preventing this transition. In particular, Gao Hongbin, Li Qingzeng, and Zhou Binbin argue that under the pressure of grain shortages, there has been a strong tendency for the dual-track system to retrogress into the previous monopoly procurement system, thereby undermining its original intent. The strengthening of administrative measures has bolstered the state's procurement and sales organizations at the expense of other sales channels, and has thereby "blocked the formation of the market mechanism."[67] Elsewhere, Zhou has argued that "in the future, we must completely deregulate procurement and marketing and take the road of making grain a commodity."[68]

Similarly, Gu Xiaoyu argues that the dual-track system has prevented the formation of a grain commodity market, caused resentment among peasants, and disrupted grain management. "If these problems are not promptly solved," he warns, "it is self-evident that we will easily head back to the old track of a unitary state monopoly of procurement and sales." Gu concludes that "only when grain is made a commodity in its true sense and its prices reflect on the whole its value and the relationship between supply and demand, can the peasants' enthusiasm for grain production be brought into the fullest play."[69]

Contradictory Policies

Given these sharply divergent assessments, it is not surprising that recent agricultural policy-making in China has been characterized by conflict, compromise, and uncertainty. The stern warning issued by Chen Yun in 1985 was the first clear manifestation of this conflict. In 1986, in response to the sharp decline in grain production the previous year, the party adopted cautious policies intended to stabilize the situation. In particular, as noted above, the party took administrative measures to expand the area of land sown to grain, to force peasants to fulfill their contracts, and to implement the "three linkages" policy. These steps brought a modest increase in grain production—though less than desired—but they clearly marked a retreat from the bold effort to abandon the monopoly procurement and sale system and from the direction charted in the Proposal for the Seventh Five-Year Plan, adopted at the 1985 Conference of Party Delegates.[70]

Although agricultural policy was explicitly excluded from the scope of the campaign against "bourgeois liberalization" in early 1987, there is, as noted above, strong evidence that the party's rural policies did come under attack at that time. The sudden eruption of political tension that quickly claimed Hu Yaobang as its chief victim also forced the party's first document of the new year—the so-called "Document No. 1," which had in recent years been devoted to agriculture—to be given over to Deng Xiaoping's December 30, 1986, address to the Politburo on the need to oppose "bourgeois liberalization." As a consequence, rural policy was belatedly communicated to the party in Document No. 5 in February. Moreover, contrary to the practice of recent years, the contents of this rural policy directive were never published. Sketchy media accounts of its contents suggest that it was a compromise document, affirming that the reforms already introduced would continue, but not endorsing any new initiatives. Thus, rural reforms were to be "enriched, consolidated, and improved." Suggesting that those who maintained that agricultural production had entered a period of "normal" growth held sway at the time, an article commenting on the directive stated that "it is now impossible to achieve such a development rate as in the past, because the rural areas have entered a new stage of sustained and coordinated development."[71]

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[66]Chen Xiwen, "China's Rural Economy . . . ," loc. cit.

[67]Grain Problem Group, loc. cit.

[68]Zhou Binbin, loc. cit.

[69]Gu Xiaoyu, "The Key to Solving the Grain Problem Lies in Relaxing Restrictions on Prices for Grain Purchases and Sales," *Jingjixue zhoubao*, Sept. 27, 1987, trans. in *FBIS-CHI*, Oct. 6, 1987, pp. 20–21.

[70]See "Proposal of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party for the Seventh Five-Year Plan for National Economic and Social Development," Xinhua, Sept. 25, 1985, in *FBIS-CHI*, Sept. 26, 1985, pp. K/1–30.

[71]Commentator article, *Liaowang*, Feb. 16, 1987, trans. in *FBIS-CHI*, Mar. 5, 1987, pp. K/35–37. An article in the agricultural daily, apparently keyed to the central document, reflected the precarious balancing of policy typical of that period of political tension. On the one hand, it declared "we must fully affirm and proclaim all the achievements of the rural reform;" on the other hand, it warned that "if we deviate from the socialist road, our reform will lose the correct political orientation." See Commentator article, "Upholding the Four Cardinal Principles Is the Fundamental Guarantee for Deepening the Rural Reform—First Talk on Deepening Rural Reform," *Nongmin ribao*, Feb. 18, 1987, trans. in *FBIS-CHI*, Feb. 25, 1987, pp. K/21–22. See also, Commentator article, "Reform Is the Self-Perfection of the Socialist System—Second Talk on Deepening Rural Reform," ibid., Feb. 21, 1987, trans. in *FBIS-CHI*, Mar. 5, 1987, pp. K/37–39.

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In practice, rural policy in 1987, as in 1986, emphasized increasing the area sown to grain, enforcing the contract procurement system, and implementing the "three linkages" policy. In addition, the procurement prices on some grains were increased somewhat, and the state contracted for 5 million tons less of grain, in an effort to provide some monetary relief for peasants (by permitting them to sell more grain on the open market at higher prices).[72]

The 1987 grain harvest was again disappointing. It missed the stated goal of 405 million tons by 3 million tons, causing the problems in the rural sector to become increasingly evident. The party, however, appeared less certain than ever about which way to turn. The annual rural work conference, traditionally held in November or December in order to have time to prepare "Document No. 1" for the following year and to transmit policy guidelines to the local level, was not held until January 1988. And when it was held, there were a number of anomalies. Typically, the main addresses to the rural work conference are published three to six weeks after delivery. After the January conference, however, no speeches were published in full, and only limited excerpts of Premier Li Peng's and agriculture minister He Kang's have appeared in print.[73] Also, although rural work conferences of the past have been routinely marked by an editorial in the party newspaper authoritatively laying out key policy directions, there was no such editorial in early 1988.

Reflecting the apparent inability of the top leadership to reach a consensus on the direction of rural reform, policy for 1988 was a continuation of the direction set in 1986 and 1987. Again, the contract procurement system and "three linkages" policy formed the backbone of China's rural policy. A State Council circular emphasized that the current dual-track policy in the procuring and marketing of grain should be continued for a long period, suggesting that the school of thought represented by such people as Chen Xiwen and Wu Xiang remained in the ascendancy.[74]

The continuity of policy since 1985 appears to reflect more compromise than consensus. As the debates outlined above show, rural policy remains highly contentious. Underscoring the failure of the January 1988 rural work conference to resolve differences within the party, it was reported in March that another rural work conference would be held "soon" to debate and decide on a "new policy decision" to accelerate agricultural development. According to the report, the leadership was prepared to adopt "radical" measures.[75] No such conference was held, however, and a reconsideration of policy had to await the annual conference in the autumn.

In the meantime, the summer witnessed intense debates in China over price reform and inflation. The debates culminated in ten days of meetings in September, first at the Central Work Conference and then at the 13th Central Committee's Third Plenum, which adopted a policy of economic retrenchment that called for "improving the economic environment and rectifying the economic order."[76] Although the rural work conference, which convened in November 1988, reaffirmed the critical importance of the rural sector (Vice Premier Tian Jiyun called agriculture "the biggest factor restricting the development of the national economy as a whole"), the meeting, reflecting the cautious economic line of the party sessions, placed primary emphasis on strengthening administrative controls in agriculture.[77]

In particular, it affirmed a mid-October decision of the State Council to monopolize the sales of chemical fertilizers, pesticides, and plastic sheeting in the National Agricultural Production Means Corporation under the Ministry of Commerce.[78] This decision, designed both to crack down on speculators and middlemen and to stabilize or lower the peasants' costs of production, seems likely to increase administrative intervention—and perhaps, corruption—in the rural production process without alleviating the problems of shortages and inefficient delivery of services that prompted the emergence of middlemen to begin with.

[72]See Jiang Shaogao, "Zhang Gengsheng Predicts New Policy for Improving the Grain Contract System Next Year," *Renmin ribao*, Nov. 30, 1986, trans. in *JPRS-CEA*, No. 87-004, Jan. 16, 1987. Rural policy was also elaborated upon in a number of articles in early 1987. See, for instance, Commentator article, "Reform Remains the Main Topic in Rural Work This Year," *Nongmin ribao*, Feb. 9, 1987, trans. in *FBIS-CHI*, Feb. 20, 1987, pp. 36–38; Liu Zhongyi and Li Li, loc. cit.; Commentator article, "Winning the People's Confidence," *Renmin ribao*, Mar. 3, 1987, trans. in *FBIS-CHI*, Mar. 11, 1987, p. K/32; and Commentator article, "Continue to Reform the System of Unified Purchase by State Quotas—Third Talk on Deepening Reform," *Nongmin ribao*, Feb. 24, 1987, trans. in *FBIS-CHI*, Mar. 6, 1987, p. K/25–27.

[73]On the rural work conference, see Xinhua, Jan. 18, 1988, trans. in *FBIS-CHI*, Jan. 19, 1988, pp. 13–15; Xinhua, Jan. 26, 1988, trans. in *FBIS-CHI*, Jan. 27, 1988, pp. 17–18; "The New Situation Confronting Agriculture," *Jingji ribao*, Feb. 1, 1988, trans. in *FBIS-CHI*, Feb. 24, 1988, pp. 18–20; and "Promote New Development of Agriculture, Achieve Steady Growth Through Increasing Vitality," *Renmin ribao*, Feb. 6, 1988, trans. in *FBIS-CHI*, Feb. 8, 1988, pp. 33–35.

[74]Report on the State Council's "Circular on Doing a Good Job in the Current Grain Work," Xinhua, Dec. 11, 1987, trans. in *FBIS-CHI*, Dec. 15, 1987, pp. 20–21.

[75]*Zhongguo xinwen she* (Beijing), Mar. 11, 1988, trans. in *FBIS-CHI*, Mar. 15, 1988, pp. 29–30. See also, *China Daily*, Jan. 22, 1988.

[76]Editorial, "Improve the Economic Environment to Deepen the Reforms," *Ta kung pao* (Hong Kong), Sept. 23, 1988, trans. in *FBIS-CHI*, Sept. 26, 1988, pp. 23–24; and "Communiqué on the 3rd Plenary Session of the 13th CCP Central Committee," Xinhua, Sept. 30, 1988, trans. in *FBIS-CHI*, Sept. 30, 1988, pp. 18–19.

[77]Tian's comments were reported by Xinhua, Nov. 2, 1988, trans. in *FBIS-CHI*, Nov. 4, 1988, pp. 22–24.

[78]Xinhua, Oct. 13, 1988, trans. in *FBIS-CHI*, Oct. 18, 1988, pp. 42–43.

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Although the leadership attempted to project an image of being both united and concerned about the state of agricultural production—the entire Politburo Standing Committee turned out for the opening of the rural work conference—it was apparent that the state is not prepared to initiate any significant new measures to alleviate rural problems. Even though agriculture minister He Kang, speaking to a concurrent meeting of the National People's Congress Standing Committee, described the situation as "grim" and declared that "the state must increase investment in agriculture and accelerate construction of the agricultural infrastructure so as to harness the peasants' enthusiasm,"[79] Tian Jiyun's keynote address to the rural work conference made clear that such investment would have to come from lower levels. State investment in agriculture must be increased in the future, Tian told the conference, "but now state finances are limited and to increase investment greatly all at once is not realistic." Accordingly, "the financial reserves of the localities should be used even more in agriculture."[80] Premier Li Peng was even blunter. He told the conference unequivocally that it would be "impossible for the state to increase agricultural investment in the next two years."[81]

If Tian was pessimistic about increasing state investment in agriculture, he was also discouraging about the prospects for allowing grain prices to be set by market forces. Closely following the logic of Chen Xiwen's arguments, Tian told the conference that "readjusting the rural production structure, perfecting the market mechanism, and developing the rural commodity economy are long-term tasks that need a process of incremental advancement; they cannot be completed in a short period of time." Perhaps most discouraging for the prospects of rural reform, Tian concluded by saying:

Under present circumstances, peasants should not have overly high expectations for increasing their income through increases in the prices of agricultural products. They should have regard for the whole situation and make contributions toward the state's efforts to control inflation.[82]

The state has promised to increase support for fertilizer production and to increase "appropriately" the contract price of grain,[83] but it is unlikely, given the financial constraints facing the state and the determination of the government to control inflation in the urban areas, that state financial support for agriculture will increase significantly in the short run. Thus, agricultural policy in 1989 will be a continuation of that adopted over the past three years—though perhaps it will entail yet stronger administrative measures. While strengthened administrative controls may produce modest increases in grain production, they seem unlikely either to promote the reform goals laid down for the agricultural sector or to produce a breakthrough in grain production that would alleviate the growing disparity between supply and demand. They also seem to run the risk of heightening tensions in the countryside.

Conclusion

The 1985 effort to implement the contract procurement system and thereby establish a market relationship between the state and the peasants and ultimately between urban and rural areas assaulted the entrenched administrative structure and the assumptions on which the old economic order were built in a way that the post-1978 household responsibility system never did. The old order was built on a structure that rigidly separated urban and rural areas and allowed for rapid accumulation of resources by the state. In rural areas, the production costs of agriculture were kept low in part by forbidding land sales, thereby effectively eliminating the cost of land in agricultural production. At the same time, labor mobility was prevented, depressing the cost of labor. The state was then able to buy agricultural produce at low prices and supply the urban work force with low-cost food, thereby maintaining a low wage structure. The commercial links between urban and rural areas were monopolized by the state, preventing the formation of markets outside state channels.[84] It was this structure that supported the unequal terms of trade between rural and urban areas—the so-called "scissors effect"—which extracted an estimated 600-800 billion yuan from the peasantry over a 30-year period.[85]

The introduction of the contract procurement system, the large-scale development of rural industry, and the freeing of nonstaple food items from price controls undermined this 30-year-old structure by opening new channels for the circulation and marketing of surplus

[79]Xinhua, Nov. 3, 1988, trans. in *FBIS-CHI*, Nov. 4, 1988, p. 24.

[80]Tian Jiyun, "It Is Necessary to Pay Full Heed to and Greatly Develop Agriculture," loc. cit.

[81]Xinhua, Nov. 7, 1988, trans. in *FBIS-CHI*, Nov. 9, 1988, pp. 41–43.

[82]Tian Jiyun, "It Is Necessary to Pay Full Heed to and Greatly Develop Agriculture," loc. cit.

[83]See "Decision of the Central Committee and State Council on Reaping a Bumper Harvest Next Year," *Renmin ribao*, Dec. 27, 1988.

[84]Comprehensive Problems Section, loc. cit.

[85]This was stated by Lin Yifu, deputy director of the Development Institute of the Agricultural Research Center under the State Council, in an interview with Wu Changsheng in *Renmin ribao*, June 29, 1988, trans. in *FBIS-CHI*, July 21, 1988, p. 55. The article Comprehensive Problems Section, loc. cit., states that peasants contributed "more than 600 billion yuan" to China's industrial modernization through the price scissors.

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grain and other agricultural products and by allowing opportunity costs to rise. But the failure to raise the price of grain to urban consumers meant that returns on grain production could not compete with those on cash crops or rural industry, so resources have flowed into the latter areas rather than into grain production.

The official response to this shift of resources away from grain production—namely, the use of administrative measures to ensure fulfillment of obligatory contracts and the enforcement of the dual-track system (rather than allowing open markets to expand)—sought to halt the process of commercialization in mid-stream. It was an effort to retain the benefits of the old system (i.e., ensuring urban grain supplies at low cost) while simultaneously reaping the benefits of the market forces that accrued in the first stage of the reform. The question is whether this is a viable approach, either economically or politically.

The current situation leaves China facing a series of dilemmas. As one article recently put it, China faces three difficulties: the need to keep urban residents reassured through stable prices, the need to stimulate peasant "enthusiasm" for grain production by raising procurement prices, and the need to reduce the state's deficit. Solving the first and second problems would mean a drastic increase in the state deficit. Resolving the first and third problems would mean keeping the prices of agricultural products low. And solving the second and third problems would mean that urban food prices would increase drastically.[86]

The policy alternatives outlined above suggest three very different approaches to these problems. "Leftists" would emphasize collectivization (perhaps under the guise of "cooperativization") to achieve economies of scale, to accumulate funds for investment, and perhaps to "guide" the peasants to invest their earnings in grain production. They might also seek to reduce the comparative advantage of cultivating cash crops and engaging in rural industry by paying the peasants less for cash crops and by limiting opportunities to engage in rural industry and commerce. Such people might argue that economies of scale and increased investment through collectivization would keep urban grain prices stable, relieve pressure on the state budget, and still bring about significant increases in grain output.

"Centrists" such as Chen Xiwen and Wu Xiang ap-

[86]Wu Changsheng interviewing Lin Yifu, loc. cit., p. 54.

A farmer sells pig heads at a Chengdu market in 1987.

—Mark O'Neill from Reuters/Bettmann Newsphotos.

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parently would like to preserve the status quo, emphasizing the dual-track system, the contract procurement system, and the "three linkages." They would argue that only by maintaining the dual-track system can urban prices be kept stable and deficits low. Emphasizing the "transitional" nature of the dual-track system, they suggest that by gradually reducing the amount of contracted purchases and by ensuring that free markets are really free, the state can gradually increase incentives to rural producers.

Radical reformers like Gao Hongbin, Li Qingzeng, and Zhou Binbin argue that the pressures on the system are such that failure to move rapidly toward a market system will, by default if not by design, lead China on the road back to the old system, undermining future reform and preventing rapid agricultural development. They believe that only by rapidly expanding market-oriented policies in the countryside can grain production sufficient to meet the growing demand be ensured. Prices paid by the urban consumer will have to increase, but such prices will ultimately be stabilized as grain production increases. If true market policies are implemented, they believe, then state subsidies will not increase.

This debate, as the alternatives suggest, is not over incremental policy changes but rather over the fundamental orientation of China's long-term development strategy. Moreover, China appears to be reaching a point of no return, where further temporizing will firmly reinstitute the very structures that the state tried so hard to break out of in 1985. A decision to further temporize is likely to undermine many of the successes of the first stage of rural reform, not to mention achievement of the long-term goal of creating a "commodity economy."

Retirement of some conservatives at the 13th CCP Congress in November 1987 and the adoption by the Congress of the thesis that China is currently in the "initial stage of socialism" apparently strengthened the hand of reformers.[87] However, today, they face a much more difficult task in convincing different interests to support an extensive, market-oriented reform of the grain procurement and sale system than they did four years ago when they moved to abolish the monopoly procurement and sale system. At that time, inflation was low, and there was a surplus of grain, so there was little immediate risk of serious economic or political fallout. Moreover, urban interests, which had been biding their time as the state gave priority to the rural sector, were pressing the state to shift resources in their direction. At the same time, fiscal conservatives were looking for a way to relieve pressure on the state treasury.

The simultaneous implementation of the contract procurement system and the "inverse 7:3" procurement price appealed to those who wanted to institute market-oriented reforms in the countryside and to those who wanted to reduce state subsidies to agriculture so that scarce financial resources could be redirected to urban areas. The abolition of the monopoly procurement system was a bold, even radical step, and the decision to implement it required a coalition of interests.

Today, the situation is very different. Inflation is high, grain consumption is outrunning production, and the demands on the state treasury are undiminished. To reduce radically the dual-track system either through significantly raising the procurement price of grain or instituting market forces would run the risk of sending urban food costs soaring, further fueling inflation and possibly provoking workers into a Polish-style resistance. Moreover, any attempt to offset such price increases with subsidies would place a heavy burden on the state treasury. It is precisely such pressures that provoked the Central Committee to adopt a policy of economic retrenchment at its plenum in September 1988. Thus, whereas four years ago both urban and rural interests could be brought together to support reform of the procurement system, today both urban interests and fiscal conservatives seem much more likely to resist extensive further reform of the procurement and marketing system. If this is the case, and the most recent rural work conference suggests that it is, then it may well be a long time before China's agricultural crisis is resolved.

[87] Joseph Fewsmith, "China's 13th Party Congress: Explicating the Theoretical Bases of Reform," *Journal of Northeast Asian Studies* (Washington, DC), Summer 1988, pp. 41–64.

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[1]Reviewers' names appear in parentheses.

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CORRECTIONS

Footnotes 84-87 on pages 16 and 17 of Thomas Sherlock's article "Politics and History under Gorbachev" (*Problems of Communism*, May-August 1988) were inadvertently scrambled. The proper numbering and sequence of these are as follows:

[84]*Pravyy uklon v VKP(b) i yego razgrom* (The Right Deviation in the RKP(b) and Its Defeat), 2nd ed., Moscow, Politizdat, 1977.

[85]Genrikh Volkov in *Sovetskaya Kul'tura*, July 4, 1987, trans. in *FBIS-SOV*, 1987, p. R/15. For the conservatives' opposition to the use of new documentary evidence to reassess the past, see the letter of four party historians in *Moscow News*, No. 19, May 10, 1987. An extended treatment of this letter and of Yuriy Afanas'yev's response may be found in Wheatcroft, loc. cit.

[86]*Sovetskaya Kul'tura*, Mar. 21, 1987, trans. in *CDSP*, Apr. 22, 1987; and Afanas'yev in *Nauka i Zhizn'*, No. 9, 1987, p. 59.

[87]*Sovetskaya Kul'tura*, Mar. 21, 1987, trans. in *CDSP*, Apr. 22, 1987, p. 4. For more on Trapeznikov, see historian Petr Rodionov in ibid., June 14, 1988; also, the numerous references in Nekrich, *Otreshis' ot strakha;* and Andrey Sakharov, *Progress, Coexistence, and Intellectual Freedom*, New York, Norton, 1968, pp. 56–67.

* * *

Our apologies to Joan Barth Urban ("Gorbachev and World Communism: Collapse or *Perestroyka?*" *Problems of Communism*, September-October 1988) for misidentifying her. She is Professor of Politics at Catholic University of America (Washington, DC).

* * *

Volume 16 of the *Litopys Ukrains'koyi Povstans'koyi Armiyi*, reviewed by Luba Fajfer in the September-October 1988 issue, should have had the subtitle "Underground Journals from Ukraine West of the Curzon Line."

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